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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW: AN ARID REGION DEPENDENT ON IMPORTED WATER
This report surveys the water sources
available to a study area that includes
Arizona and Southern California and the
legal rights of water users in the two states.
It assesses the security of those sources and
how the various interests served by them will
be affected during prolonged water shortages.
In the West, elaborate laws and
government policies decide who gets water
when supplies are in short supply. Nowhere
else are water laws, policies and institutions
more complex and firmly set than they are in
the Southwest. Nowhere else in the country
are so many people concentrated in such a
naturally dry area. Millions of people have
flocked to an area haunted by the specter of
drought. Their security depends on accurate
decisions being made about water to protect
them from the destructive effects of a severe,
sustained dry spell. The area has fortuitously
been spared a truly severe drought during its
period of greatest growth. It has the
advantage of elaborate water conveyance
facilities, and it is favored by laws that
allocate water to it that originated in a much
larger area.
The area includes some of the most
arid territory in the world. Average rainfall
ranges from 3 inches to 20 inches a year/
Usable water that reaches the Colorado
River, a mainstay of the area's water supply,
averages only about 1 inch a year spread over
a vast watershed that drains parts of seven
states. Snowpack in the surrounding
mountains provides reliable but limited local
sources of water. Most of the snowmelt
flows into sandy-bottomed streams and alluvial
valleys where it recharges shallow aquifers.
The water can be recovered with relative ease
but excessive pumping causes serious
problems. Cyclical droughts are a fact of life
in the area.
Considering only the water supplied
by streams and aquifers in the area, one
would expect a relatively small population,
engaged in activities that demand little water.
But the natural limits of aridity have not
determined the area's course because vast
quantities of water have been imported from
outside the region and pumped from great
groundwater reserves.
Rapid and unrelenting growth has
continued through most of the twentieth
century. Although the area is approaching
the limits of its water supply, as demonstrated
by its incipient vulnerability to drought, and
significant new water sources are not on the
horizon, growth conceivably can persist. This
is possible through a combination of enforcing
rights against water exporting regions,
reallocation and tighter management of
present supplies, and sacrifice of aesthetics,
lifestyles and environmental values of water
use. Securing water for future urban growth
in these ways does require increasingly
difficult tradeoffs and costs - reduced
agricultural production, environmental
degradation, curtailment of lifestyle amenities
like green lawns, and possible political
conflicts with water exporting regions whose
water use must be limited.
A Heavy Dependence on Water
Despite the scarcity of its indigenous
natural water supplies, the study area is
populated by over 19 million people, about
five-sixths of them in Southern California; the
area includes the fastest growing cities in the
nation.2 The expansion of human population
in the area has accompanied intense
economic activity. Much of the activity is
water-dependent, including massive production
of agricultural goods requiring heavy
irrigation. In half a century of almost
uninterrupted prosperity and growth there
have been few concessions to the area's
aridity.
The most obvious natural fact about
the region, its dryness, has had little impact
on the livelihoods or lifestyles of the people
settling there. Indeed, the area abounds with
outward manifestations of denial of its aridity.
Green lawns and exotic plantings imported
from humid climes are the hallmarks of
suburban living. Golf courses have
proliferated. Fountains and artificial lakes
grace residential developments, places of
business and government buildings. The area
has not attempted to find alternate, less
water-intensive ways to satisfy its economic
goals, its aesthetic needs, recreational
demands, environmental concerns and other
objectives.
The government agencies and special
districts charged with providing the area with
adequate water historically succeeded in
keeping supply ahead of demand. Until the
last decade they insulated consumers from
pressure to restrict usage. And there has
always been sufficient water available to
accommodate population growth in the
region. Engineering ingenuity supported by
public investment has created facilities to
move water long distances and to store
enough to smooth out annual fluctuations in
precipitation. Political action and interstate
accords have secured rights to use definite
quantities of water in Southern California and
Arizona vis a vis other states and Northern
California.
The region has not yet confronted the
limits of its ability to grow. It is, however,
struggling to cope with the economic, social
and environmental symptoms of rapidly
expanding population. The area managed to
keep water supplies ahead of growing demand
by importing new water and exceeding safe
groundwater pumping levels locally. Recently,
however, governments and water suppliers in
Arizona and Southern California have
recognized that encouraging consumers to
reduce water demand can relieve some of the
pressure to develop new supplies which are
increasingly difficult and costly to find.
Cyclical droughts have occasionally
broken the illusion of security, reminding
water consumers that some uses are more
important than others. Legal principles for
allocation of water are frequently invoked to
determine which combination of streams,
aquifers and reservoirs will provide water in
a particular year. But ordinarily there is no
apparent difference felt by consumers from
one year to the next. Only in extraordinary
episodes, such as the Southern California dry
spell of 1988-1990, have supplies been so low
that a few local curtailments in use have been
necessary. Yet these droughts have been less
severe, shorter and less widespread than the
droughts revealed in tree ring studies that
reveal historical precipitation patterns.
The moderately severe, multi-year dry
spells the area has experienced in the post
war years, since demand has so dramatically
increased, have caused localized minor
intrusions on lifestyle — brown lawns,
reduction in car washing, attention to leaky
plumbing. These episodes have aroused
considerable citizen concern in recent years.
In Southern California the effects have been
confined to a few communities but, because
of the publicity, for the first time in seventy
years water is being perceived as a potential
restraint on the quality of life and on ability
to expand. In Arizona, precautionary legal
reductions in per capita use in urban areas
and controversy over retirement of
agricultural uses to provide more water for
urban growth have raised Arizonans'
consciousness of the finite nature of water in
the desert and its linkages to population
growth and lifestyle.
The public is beginning to comprehend
that every water use must be traded off
against every other use and that, as a growing
number of people must share a limited supply
of water, the necessity for tradeoffs is ever
greater. Droughts force those tradeoffs,
simulating stresses that will be felt with
increasing frequency as growth in demand
outstrips supply. And ultimately it is drought
that defines the limits of the present system,
calling for reallocation among existing users,
assertion and restructuring of rights to water
from other areas and importation of more
water from new sources.
Development of Imported Water
In both the Los Angeles area and in
Arizona alluvial groundwater was a rich,
vitally important resource that enabled oases
to sprout in a desert environment. Early in
their history, however, it became apparent in
both areas that local water supplies would be
inadequate to support extensive growth. The
limits of groundwater pumping were realized
as overdrafts caused saltwater intrusion along
the coastal plain, and eventually land
subsidence collapsed aquifers and caused
property damage in Arizona. Both areas
experienced escalating pumping costs.
Huge quantities of water are now
imported from distant sources entirely outside
the watersheds of the area served to augment
locally available groundwater supplies. This
enables millions of people, along with their
water-intensive economies and culture, to
survive in the deserts that comprise the study
area.
The Colorado River, a river to which
the area itself contributes only a small
amount of runoff, is the mainstay of present
and future supplies. The river originates in
the Rocky Mountains a thousand miles from
the study area. It drains the snowmelt of the
Rockies in Colorado and Wyoming, and part
of northern New Mexico, then flows generally
through Utah and south to form the
boundary between Arizona on the east and
California and Nevada on the west
The states along the river early
perceived its importance as a source of water
for future growth, and entered into legal
negotiations to apportion rights to the water.
Throughout the century they have pressed for
federal expenditures to help harness and
distribute the water to bolster the region's
economic expansion. The Colorado River
was first tapped for use in the study area
around the turn of the century to irrigate rich
desert soils deposited by the river millennia
earlier. In 1901 irrigators in Imperial Valley
dug a canal from the riverbanks some 50
miles through Mexico to their farms. From
that time until recently, California has been
the primary consumer of the river's water.
The lucrative farming enterprises of the
Imperial Valley and Coachella Valley would
not exist today without elaborate canal
systems to move water from the Colorado.
In addition, municipal demands
created a heavy and growing dependence on
the Colorado. Southern California cities from
Ventura to San Diego, including Los Angeles,
Orange County and their sprawling suburban
communities, have relied heavily on imported
Colorado River water. Indeed, they have
been able to rely on a larger share of this
water than is legally allocated to them
because Arizona has lacked facilities to put
its full share to use. The California cities
now facing curtailment of their use of surplus
water because Arizona is beginning to use it.
Farmers near the. river used water
from it from the early days of the Arizona
Territory, but Arizona's major municipal uses
of Colorado River water only started in the
past few years. Yet the state has "depended"
on fulfillment of its legal right of access to
water for municipal expansion for decades.
The state's growth exceeded the natural limits
of its water and dangerously drew down its
groundwater in the expectation that spent
aquifers could be replaced and perhaps
replenished with imported river water. The
nearly completed Central Arizona Project will
enable realization of Arizona's legal
entitlements; river water is now delivered to
Phoenix and soon will be available to the
Tucson area.
Arizona and Southern California each
have engineered systems to develop water
from sources other than the Colorado
mainstream. One of the first federal
experiments in "reclaiming" arid lands was the
Bureau of Reclamation's Salt River Project.
It began as a way of taming and conserving
erratic flood waters to serve farmers of
Arizona's Salt River Valley. It still serves
farmers but is also the main source of surface
water for the Phoenix metropolitan area.
The City of Los Angeles began its
own projects to import water from watersheds
to its immediate north shortly after the turn
of the century. The scheme to bring water
from Owens Valley to slake the city's
anticipated needs is now legendary. Streams
feeding Mono Lake were also tapped. For
years, the Los Angeles Aqueduct from Owens
Valley and Mono Lake has been a vital
source for Los Angeles. Southern California
turned also to more distant sources of water
from Northern California. The State Water
Project was built with billions of federal and
state dollars partially repayable over time by
the users. The project now collects and
distributes enormous quantities of water from
water-rich northern rivers. Southern
California municipal interests have greater
contractual rights to these project waters than
any of the agricultural contractors in the
Central Valley.
For the present, further development
of imported water for the region appears
financially, politically or physically impractical.
Extravagant schemes to develop water from
river basins as far away as the Yukon and the
Missouri Rivers were seriously discussed in
the 1960s and conceivably could be revived.
They are likely to encounter great opposition
on the grounds that they would be too costly,
would deprive the areas of origin of a vital
resource and would cause considerable
environmental disruption. Desalination of
ocean water, cloud seeding and towing
icebergs have been discussed. All face
technological barriers and huge costs.
Although several small structural projects that
hold promise for improving the system's
capacity and reliability have been proposed,
only a few are feasible. This report therefore
assumes that development of major new
sources of water is not presently a realistic
option. If new sources were pursued, they
would not be able to produce substantial
quantities of water for decades. Thus the
question for present generations is how to
plan for and survive major droughts with
current supplies.
The Legal Matrix
The laws allocating and controlling
the water sources used by the study area
create a complex and interactive web that
must be understood in order to determine
who is entitled to water in a severe, sustained
drought. All sources of water available to the
study area are subject to legal restrictions on
when, where and for what purposes they may
be used. Present laws also influence the
reallocation of existing water rights.
Because of heavy federal involvement
and investment in development of water for
the study area, federal law is important in
determining who has rights to water in a
drought For instance, the Colorado River,
which is the preeminent source of renewable
water supply for users in the study area, is
allocated by an essentially federal body of
law. The "law of the river" is a unique
aggregation of interstate compacts, Supreme
Court decisions, federal laws and contracts
that defining who is entitled to use specific
quantities of water from the river and how
federal facilities (controlling virtually all water
in the river) will be operated.
The amounts and circumstances under
which water can be delivered to parties who
are beneficiaries of the Salt River Project, the
California State Water Project and other
water development projects are determined
largely by contractual agreements. The
contracts follow federal or state statutes and
regulations depending on the project.
State water laws control how water
may be allocated and used within each state.
Locally developed sources, including
groundwater, are subject to these laws. The
same is true of water from interstate rivers
once it is apportioned to a state. Arizona
has a comprehensive law controlling
groundwater pumping and future use which
will increase the state's reliance for growth on
imported water.
More than ever before, environmental
laws affect the quantity of water available to
the region. Concerns with destruction of fish
habitat and other uses limit the quantities of
California State Water Project water that can
pass through the delta of the Sacramento and
San Joaquin Rivers at San Francisco Bay.
The public trust doctrine has been invoked to
curb expansion of Los Angeles's use of water
that causes harm to bird habitat. Owens
Valley residents have sued to curtail exports
of groundwater to Los Angeles because it
affects ecological values. Increased salinity in
the Colorado River may be the factor most
likely to limit future use of water from that
source. And groundwater pumping is causing
salt water intrusion and contaminant plumes
to threaten the quality of drinking water
supplies.
Inevitable Drought
This report assumes that a severe,
sustained drought in the region is inevitable.
Cycles of droughts, including major events
lasting several years, are shown by historical
data and by information scientifically
reconstructed from prehistory.
The field of dendroclimatology has
produced estimates of flows for rivers on
which the study area depends. Data from
studies of tree rings furnish information about
climate in the western United States going
back hundreds of years. Scientists have
calibrated and verified their reconstructions of
precipitation data based on nearly a century
of actually recorded flows. Reconstructions
of data show that droughts - dry years and
series of dry years - have been far more
frequent and severe over the last 400 years
than is indicated by the experience of the last
few decades (Stockton, Meko & Boggess,
1989). It has been during the latter period
that the region's population and economy
have grown to rely on nearly all the water
that is available to it in a "normal" year. It is
reasonable to anticipate more serious drought
events in the future than the area has
experienced in the recent past. With present
sources approaching full utilization, water
supply systems will experience more stress
than ever before.
In addition to evidence portending
harsher and longer droughts for the region
than have been experienced in the last thirty
years, conditions of aridity may become worse
than they were in the past. Most scientists
now agree that the climate is changing and
portions of the earth, including the study area
and the areas where its waters originate, are
becoming drier. This is almost entirely the
consequence of human-induced polluting
activities that have increased the layer of
carbon dioxide and other gases confining the
earth's atmosphere, trapping heat from the
sun that would otherwise dissipate. It
appears that this is both warming the land
and air and changing patterns of precipitation.
One study indicated that the annual flow of
the Colorado River could be reduced by
almost 40% with a 2°C temperature increase
and 10% change in precipitation (Revelle &
Waggoner, 1983). The exact effects of global
climate change on performance of water
supply systems of the study area are
unknown. However, the prospect of global
warming and all credible evidence about the
phenomenon heighten the need to consider
the consequences of a shortage on the
system's performance.
The aim of this report is to identify,
based on existing legal and institutional
arrangements, the most drought-vulnerable
aspects of the present system and the
sequence in which stresses will be felt. This
analysis should be useful in any attempt to
model system performance with greater
particularity based on drought experiences
drawn from recorded events, from data
reconstructed from tree ring studies, or from
hypothetical droughts."*
Prospective weaknesses in the water
supply system are revealed in water-short
years. Therefore, it is instructive to model
the system's performance against hypothetical
severe, sustained drought events to determine
where and to what degree problems will be
felt under various scenarios of shortfall.
Although the severest and longest droughts
historically have been infrequent, they
nevertheless are realistic bases for
hypothetical events. Because demand in the
study area is likely to continue to increase
somewhat, even if immediate efforts are made
to contain it, the types and magnitudes of
effects caused by extreme droughts assuming
present demand, may become more probable.
That is, less severe droughts provoke more
serious effects if demand increases and supply
remains constant.
A Drought Resistant System?
This report concludes that, under the
existing legal and institutional regime, most of
the consumptive water uses in the study area
(agricultural, municipal and industrial) can be
maintained even during a severe, sustained
drought. As groundwater supplies diminish,
Southern California initially faces restrictions
on some agricultural users and modest
constraints on municipal deliveries, affecting
principally outdoor uses. There will be more
severe localized shortages (e.g., Ventura
County, San Diego County) caused by limited
storage facilities and groundwater in parts of
the system. Some areas outside the MWD
service area, notably Santa Barbara, lack the
imported water to satisfy the demand of their
population.
Reductions in State Water Project
deliveries will occur after Central Valley users
have been cut back for a period of perhaps
several years, causing valley farmers to pump
more groundwater. But Southern California's
basic Colorado River supplies (not including
the excess deliveries which have been made
in recent years) would remain reliable even if
the ten-year period yielding the lowest
average flows shown in the data were
repeated.4 This is because the state secured
firm legal entitlements to most of the water
it diverts from the Colorado many years ago.
Central Arizona would suffer some potential
reductions in agricultural uses of Colorado
River water after many years of drought, but
the prospects of municipal cutbacks are
remote. Limited foreseeable shortages in
Colorado River supplies can be replaced by
increased groundwater pumping in Arizona,
although there may be problems allowing
such increases under the existing groundwater
law.
The area's remarkable "drought
cushion" is the result of having secured the
best legal rights to use a vast reservoir
storage system and copious imported supplies
drawing from the Colorado River and from
Northern and Central California rivers. The
plumbing system serving the study area
spreads the risk of drought over a great
expanse of time and space by collecting water
from far beyond the area's bounds and storing
many years' natural water production for
future use. The legal arrangements that
allocate rights to that system concentrate the
remaining risk of shortages on some
agricultural users in the area, but more
heavily on the areas where most of the water
originates -- Northern California and the
upper basin of the Colorado River. In
addition, the legal security of some sources,
particularly the Colorado River, comes partly
at the expense of environmental values.
Though the water supply for the study
area is reasonably secure for present
demands, that security may be short-lived.
Ongoing expansion of the population and
economy of the area will put new pressures
on the system and eventually exceed its
capacity. It is impossible to predict when that
point will be reached. For a while growth
can be sustained by using existing supplies
more efficiently. Supply systems are being
improved and extended, new water
management techniques are being adopted
and existing rights are being reallocated.
Considerable savings of water may be possible
with minimal impacts on lifestyle (leak
reduction, curtailing over-irrigation of lawns
and exotic plantings, agricultural efficiency
improvements, retrofitting buildings with
water-saving plumbing devices). But if growth
continues, these savings will be consumed and
further demand reduction will require
alterations in lifestyle. The area must
eventually turn to reallocation of existing
rights, mostly rights now held by agricultural
users. Choices among urban lifestyle,
agricultural cutbacks and growth control are
bound to be controversial. Unless those
choices are consciously made, however, the
system will become more sensitive to cyclical
drought events, and droughts of longer
duration or severity will cause greater
dislocations.
It may not be immediately apparent
that the system is becoming more vulnerable
to drought and therefore hard political
choices may be postponed. Built-in
protections against long-term drought can be
used up to meet periodic shortages.
Although water managers know better,
politicians, developers and consumers could
go many years without facing the reality that
a water shortage exists. The system may
become more vulnerable to droughts, but
minor and short-term fluctuations can be
masked by drawing more heavily and more
frequently on water in reservoir or aquifer
storage. If basic demand is expanding there
will be less water available to replenish these
reserves when natural supplies are above
normal and it will become increasingly
necessary to tap into storage.
The cushion against severe, sustained
drought thus gradually disappears and the
potential effects to be suffered in a severe,
sustained drought grow more serious and
widespread. The risk of harm from drought
can increase virtually unnoticed for several
years. Eventually, however the greater
exposure to risk will be perceived when water
users are limited because water supplies are
inadequate to meet unconstrained demands.
The choice to run a greater risk of drought
can be a rational one, but it requires
preparation and planning. Restrictions on
use are acceptable if they are planned to
cause a minimum of surprise and dislocations.
Concern for interregional equity and
environmental integrity create additional
pressure for attention to the prospect of
drought in the study area. The law allows
the effects of water shortages to be deflected
causing inequities outside the region and
environmental harm both inside and outside
the region. Though the upper Colorado
River basin states are the source of most
water in the river, in a severe drought they
could be limited to using only the amount of
water that was in use in the 1920s. Cities
like Denver and Salt Lake City face
termination of basic supplies, as do ski areas
and agricultural users in the upper basin, long
before agricultural, municipal and industrial
users in the lower basin are legally required
to make any significant cutbacks in water use.
Rangeland and forests will suffer unavoidable
damage as a consequence of reduced rainfall
and runoff. These impacts will be
compounded as users must rely on dwindling
streams, lakes and groundwater in a desperate
attempt to satisfy their historic consumptive
uses.
There will surely be ecological damage
and lifestyle changes for the residents of
Southern California and Arizona who now
benefit from and were drawn to the area
partly by the area's fish, wildlife, boating,
camping and skiing and other recreational
opportunities. The damage imposed on such
natural resources during any dry period will
be exacerbated by heavier diversions depleting
streamflows and diminishing wetland areas.
These environmental effects will spread into
the Rockies and, to a lesser extent (because
of institutionalized environmental controls), to
Central and Northern California.
Political pressure for nonenforcement
or renegotiation of the rights of municipalities
and agricultural interests in the study area
will mount if their full enforcement results in
serious environmental damage and inequities
to other regions. It is beyond the scope of
this report to analyze the extent of such
damages. To the extent the beneficiaries of
those rights can anticipate and ameliorate
such concerns, however, they may avoid the
prospect of political or judicial alteration of
their present legal entitlements.
Water supply agencies and
governments in the study area have
performed well in moving water to the water-
scarce region. They have obtained impressive
legal protection for rights to import water
from afar, even to the detriment of areas
where water originates. Water users in
Arizona and California consequently are
beneficiaries of elegant engineering and legal
schemes. But the system stands to lose its
resilience as options for expanding supply are
exhausted and demand is allowed to increase.
The impacts of severe, sustained drought will
be felt with increasing seriousness as growth
burgeons in the study area unless demand is
curbed or supplies are reallocated among
existing users. The limits of supply systems,
as revealed by their performance in drought
will eventually intrude on the lifestyle and
economy of the study area and will cause
environmental, social and economic effects
throughout the seven Colorado River basin
states.
Action for Future Drought Protection
Governments and water suppliers in
the study area have many options for
addressing water supply and demand in order
to forestall the effects of drought. Supply-
oriented options include expanding sources
of supply, managing supplies better, and
reallocating supplies. Demand can be
managed by limiting per capita use, using
conservation measures, restricting population
growth and finding less water-dependent
means of achieving economic, environmental
and other objectives. Drought vulnerability
can be improved by incorporating all these
options within the legal and institutional
8
framework. Some measures may require
alterations in the present framework.
Ultimately, solutions to the problems
of water supply and drought require broad
public discussion and high level policy
decisions. It is inappropriate to expect water
supply agencies alone to solve them. Issues
.like whether to phase out a portion of the
region's agricultural industry, whether to place
basic limits on water use that affect lifestyle,
whether and how to control population
growth and how much risk of unmet demand
is tolerable are policy issues of fundamental
importance. On the other hand, decisions
not to improve supply or control demand are
inherently decisions to increase the risk of
drought effects.
Specific Recommendations
This report recommends the following
measures that are discussed in Chapter 6:
Water Supply Management:
Improved Drought Planning
Governments in the area must design
comprehensive new planning processes that
identify alternatives for meeting society's
many objectives that depend on water use.
Comprehensive water planning
includes setting levels of acceptable
risks of shortage and commensurate
limits on both per capita use and on
the number of consumers who can be
served.
Water suppliers and
management experts should use
comprehensive modeling
exercises to determine the
system's vulnerability to
drought.
Drought planning should consider the
types and intensity of damage to
natural systems that will occur at
various levels of reduced supply.
Groundwater Management
The ability of the study area to
cushion the impacts of drought depends on
the amounts of water that are in aquifer
storage.
Storage of groundwater should be a
high priority use for any water in excess of
essential water demands.
Optimizing Colorado River Reservoir
Management
Depletion of Colorado River reservoir
storage in a drought triggers a chain
reaction of negative impacts and
should be minimized.
Plans should be devised to shift uses
to other sources of water as Colorado
River reservoirs are drawn down.
Coordination among Colorado River
Basin States
A Colorado River basinwide
organization should be formed to
make plans and decisions concerning
drought and other common interests
of the basin states.
Reallocation of Supplies:
Transfers and Marketing
Firm water supplies that may be vital
to surviving a drought can be assured through
economically beneficial contractual
arrangements.
Water salvage and reuse
schemes can be pursued.
Exchange agreements can allow
more flexible use of existing
water resources.
Agreements for use of
agricultural water can increase




Agreements with upper basin
states could make present
Colorado River supplies more
reliable.
Urban water users can negotiate
agreements with Indian tribes who
have presently unused rights to ensure
that water subject to Indian rights
continues to be available to the cities.
Water Demand Management:
Demand Limitations
Reduced demand, like a source
of supply, can furnish drought
protection.
Land use controls can be
employed to curb growth in
Southern California and
Arizona.
Water conservation is a high
priority for water suppliers and
governments at all levels.
State and federal governments
can adopt agricultural water
efficiency programs.
Major use restrictions, especially on outdoor
urban water use, prolong supplies and delay
the negative effects of drought.
Water pricing is the most effective means of.
reducing urban demand.
Flexible Use of Existing Institutions
Water suppliers in the project area
must use the laws and institutions that secure
their water supplies flexibly in order to cope
with the inevitability of major droughts.
Water laws and policies are now changing
throughout the West to require better
management of water, and water suppliers are
responding by using innovative approaches.
For instance, several water marketing
programs are in the works to reallocate
Colorado River water within California,
including the widely-discussed Metropolitan
Water District-Imperial Irrigation District
deal. Creative ideas for storing excess
supplies in distant groundwater basins are also
being pursued. Those devices can give
greater drought protection to urban uses
where the growth in demand is the greatest.
Millions of acre-feet of water are now
allocated to agricultural irrigators in
California's Central Valley and Imperial
Valley and in western and central Arizona.
A relatively small portion of this water could
sustain substantial additional urban growth if
that is the goal of the two states.
Reallocation from several Indian tribes with
rights to substantial quantities of water could
also feed urban demand if appropriate
arrangements were made to compensate
them. Negotiations could also lead to a
reallocation of water apportioned to the
upper Colorado River basin states that is not
now consumed by them or that is utilized for
low-valued economic purposes, generally
agriculture.
Major reallocations raise major questions of
equity, environmental concern and social
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policy. Decisions to shift large amounts of
water from agriculture into urban uses, even
if they represent only a small percent of the
total quantity of water committed to
irrigation, may have impacts on the area
where the water originates that go far beyond
the farmers who sell it. Communities, local
governments and economies can be affected.
Indian tribes can decide whether or not to
convey the right to use water away from their
reservations, but must consider the lost
opportunities for use of the same water and
the effect on their culture and economy and
on future generations. There are, of course,
serious potential environmental consequences
as water is transferred out of an area for use
elsewhere.
Many of the same policy issues raised
by reallocations must be considered in
enforcing existing rights. Users in the study
area now have rights to take water in times
of shortage to the disadvantage agricultural
users in California's Central Valley and, in an
extended drought, users in the upper basin
states. Environmental harm also becomes
more likely throughout the system in years
when consumptive demands exceed the
quantities of water that are naturally
available.
Water suppliers in the project area
have often performed during droughts in ways
that do not perpetuate inequities. Instead of
insisting on their full legal rights regardless of
the harshness of the consequences, they have
allowed temporary reallocations to prevent
socially unacceptable effects for parties
disadvantaged under the law. For example, in
the 1978-79 drought, the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California had sufficient
Colorado River water available and so it
agreed not to enforce strictly its rights to
State Water Project water, thus allowing
farmers in the San Joaquin Valley to sustain
their uses of project water. Moreover, in
1990 MWD agreed to sell water outside its
service area to relieve the distress of water-
short Santa Barbara. It is not clear whether
such charity would survive in a deeper or
longer drought or if alternative sources were
not available to MWD.
Planning to improve the system's
drought performance is needed long before
the onset of drought. Arrangements for
coping with a serious drought are best
considered outside a crisis milieu. The
affected parties must make long range,
creative decisions in advance, not in the heat
of a drought. When the "haves" are insisting
on their legal rights and the "have-nots" are
insisting on their equities during a drought,
the possibilities for creative responses are
more limited. Furthermore, the emergency
conditions can provoke externally imposed
solutions.
Drought planning should be
considered in a broader context than simply
drought response. In a sense all water
planning is drought planning. Planning is
driven in large part by the amount of water
that is available in dry years. Other
government policies and powers affect
demand for water and it is demand that
determines how much water must be available
before there is a "shortage." Therefore water
supply and the risk of drought should be
factors in land use planning and other
decisions. If population is allowed to increase
without check and per capita water demand
is driven entirely by an oasis mentality, no
amount of traditional drought response
planning will suffice. The degree of future
drought protection for the study area
ultimately will be more a function of political
will than of engineering genius, legal
maneuvering or public finance.
This report is intended to contribute to the
awareness of the issues and options that is
necessary to equip decisionmakers - not just
water managers - to protect the water
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security of the study area through a
comprehensive approach to drought
awareness and planning.
Chapter Organization
Chapter 2 deals with the Colorado
River, a major resource that must be shared
by Arizona, California and Nevada, as well as
with four upper basin states and Mexico.
Chapter 3 surveys several sources of water
originating within California that are available
to Southern California. Chapter 4 discusses
sources of water developed within Arizona.
In Chapter 5 the performance of the legal
institutions allocating available water sources
is analyzed. Drought-vulnerable aspects of
present supply sources are identified based on
the existing legal arrangements. The final
chapter recommends options for policy
makers and water managers to relieve
vulnerabilities to drought in the study area.
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CHAPTER2
THE COLORADO RIVER - A SHARED SOURCE OF SUPPLY
The Colorado River is the lifeline of
the study area, sustaining its meteoric growth.
Local surface water supplies in Southern
California and Arizona could meet only a tiny
fraction of demands. Copious groundwater
were overdrawn to stanch shortages while the
two states grew rapidly. Meanwhile they
searched for and developed imported water.
The first imports came from the Owens
Valley in 1913, then from the Colorado. The
California State Water Project started
delivering water to Southern California from
the north 17 years ago but until recently
portions of the project were under
construction and its waters could satisfy only
a small part of the area's demands. Southern
California could not have grown as large and
as fast as it has, nor could it sustain present
levels of consumption, without Colorado
River water. Arizona has grown on the
strength of the future promise of Colorado
River water, while overdrafting groundwater.
Demands on the Colorado River are
now so great that none of the average flow
of about 13.5 million acre-feet a year reaches
the sea.*5 The population within the
watershed of the river is sparse and has a
history of very slow growth. But the river
has been tapped to the limits of its capacity
in order to fuel development and population
expansion, much of it outside the watershed.
Demands are heavily concentrated in the
lower basin states of Arizona, California and
Nevada. Present demands of the upper basin
states, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and
Wyoming, are relatively small. Colorado and
Utah, however, depend on the river for
significant diversions for municipal uses
outside of the watershed, principally in the
Denver, Colorado Springs and Salt Lake City
areas.
Legal Division of Colorado River Water
The Colorado River Basin, shown in
Figure 2-1, comprises parts of seven states.
By dint of hard-fought lawsuits, negotiations
and political battles, the river's water has
been parceled among the neighboring states.
The apportionment has been more complete
than that of the waters of any other river.
The process was contentious and painful at
times, and some ambiguities remain. But it is
striking how solidly the apportionment is
embedded in the relations of the seven states.
They disagree on many issues but they seem
unanimous in their commitment to keep the
basic allocations of the Colorado River
immutable.
The lower basin states' resistance to
altering legal institutions for sharing the river
can be explained by the fact that the present
arrangement generally favors them. They
have priority to most of the water produced
in the basin, with a storage and delivery
system that helps to ensure satisfaction of
their rights. Still, the upper basin states do
not urge alterations in the scheme. If they
were left to the mercies of the political
process or to the Supreme Court's "equitable
apportionment1* doctrine, they almost certainly
would fare no better. With their smaller
populations, slow growth, modest economic
importance and relatively meager
representation in Congress they are no match
for powerful interests in Southern California
and Arizona.
Early in the twentieth century,
interests in California laid plans to develop
the water of the Colorado River. The rich
agricultural potential of the Imperial Valley
and burgeoning growth in Los Angeles













power. Thus, Southern California civic
leaders, politicians and newspapermen
pressured the federal government to build
major facilities to store and transport river
water.
Upper basin interests were concerned
that heavy investments in water project
development and lower basin reliance on
uninterrupted water flow would make it
difficult for upriver states to claim a share of
water in the future. Legal precedent
suggested that the Supreme Court would, if
called upon to apportion an interstate stream,
favor the state that gains the most benefit
from use of the water (Kansas v. Colorado.
1907) and that, as between two states that
follow the law of prior appropriation, the first
state to put water to use has a better right
(Wyoming v. Colorado 1922). The relatively
undeveloped upper basin therefore sought the
security of a negotiated interstate compact
allocating rights in the river. The
Constitution authorizes states to enter
compacts, subject to congressional approval,
to deal with interstate issues. Before 1922,
the device had been used to settle boundary
disputes and other controversies, but never to
apportion an interstate stream.
The seven states along the 1400-mile
river entered into the Colorado River
Compact of 1922 dividing use of the river's
water between the upper basin and the lower
basin. The lower basin states of Arizona,
California and Nevada were guaranteed that
the upper basin states of Colorado, Wyoming,
Utah and New Mexico would deliver an
annual average of 7.5 million acre-feet of
water to Lee Ferry, a point on the river
approximately on the Arizona-Utah border.**
The upper basin states received a right to use
an equivalent amount of water (if it was
available). The lower basin also secured the
right to increase its beneficial consumptive
uses by another one million acre-feet/ The
Compact recited that ^'present, perfected
rights" are "unimpaired.
n8
The parties contemplated each basin
eventually using equal quantities of water (7.5
million acre-feet), plus up to another one
million acre-feet for the lower basin. They
also expected that the United States would
have a future obligation to deliver water to
Mexico and agreed to share that obligation
equally.
The practical difficulty with the
Compact is that it attempted to allocate more
water than is likely to be available in an
average year. A 1944 treaty with Mexico set
the obligation for U.S. water deliveries from
the Colorado at 1.5 million acre-feet a year
(Treaty with Mexico, 1944). Thus, it would
take a total flow of 16.5 million acre-feet a
year for this obligation to be met if each
basin used its full 7.5 million acre-feet of
water. It may not have seemed unreasonable
to expect flows of at least 16.5 million acre-
feet at the time the Compact was negotiated.
In 1922, the average annual flow since 1896
was 16.8 million acre-feet. And the twenty
years ending in 1922 were particularly wet
ones in the basin, averaging almost 18 million
acre-feet a year. These averages are all high,
however, based on long-term data. Tree ring
studies covering hundreds of years, however,
justify a far lower average figure, only about
13.5 million acre-feet (Stockton and Jacoby,
1976).
Demands in the lower basin states are
now large enough to consume their full 7.5
million acre-feet per year share of river water.
Annual deliveries of this quantity at Lee
Ferry plus the upper basin's one-half share of
the Mexican Treaty obligation (750,000 acre-
feet) would leave an average of only 5.25
million acre-feet available for upper basin
consumption in average years.9 The burden
of meeting lower basin delivery requirements
generally is on the upper basin because the
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upper basin apportionment is expressed in
terms of limitations on its use, so as to
guarantee deliveries in the specified amounts
at Lee Ferry. This burden has worked no
hardship so far because the upper basin has
actually developed and used less than 4
million acre-feet annually and reservoir
storage has generally been high since the
upper basin facilities were built.
The upper basin has the right to use
7.5 million acre-feet only if that quantity is
available after it has satisfied its delivery
requirements which average 8.25 million acre-
feet a year (the assumed lower basin demand
7.5 million acre-feet plus an upper basin
contribution of .75 million acre-feet toward
the Mexican Treaty obligation). Another
million acre-feet also potentially goes to lower
basin beneficial uses. Beyond these amounts,
the allocation of any additional waters is not
specified by the Compact, but is left to future
apportionment in Article III(f). However, the
point is largely academic given the mistaken
estimates concerning average flows. Above
average flows in most years will most likely be
needed to replenish and build up supplies of
water in storage.
Under the Compact, the upper basin
is not actually required to deliver a fixed
quantity of water at Lee Ferry for the lower
basin in any particular year, though current
operating criteria adopted by the Bureau of
Reclamation provide for releases of 8.23
million acre-feet annually. The only annual
delivery obligation in the Compact is one-half
the Mexican Treaty guarantee of 1.5 million
acre-feet. This presumably could allow the
upper basin the flexibility to consume up to
the full virgin flow in low water years and
store water in excess of its needs in high
water years. This is subject to the condition
that deliveries to the lower basin at Lee
Ferry for the current year plus the
immediately preceding nine years (the ten-
year moving average) total no less than 75
million acre-feet (Colorado River Compact,
Article m(d)).
The waters apportioned between the
basins have also been rather precisely divided
among the states within each basin. The
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact
approved in 1949 gave each upper basin state
a percentage of the quantities of water left
over after meeting obligations to the lower
basin and Mexico.
The lower basin states were unable to
agree on an apportionment among themselves
for many years. Arizona refused to ratify the
Colorado River Compact, fearing that it
would enable California to monopolize the
river. California was indeed pressing for
major development of the river with annual
proposals in Congress for what was to
become Hoover Dam. Arizona was able to
stall enactment of a law approving the project
for six years. But in 1928 the Boulder
Canyon Project Act authorized the dam and
further provided that the Colorado River
Compact could become effective upon the
ratification of only six states, i.e., without
Arizona's consent.
The Boulder Canyon Project Act
conditioned authorization of Hoover Dam on
California's agreeing that its consumption of
water would not exceed 4.4 million acre-feet
a year. The Act further provided that the
three lower basin states could enter a
compact that would apportion to Arizona 2.8
million acre-feet and Nevada 300,000 acre-
feet for their annual consumptive use. Excess
deliveries were to be apportioned under the
authorized compact 50% to California, 46%
to Arizona, and 4% to Nevada.
No such lower basin compact was
ever negotiated but in 1963 the Supreme
Court held that the Boulder Canyon Project
Act effected an allocation of the lower basin
share of water among the three states
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(Arizona v. California. 1963). The Act's
particularity in specifying each state's
proposed share convinced the Court that
Congress had made an apportionment of the
river's water whether or not the states
actually entered into an agreement to that
effect.
Arizona eventually approved the 1922
Compact as a means of securing some of the
benefits of Hoover Dam, but not until 1944.
The state's resistance had been worn down
after twenty-two years, three unsuccessful
Supreme Court cases (Arizona v. California.
1931,1934,1936), internal strife, drought and
even a short-lived military action against
crews building a dam partly on Arizona land
to serve Southern California. Facing
dwindling water supplies, inadequate electric
power, dry wells and a lack of facilities to
bring water from the Colorado, Arizonans
rethought their refusal to cooperate in the
allocation of river water. The United States'
1944 agreement that Mexico was entitled to
a 1.5 million acre-feet share of the river was
the last straw. Three weeks after the
Mexican Treaty was signed, the Arizona
Legislature, perceiving that the state was
effectively disenfranchised in Colorado River
affairs, ratified the Compact.
Arizona's belated acquiescence in the
Compact may have removed one perceived
obstacle to its sharing the fruits of federal
investments in river development, but its
agreement did not move the state noticeably
closer to the water and power it needed.
Years of fighting to procure the massive
Central Arizona Project (CAP) followed.
Arizona embraced the Bureau of
Reclamation's plan for an aqueduct system
that would pump 1.5 million acre-feet of
water per year 1800 feet uphill, then
transport it more than 240 miles to Phoenix
and Tucson. California bitterly opposed the
project. At first, the two states sharply
disagreed over the quantities of water to
which each was entitled. Congress refused to
approve any project until the two states
worked out their differences. This led to the
1963 Supreme Court decision in Arizona v.
California that recognized the shares set out
in the Boulder Canyon Project Act as
effecting a congressional apportionment of
the river.
The Supreme Court's decision
validated Arizona's claim to 2.8 million acre-
feet and thus enhanced the state's standing to
seek congressional largess for Colorado River
development But the Court also reckoned
with the claims of five Indian tribes whose
reservations lie along the river. The Court
held that the tribes had a right to use up to
900,000 acre-feet of water a year. The
amount of water was based on the implied
intent of Congress: it would take this
amount of water to irrigate the arable lands
on the reservations. Because Congress
apparently intended the Indians to be farmers
the Court said that they should have enough
water to carry out this purpose. It is
significant, however, that although the rights
of the tribes were quantified based on
potential irrigation demands, their future use
was not legally limited to agriculture (Arizona
v. California. 1979).
Arizona's quest for the CAP
continued for several more years. California
persisted in using its dominant political force
to oppose the project, realizing that its
demands already exceeded its legal share of
water. The political price of California's
support was Arizona's concession that any
annual shortages would be met from the
CAP's share before any reductions were made
in California's 4.4 million acre-feet share of
water. The upper basin states also argued
successfully for authorization of several water
projects in exchange for their support of the
bill. Finally, in 1968, Congress passed the
Colorado River Basin Project Act allowing
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the project to proceed under these and other
conditions.
It took almost eighteen years after the
authorization to complete the basic works of
the Central Arizona Project (CAP).
Appropriations for the costly project - about
$2 billion - were difficult to obtain, and
building the behemoth aqueduct was a major
undertaking. Most of Arizona's great
population growth had been supported by
groundwater pumping, resulting in huge
annual overdrafts that caused water tables to
drop sharply and much overlying land to
subside.^ The Carter Administration
invoked a restriction in the 1968 authorizing
act against use of CAP water in areas that
did not effectively control the expansion of
groundwater use for irrigation and threatened
to withhold financial support for the CAP.
This put pressure on Arizona to proceed with
efforts to control groundwater withdrawals.
The state then passed a significant new
groundwater management law in 1980,
designed to phase out agricultural use of
groundwater and to impose conservation
planning requirements on areas of
concentrated municipal growth.
California's rather firm entitlement to
4.4 million acre-feet a year, plus any surpluses
to which the state is entitled, has been
divided by a 1931 "Seven Party Agreement."
The Agreement gives the highest priority to
several agricultural irrigation districts for up
to 3.85 million acre-feet, then to the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California (MWD) and the City of Los
Angeles for up to 550,000 acre-feet, then (to
the extent water remains unused) to MWD
and to the City of San Diego and County of
San Diego for 550,000 and 112,000 acre-feet
respectively, with equal priority/^ There are
additional allocations and priorities, but these
major provisions actually leave little water for
any users other than the agricultural districts
and MWD together because they are virtually
certain to use their full allocations. The
additional allocations (beyond the total
California entitlement of 4.4 million acre-feet)
have been extremely important to MWD for
many recent years as Arizona has not taken
its full share of the lower basin entitlement:
MWD has actually taken about 1.2 million
acre-feet under the Seven Party Agreement.
California thus has diverted several hundred
thousand acre-feet a year more than the
state's Compact share. These additional
diversions to California are being reduced as
the Central Arizona Project becomes
operational and Arizona is able to call for its
share of Colorado River water.
The prospect of losing the use of
waters apportioned to Arizona has caused
MWD to seek replacement sources. One of
the most promising approaches is to
reallocate rights to Colorado River water
under the Seven Party Agreement through a
variety of innovative transfers. MWD has
begun negotiating agreements with the
agricultural districts, attempting to expand its
right to use river water. These agreements
are possible without a reduction in
agricultural production because water that has
been lost by inefficient conveyance facilities
and practices can be salvaged.
The largest of the agricultural water
districts entitled to Colorado River water is
Imperial Irrigation District (IID). For many
years it has been apparent that IID was
diverting far more water than necessary for its
crop lands, resulting in the waste of huge
quantities of water through seepage and
return flow into Salton Sea, a saline water
body in a sink that collects runoff from the
entire valley. The State Water Resources
Control Board found IID's excessive use of
water to be unreasonable and ordered it
stopped. Meanwhile, MWD was searching
for new water supplies to substitute for the
surplus Arizona water it was temporarily using
while Arizona completed the Central Arizona
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Project, which will enable delivery of that
water to the Phoenix and Tucson areas.
this water in return for paying the costs of
salvage.
After five years of study and
negotiations, IID and MWD reached an
agreement in 1989 for MWD to take IID
water conserved by projects financed by
MWD. The Conservation Agreement
commits the parties to a five-year program
commencing in 1990 which involves lining
canals, constructing new regulating reservoirs
and automating the IID delivery system.
These projects will cost MWD an estimated
$97.8 million and it has agreed to pay an
additional $23 million for certain indirect
costs, including mitigation of adverse impacts
on agriculture and the environment and for
lost hydroelectric revenues. These
improvements are to conserve some 106,100
acre-feet a year, which will be available to
MWD. This results in a capital cost of about
$1,139 per acre-foot to MWD. MWD has
the right to the water for 35 years and will
take it from on the Colorado at its Parker
Dam diversion, resulting in a nominal cost of
about $33 per acre-foot if all the conserved
water is delivered over that period.
Other transfers hold considerable
promise for augmenting MWD's share of
waters from the Colorado River. Congress
has authorized California contractors to line
the All American Canal and to contract to
receive the benefit of the water conserved,
estimated to be about 70,000 acre-feet per
year (102 Stat. 4005). In 1987 MWD
concluded a contract under which it is lining
31 miles of the Coachella Canal for which it
will receive the right to use about 26,000
acre-feet of the Coachella Valley Water
District's allocation (Kaman, 1991).
Approximately 300,000 acre-feet more water
may be available from other conservation
improvements within the IID. MWD and
perhaps other municipal users in Southern
California will negotiate for the right to use
Present Demands
For the last 10 years California alone
has taken about 5 million acre-feet a year
from the Colorado River (including its share
plus much of the unused portion of Arizona's
share). The upper basin states collectively
have consumed about 3.5 million acre-feet of
water in recent years, less than half their
apparent legal entitlements. Though
Arizona's lack of delivery facilities has
impeded its ability to consume water legally
available to it, the completion of the Central
Arizona Project, by far the most elaborate
and expensive project ever sponsored by the
United States Bureau of Reclamation, will
make it possible for Arizona to divert its full
share. California and Arizona each already
has consumptive uses capable of exceeding its
full legal apportionment of Colorado River
water. And Nevada, the other lower basin
state, now has demands for more than its
300,000 acre-feet entitlement. The extent to
which Arizona decides to use river water or
to use other sources to meet its growing
demand is heavily influenced by economics.
At an estimated $55 per acre-foot, the cost of
pumping CAP water could make the lower
cost option of pumping groundwater more
attractive to Arizona users. While this would
continue overdrafts in Arizona, it would allow
Southern California to continue to use more
than its apportionment of river water.
The five Indian tribes with
reservations along the mainstem of the river
have been consuming only about 395,000
acre-feet, or about 44% of their maximum
entitlement of 900,000 acre-feet (or sufficient
water to irrigate about 140,000 acres,
whichever is less). The amount they consume
is to be charged to the shares of the .states
where the water is used. This theoretically
reduces the amounts of water now available
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to non-Indian users in Arizona and California
under the Compact by 340,000 acre-feet and
55,000 acre-feet respectively, but it has not
led the Interior Department to restrict
diversions by the two states. The tribes have
recently begun to increase their use of water,
which will further diminish the water legally
available to the two states. The tribal
allocations appear to be fixed and not subject
to later expansion even if the Indians make
a substantial showing that they ought to have
been awarded rights to a greater volume of
water in the original adjudication (Arizona v.
California. 19S3).13 However, the demands
of dozens of other tribes in the basin have
not yet been quantified. Their claims based
on practicably irrigable acreage could be
enormous: most estimates are in the millions
of acre-feet.-^
In times of shortage, priorities of
Indian reserved water rights throughout the
basin entitle them to be satisfied first, in
order of priority date, along with non-Indian
"present perfected rights." Unlike the absolute
priority of such rights in the upper basin,
"present perfected rights" in the lower basin
are to be satisfied according to Arizona v.
California. 1963, which recognizes broad
discretion for the Secretary of Interior to
allocate Colorado River water by contracting
for water deliveries from the river's storage
facilities.
Storage and Delivery Facilities
Federal subsidies have supported the
development of Colorado River water,
enabling Southern California and Arizona to
prosper and grow. Well over half of the
federal Bureau of Reclamation's total
construction budgets from inception of the
national program has been invested in the
region (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 1981).
Much of the investment has been recovered
from power sales and municipal water
contracts.
Virtually all of the water in the river
now can be regulated by Reclamation dams
which have a storage capacity equal to about
four years' average annual flows. Total
storage is about 63 million acre-feet. Of this
amount, 34 million acre-feet are in the upper
basin, most of it (27 million acre-feet) in
Lake Powell, behind Glen Canyon Dam; and
28.6 million acre-feet are in the lower basin.
Most of the lower basin storage (26.2 million
acre-feet) is in Lake Mead, which was created
by Hoover Dam. Though the facilities are
constructed in both the upper basin and
lower basin states, they store water that is
primarily available for use in California and
Arizona.
The extensive reservoir storage system
on the Colorado provides protection against
periods of uneven or below average annual
flows. While most of the reservoir storage is
located too far down the river to hold water
for use in the upper basin, storage
complements the Compact to serve both
basins' needs. Indeed, the compact allocation
scheme would not work without some storage
facilities. The potential benefits to the lower
basin states from the reservoirs are great.
Flood waters are captured when they would
otherwise flow to the sea, so that stored
water is available in dry years. This is
especially important because runoff, and
consequently the quantity of unused upper
basin water flowing to the lower basin,
fluctuates tremendously.^^ Furthermore,
storage facilities allow the Secretary of
Interior to make deliveries of water to users
at the times when the water is needed, not
just when the upper basin states decide to
deliver it.
The upper basin also realizes benefits
from the reservoirs. It need not deliver a set
amount of water for lower basin uses in any
particular year because the compact obligation
is expressed as an aggregate release
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requirement for the most recent 10-year
period. So if excess water has flowed to the
lower basin in wet years, it results in a credit
that allows the upper basin to use most or all
of the virgin flow if necessary in dry years.
Meanwhile, water in storage from years in
which there was a surplus can be released to
satisfy compact guarantees to the lower basin
and Mexico.
The Colorado River reservoirs, like
other surface storage systems, lose stored
water to evaporation. Evaporative losses are
especially high in the Colorado River basin
because the region is so arid. The Bureau of
Reclamation estimates that the average
annual evaporative loss between 1976 and
1980 was over 1.7 million acre-feet/6
Evaporative loss has two consequences for
drought planning: 1) there is an optimum
level of storage in the basin beyond which
there will be no net increase in the long-term
usable supply, a level that was long ago
reached on the Colorado (Langbein, 1959;
Hardison, 1972); and 2) evaporative loss is a
consumptive use that is debited to the basin
in which the water was stored.
The elaborate system of dams on the
Colorado River also produces hydroelectricity
selling for about $500 million per year. The
power is priced at below market rates and
used mostly in California and Arizona. The
largest single power customer is the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California which uses it to pump Colorado
River water into its south coast service area.
Hydroelectric power production was not a
primary purpose under federal statutes
authorizing most of the facilities on the
Colorado River. The 1922 Colorado River
Compact expresses a preference for the
"dominant purposes" of domestic and
agricultural uses over the "subservient" use of
water for power generation (Article IV(b)).
The preference is reflected in the Boulder
Canyon Project Act which implements the
Compact and declares that the project
(Hoover Dam and related facilities) is to be
used "first, for river regulation, improvement
of navigation, and flood control; second, for
irrigation and domestic uses and satisfaction
of present perfected rights [pursuant to the
Compact]; and third, for power." The
purposes of the federal facilities and the
comprehensive water development have been
expanded in successive enactments, for
instance the 1968 Colorado Basin Project Act,
authorizing the CAP and other projects and
providing for the methods for long-range
operation of all system reservoirs, added
specific mention of "improving water quality;
providing for basic public outdoor recreation
facilities, improving conditions of wildlife ... ."
(43 U.S.C. § 1501 (a)). But Congress insisted
that "generation and sale of electrical power
[is] an incident of the foregoing purposes."
Although power generation was only
an incidental motive for Congress's decision
to construct facilities on the Colorado River,
it has become a highly influential factor in
how the Secretary operates the reservoir
system. Sales of hydropower have
replenished government coffers, satisfying
project repayment obligations even as
agricultural users have sought relief from
those obligations. Although the seven basin
states tend to resist operations designed
primarily to produce more power while
depleting the storage available for future
water delivery needs, they recognize the
benefits of achieving repayment of project
costs. The tension between releasing water
for power production and the need to hold it
in storage to conserve it for consumptive
needs has not yet been fully felt because the
reservoir system has been filling or nearly full
in most years since it was constructed.
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Reservoir Operations: Authority of the
Secretary of the Interior
The operation of storage and delivery
facilities is determined largely by the
Secretary of Interior. Several acts of
Congress vest the Secretary with broad
powers to decide how much water to store,
how much to release, for what purposes and
when/77 The United States Supreme Court
resoundingly endorsed extensive exercises of
Secretarial discretion in Arizona v. California.
1963. The Court found that Congress
effectively gave the Secretary authority to
carry out interstate allocation of lower basin
water through contracts with water users.
Conflict over the manner in which the
Secretary exercises his discretion arose when
the new Glen Canyon Dam was completed.
The Secretary decided to release water from
Lake Powell for power generation while the
reservoir was still filling. Water users
challenged the decision but the court ruled
that the Secretary acted within his discretion
fYuma Mesa Irrigation & Drainage District v.
UdalK 1966; Yuma County Water Users Ass'n
v. Udall. 1964). The controversy over
whether the Secretary should release water
for power generation, allow consumptive uses
and store water for future needs led to the
enactment of a provision in the 1968
Colorado River Basin Project Act requiring
the Secretary to promulgate operating criteria
(43 U.S.C. §1552). The resulting criteria
adopted by the Secretary, which are subject
to review every five years, govern operation
of Lakes Powell and Mead. The Secretary
has broad discretion to fashion these
operating criteria. Thus, a court would have
to find that the Secretary's decisions on how
to operate the reservoirs amounted to an
abuse of discretion in order to overturn them.
The need for conservation storage has not yet
been great enough for water users to make
such a showing.
An important feature of the operating
criteria affecting drought management is that
the Secretary will release a minimum of 8.23
million acre-feet of water from Lake Powell
in each year that he finds that it is
"reasonably necessary to assure compact
deliveries without impairing upper basin uses".
The lower basin must rely on inflow of the
Paria River just Glen Canyon Dam to supply
the other 20,000 acre-feet needed to make up
the 8.25 million acre-feet upper basin delivery
obligation. Thus the lower basin cannot
ordinarily call for additional releases for
present beneficial uses under article III(b).
Greater amounts than 8.23 million acre-feet
can be released, however, if the lower basin
has beneficial consumptive uses for it and the
upper basin does not, provided two conditions
exist: 1) active storage in the lower basin in
Lake Mead is less than the amount of active
storage in Lake Powell; and 2) the Secretary
finds that Lake Powell storage is not
"reasonably necessary" to meet the upper
basin's delivery" requirements under the
Mexican Treaty and the Compact "without
impairment of annual consumptive uses in the
upper basin."
The first condition can benefit the
upper basin. It ensures that Lake Mead must
be drawn down for lower basin uses rather
than allowing storage in Lake Mead to be
built up while depleting Lake Powell with
upper basin releases for the annual needs of
the lower basin. Balancing the use of the
two reservoirs provides some assurance to the
upper basin that it will not be forced someday
to forego use of annual runoff in order to
make annual compact deliveries even as the
lower basin has copious water in storage.
Other aspects of the criteria could
potentially operate to the detriment of the
upper basin. For instance, they allow the
lower basin to draw on Lake Mead for more
than 7.5 million acre-feet of annual
consumptive uses in years when the Secretary
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finds that a "surplus" exists. Depending on
how liberally the Secretary interprets the
criteria for determining a surplus, the
provision could accelerate drawdowns of Lake
Mead, creating an imbalance between the two
reservoirs thereby helping to justify further
releases from Lake Powell. Furthermore, the
basic requirement of a constant delivery of
8.23 million acre-feet could be applied to
deny the upper basin's ability to make excess
deliveries in high-flow years and then deliver
less in dry years. This was an important
element of flexibility built into the Compact
The provision requiring basically constant
annual deliveries has not operated to the
harm of the upper basin because Lake Powell
has been full or nearly full in recent years.
Nevertheless, the criteria could prove
troublesome, for instance, if in a series of dry
years the upper basin needed to use nearly all
the natural inflow for its own purposes and
Lake Powell had inadequate water in storage
for releases of 8.23 million acre-feet. It
might be in the upper basin's interests to
curtail deliveries for a few years, relying on
past years surplus deliveries or counting on
years of surplus occurring in the future to
even out the averages. This would allow it to
use limited inflows to meet its own demands.
Presumably, the compact negotiators intended
to allow such flexibility when they provided a
ten-year moving average as the measure of
the upper basin's delivery requirements rather
than a constant annual requirement.
The operating criteria can be read to
require very conservative secretarial policies
with respect to releases from reservoir
storage. They specify that the Secretary must
prepare an annual operating plan for the
Colorado River reservoirs. The plan must
consider several factors including:
(a) Historic streamflows;
(b) The most critical period of
record;
(c) Probabilities of water supply;
(d) Estimated future depletions in the
upper basin, including the effects of
recurrence of critical periods of water
supply,
(e) [various studies];
(f) The necessity to assure that upper
basin consumptive uses not be
impaired because of failure to store
sufficient water to assure deliveries [of
the Mexican Treaty obligation and of
the 75 million acre-feet of water every
ten years as required by article IH(d)
of the Compact]. (U.S. Dep't of
Interior, 1978)'°18
If the criteria are read to prefer storage of
water for drought protection, releases beyond
the basic compact requirements and Mexican
Treaty deliveries would be rare, largely
confined to years when the reservoirs were
full or nearly full: The ten-year treaty quota
for the lower basin of 75 million acre-feet
probably will be a maximum except when
there are spills from a full reservoir or to the
extent storage space must be vacated for
flood control.
The operating criteria, especially as
applied in the Secretary's plan of operations,
now favor power generation. The attempt to
balance storage in Lake Mead and Lake
Powell is more than an attempt to achieve
some degree of interbasin equity. It is a
means of optimizing the power generating
potential of the two reservoirs. The
minimum delivery quota of 8.23 million acre-
feet provides the reliable annual supply of
water needed to produce power.
Furthermore, when additional releases are
made to equalize Lake Mead and Lake
Powell storage (i.e., when the Secretary
determines there is sufficient water in upper
basin storage), the criteria ensure that "the
annual release will be made to the extent that
[water] can be passed through Glen Canyon
Powerplant when operated at the available
capacity of the powerplant." In this way, the
23
Secretary through the Bureau of Reclamation
has operated the facilities, especially the
timing of releases, to maximize power
generation. The availability of a large supply
of low cost power benefits some users like
CAP and MWD who have to pump river
water over mountains lessening the likelihood
of lower basin objections.
The hydropower-inspired regime of
reservoir operations is potentially at odds with
drought protection goals and water use and
conservation. Sometimes it can mean less
water is released than the upper basin might
choose to release in a high water year. At
other times it could lead to premature
depletion of stored water in dry years that
could be detrimental to water users in both
basins. Surely it denies the upper basin some
of the flexibility it bargained for in the
Compact.
Major conflict over the Secretary's
operating criteria has been avoided only
because of the extraordinarily high runoff
conditions in recent years. Operation of the
Colorado River reservoirs could be legally
challenged as contrary to the Law of the
River if it results in preference to
hydropower over the project's primary
purposes. As a drought approaches, the
likelihood of such a challenge increases
because the Secretary presumably is charged
with reconciling competing uses consistent
with the Law of the River. Overall, the law
favors conservation storage and service of
multiple purposes which the Secretary must
consider and reflect in the criteria and plans
of operation.
Conflicts between power generation
and environmental and recreational concerns
have become more apparent than conflicts
with water storage needs in the operation of
Colorado River reservoirs. Impairment of
recreation and environmental harm occur not
only during the periods of low flow. Radical
fluctuations in water releases from Glen
Canyon Dam that respond to peak power
demands disrupt recreational uses by creating
hazards and limiting overall opportunities for
white-water boating and they cause
environmental damage in Grand Canyon by
eroding banks and beaches, stranding fish,
exposing spawning beds and artificially
altering wildlife habitats.
Recreational and conservation
interests have challenged the operating
regime (Grand Canyon Domes v. Walker.
1974; National Wildlife Federation v. Western
Area Power Administration. 1989). These
challenges and the Department of the
Interior's own recognition that there were
existing and potential problems with the way
the reservoirs were being operated led to the
commissioning of the Glen Canyon
Environmental Studies. The resulting studies
furnished considerable new information but,
according to a National Research Council
review requested by the Department, were
lacking in a number of respects (National
Research Council, 1987). A new round of
studies is now in progress and the
Department has decided to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on
Glen Canyon Dam operations. In addition,
the Western Area Power Administration
(WAPA) which is in charge of marketing
power from dams on the river will prepare
an EIS on the post-1989 General Power
Marketing and Allocation criteria which guide
its contracting activities. The WAPA EIS is
the result of a lawsuit initiated by
conservation groups.
The environmental impact statements,
Glen Canyon Environmental Studies, and the
National Research Council review should aid
in determining how the reservoir system can
be operated for optimal benefits. According
to the National Research Council, "Changes
in operations at the [Glen Canyon] dam . . .
could reduce the resource losses occurring
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under current operations and, in some cases,
even improve the status of the resources ...."
The Council's report, however, pointed out
that the United States has assumed major
contractual obligations to provide power
which could be a constraint on any
operational changes that attempt to balance
competing demands. The Council urged a
close look at these constraints, noting
succinctly that, at this point in the
management of Colorado River resources,
"power not water delivery is the key to the
operation of Glen Canyon Dam." Presumably
water supply, including drought management,
and other goals will take a higher place in
the considerations of the Department as it
revises dam operations to correct the "tail-
wags-dog" preference for hydropower that has
evolved into the present regime.
The Salinity Problem
Colorado River water is heavily
polluted with salts by the time it reaches
diversion points for California and Arizona
users. The problem is caused by natural salt
seeps, by irrigation return flows carrying salts
leached from soils and by concentration of
salts due to depletions from consumptive uses
and from reservoir evaporation. In the past,
salinity has occasionally reached levels that
are considered unsuitable for irrigation. A
salinity control program now helps to keep
water quality at acceptable quality. Neverthe
less, maintaining the quality needed by users
depends precariously on having sufficient
flows to dilute salts in the river. Higher salt
concentrations in a drought could render
waters in the river useless for many purposes.
The salinity problem became an
international incident in 1961 when salt
concentrations in the water flowing into
Mexico to satisfy the Mexican Treaty
obligation reached 2700 mg/1, too salty for
irrigation. The sudden increase in salinity was
caused by a federal "rescue" project that
removed salty water from the Wellton-
Mohawk Division of the Gila Project in
southern Arizona and put it in the Colorado
River just above the Mexican intake. The
rescue was necessary because of an earlier.
Reclamation project by which the Wellton-
Mohawk Division had imported Colorado
River water into an area where farming with
groundwater had become difficult because of
salt buildup. The imported water raised the
level of salty groundwater to the point that it
began killing plants. Then the second rescue
project was built by the Bureau of
Reclamation to pump down the groundwater.
Pouring the salty pumped water into the river
was made worse because the Bureau was then
filling Lake Powell behind the newly
completed Glen Canyon Dam, leaving very
little water in the river below the dam to
dilute salts.
Mexico complained loudly about the
degraded quality of the river. The Mexican
Treaty is silent on the quality of the water to
be delivered to Mexico but the United States
eventually agreed to deliver water of a
minimum quality. Treaty deliveries are to
have salinity concentrations no greater than
115 parts per million higher than the
concentrations in water used in the United
States as measured at Imperial Dam (Minute
242).
The United States' commitment to
reduce salinity has been supplemented and
implemented by federal statutes. The Clean
Water Act requires states to set water quality
standards based on uses designated for
waterways by each state. Measures to protect
those waters are then adopted either by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
or the state (if the state has been delegated
authority to administer the Act as nearly all
the basin states have).
In 1974, two years after major
amendments framed the basic program of the
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Gean Water Act, Congress enacted the
Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act
authorizing an elaborate and expensive
program of structural measures to prevent
and remove salinity from the river.
Authorized projects under the Bureau of
Reclamation include wells to intercept saline
groundwater and surface waters destined for
the river, improving irrigation systems,
disposing of salt wastes and building a huge
desalination plant. The Department of
Agriculture also sponsors projects targeting
on-farm irrigation system improvements.
For several years, EPA has allowed
the basin states collectively to set numerical
criteria for water quality in the Colorado
River in the plan developed under the
Salinity Control Act. The criteria are to be
satisfied at three checkpoints along the river
rather than requiring each of the states to set
its individual stateline standards. EPA's
approval of this practice has been upheld as
a proper exercise of its discretion
(Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle.
1981). Federal estimates show, however, that
water quality can be kept within the limits set
by law only for a few more years unless
additional controls are imposed (U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation, p. 2, 1989). The most
obvious further measures to control salinity
require reducing the amount of irrigation
water applied to the most saline soils -
mostly in the upper basin states where farm
production is the least valuable. This could
be accomplished by payments to irrigators, by
outright purchase and retirement of farm
lands or by more complex contractual
arrangements that involve farmers,
communities, states and the lower basin
consumers.
Extraordinarily high flows in the river
in the early 1980s filled reservoirs, diluting
salinity. A sustained drought would cause the
opposite effects, though salinity would not
increase in direct proportion to reductions in
flow (Vaux, 1990). The limits set for salinity
would soon be exceeded. Water could
eventually become too salty for farming,
especially at diversion points on the river.
Presumably municipal users could bear the
substantial costs of treating the water
satisfactorily but irrigators in the United
States and Mexico would have greater
difficulties bearing the costs and might have
to curtail their uses. Planning for a severe,
sustained drought therefore must consider the
effects on water quality because much of the
water available in a drought could be too
salty to use. Legal limits on salt
concentrations will be violated in low flow
periods without control measures beyond
those in place and authorized by existing
salinity control legislation, even without a
severe, sustained drought. Thus the issue of
additional salinity control is ripe for
immediate further action and discussion, a
process that could trigger a broader
examination of water use and growth issues.
The process should be informed by a
comprehensive consideration of how to
manage both supply and demand of water in
light of major drought cycles.
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CHAPTER3
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA'S WATER SUPPLY
History and Overview
California's multi-year drought
beginning in 1987 was not a unique event.
The state experienced critically dry periods in
1976-77, in 1928-34 and in a drought at the
turn of the century that sparked the
development of Southern California's major
water supply systems.
In 1904, William Mulholland, long
time superintendent of the Los Angeles
Water Department, declared that the City
would have to supplement its Los Angeles
River water supply. The catalyst for
Mulholland's announcement was a multi-year
drought during the previous decade. The
City of Los Angeles concluded that its water
supply would be insufficient to meet the
needs of its population during future
droughts. In the years following, the City's
rapid growth rate corroborated the urgency
for a new water source; the population of
Los Angeles swelled from 200,000 in 1905 to
well over 1 million by 1925 (Kahrl, p. 228,
1982).
The City of Los Angeles first turned
to the Owens River, some 250 miles to the
northeast, for its supplemental water supply.
City voters passed bond issues in 1905 and
1907 to purchase private lands and water
rights in the Owens Valley and to finance
construction of the Los Angeles Aqueduct to
carry the water to the City by gravity flow.
The aqueduct supported Los Angeles's
expansion within and beyond its boundaries,
even into the then-rural San Fernando Valley
where farmers depended on the erratic flood
flows of the Los Angeles River.
The 200-mile Los Angeles Aqueduct
was begun in 1908 and completed in 1913 at
a cost of over $23,000,000. The original
aqueduct supplied five times the water
previously obtained from the Los Angeles
River (Boronkay and Hutchinson, p. 142,
1977).
Los Angeles next moved to augment
its aqueduct supply by developing the
groundwater potential of the Owens Valley,
purchasing an additional 200,000 acres of
valley lands toward that goal. The City's
exploitation of surface and subsurface water
from the Owens Valley led to recurrent
conflict with valley residents/9 Recent
battles have been over the environmental
effects of the City's pumping operations on
the valley's water table. Over the years,
resentment of the City's de-watering of the
area by valley residents has sometimes been
expressed in violent acts, including the
repeated dynamiting of the aqueduct and
intake facilities.
In the early 1920s, the City of Los
Angeles began planning to extend its Owens
River aqueduct system into the Mono Basin
to develop additional water. It took five
presidential orders and two acts of Congress
to withdraw federal lands in the basin from
entry by private developers and allow Los
Angeles to purchase all federal land in Mono
County necessary for the City to develop its
planned water supply (Kahrl, p. 433, 1982).
Los Angeles voters in 1930 approved
a $38 million bond issue to complete the
purchase of Owens Valley lands and build an
extension to the Mono Basin, with a reservoir
at Long Valley. A second aqueduct was
completed in 1970 to carry increased Owens
Valley and Mono Basin waters developed
mostly by groundwater pumping. This added
30
139 miles of pipe to feed into the 338 mile
aqueduct
Even as the Los Angeles Aqueduct
was being planned and built, Southern
California turned its eyes to the Colorado
River. Since the turn of the century, vast
quantities of water had been diverted to the
hostile but fertile desert lands of Imperial
Valley. The canal system that delivered water
to the valley was highly unreliable, however,
being vulnerable to disruption by floods and
needing constant repair. Large landowners in
the valley sought the aid of the federal
government for a dam and canal system.
They were soon joined by investors and
boosters from Los Angeles who saw the
potential for bringing even more water to
support population growth in Southern
California.
With the new Owens Valley supplies,
most Los Angeles leaders could hardly
imagine a water shortage, and some
considered the cost and difficulty of moving
water from the Colorado River to the city
over the intervening mountains to be
excessive. Ultimately they were persuaded to
support the project and an alliance of
Imperial Valley landowners and Los Angeles
investors was forged. Concern that California
would monopolize the river provoked other
basin states to agree to the 1922 Colorado
River Compact that divided the river's water
between the upper and lower basins of the
Colorado River. The Compact led directly to
congressional enactment of the Boulder
Canyon Project Act authorizing spending an
unprecedented amount of public money
principally for Hoover Dam and the All
American Canal, both largely for the benefit
of California.
Municipal interests, primarily the
newly-formed Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California (MWD), were assured of
over a half-million acre-feet of water annually
from the river by agreements negotiated with
farm interests in the Imperial and Cochella
Valleys who would take most of the state's
share of water. MWD constructed a canal
system capable of taking much more than its
portion of water, evidencing a prescience
about both its future demand and about its
ability to use greater quantities than the basic
allotment The upper basin states demanded
little of the river and Arizona used less than
half of its entitlement, leaving much of its
water unused and available for Southern
California municipal consumers. Later, the
greater capacity of the system was to prove
a vital element in providing MWD flexibility
to bargain for use of additional water based
on rights of the irrigation districts.
The almost continuous water
development that began in 1908 - Los
Angeles Aqueduct, Hoover Dam, All
American Canal, Colorado River Aqueduct,
Mono extension of the Los Angeles
Aqueduct - paused during the war years of
the 1940Y After the war MWD began
planning a second aqueduct from the
Colorado River which it did not build.
Although the full California apportionment
was in use, Arizona's still remained unused.
But by then Arizona had commenced a new
round of litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court
against California.
Eventually, although no real water
shortage was foreseeable, Southern California
threw its support to the State Water Project.
At first the project had no possibility of
political success because it lacked the support
of Southern California, the State's great tax
base; the only immediate beneficiaries were
Central Valley irrigators. Those irrigators had
begun receiving water from the Central
Valley Project, a federal project that proved
inadequate for California's participation in a
revised statewide design to develop and
distribute water. It was an elaborate plan to
move vast amounts of water south from the
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state's water-rich northern region, to
agricultural lands of the Central Valley, and
on to the burgeoning urban populations of
the south.
In 1920 Robert Marshall of the U.S.
Geological Survey had proposed a
comprehensive plan to utilize the waters of
California's Central Valley. The Marshall
Plan called for water from the Sacramento
River to be transferred by successive
southward exchanges through the Central
Valley. Southern California was to receive a
transfer from the Kern River (Boronkay and
Hutchinson, p. 144, 1977). The essential
elements of the Marshall Plan became
embodied in the water and power bills and
initiatives of the 1920s, all of which were
defeated by interest groups opposed to the
state's involvement in water development.
The spirit of the Marshall Plan was
revived in 1930 with the original State Water
Plan, which called for the transfer of surplus
Northern California waters to areas of
predicted shortage in the Central Valley
where large farms were quickly and
dangerously drawing down groundwater
supplies. The plan, a state agency report to
the legislature, was approved by legislation
and by a referendum authorizing the sale of
$170 million in revenue bonds to finance the
Central Valley Project (CVP).
California was unable to sell the bonds in the
depths of the Depression, however, and
turned to national spending programs to save
the project
By 1937 the federal Bureau of
Reclamation had fully assumed the financial
burdens and administration of the CVP. The
project facilitated the transfer of water from
the Sacramento and Trinity River Basins to
undersupplied areas of the Sacramento and
San Joaquin Valleys and helped to develop
local supplies from the Kern and San Joaquin
Rivers. But the Central Valley Project ended
up exciting more agricultural growth then it
could support Farming was so lucrative it
continued to expand and almost immediately
the CVP needed supplemental water for
irrigation. Continued heavy pumping was
depleting the groundwater supplies the CVP
was to help conserve.
In the mid-1940's, the legislature
authorized a series of studies on statewide
water use and future needs which culminated
in the 1957 State Water Plan. The plan was
intended to set forth California's ultimate
water requirements with all areas of the state
at projected levels of full development It
was designed to be adaptable to the demands
of advancing technology and changing future
conditions (Meyers and Tarlock, p. 347,
1980). The plan called for the development
of local sources of supply and urged the
construction of a State Water Project to
transport Northern California waters to areas
of the state where future supply was deemed
insufficient
The California Legislature in 1959
passed the Burns-Porter Act, a water
development plan financed by $1.75 billion in
general obligation bonds to finance the first
phase of the State Water Project (SWP).
The state's voters supported the bond issue in
a referendum. Some influential Southern
California interests opposed its proposal but
changed their views at the last minute. The
measure barely passed thanks largely to
support of the populous southern counties.
The first phase of the SWP now
transports water as far as 700 miles through
the California Aqueduct from its Feather
River source in Northern California to satisfy
demands in the San Francisco Bay area, the
San Joaquin Valley and Southern California.
The SWP delivers about 2.4 million acre-feet
of water a year to 30 public agencies serving
some 17 million people throughout the state.
The largest single customer is MWD, which
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takes almost half the water. The terms and
conditions for delivery of SWP water are
governed by state water contracts, under
which each agency has contracted with the
DWR on a long-term basis for the delivery
of annual entitlements.
The 444-mile-long California Aqueduct
is the main transportation facility of the SWP.
The Aqueduct system includes dozens of
dams, reservoirs and pumping and generating
plants as well as several branch aqueducts.
The aqueduct divides in Southern California,
with the West Branch carrying the largest
share of SWP water to the Castaic Lake
Reservoir northwest of Los Angeles. The
East Branch delivers water to contracting
agencies in the Antelope Valley, San
Bernadino County and Riverside County.
The East Branch is currently being enlarged
to increase pumping and power generation
capabilities.
The main SWP storage facility is Lake
Oroville in Northern California's Butte
County, which has a capacity of 3.5 million
acre-feet. From there water flows down the
Feather River into the Sacramento River and
then into the delta where the Sacramento and
the San Joaquin Rivers converge and then
flow into San Francisco Bay. The
Sacramento-San Joaquin-San Francisco Bay
Delta (Bay-Delta) serves as an intake pool
for both the SWP and Central Valley Project
(CVP) systems, with pumps diverting the
water into the California Aqueduct and
various canals for delivery to the San
Francisco Bay area, the Central Valley and
Southern California. These, along with other
California water-supply facilities, are shown in
Figure 3-1.
Using the Bay-Delta as a conduit for
major water project diversions causes water
quality problems. As freshwater is removed
from the Delta, salt water from San Francisco
Bay backs up into the estuary and into the
rivers, harming valuable anadromous fish
(salmon and striped bass) populations and
other beneficial uses of water. A 1986 state
court decision instructed the State Water
Resources Control Board (SWRCB) to revise
its plan for checking saltwater intrusions into
the Delta from the Bay (U.S. v. SWRCB.
1986). To implement the water quality
control plan the board has the authority to
modify the extractions of water from the
Delta by all users including the State Water
Project and the Central Valley Project The
SWRCB is charged with setting water quality
standards to protect the diverse uses of water
that depend on the Bay-Delta. It then must
determine how to achieve the standards by
imposing various control measures including
limitations on diversions.
The SWRCB initiated hearings in
response to the court's ruling to determine
the optimum balance between Bay-Delta
water quality and reasonable beneficial uses
of the water. One of the SWRCB's options
is to require that SWP and CVP water be
released from upstream storage to flow
through the Delta to the Bay to combat
saltwater intrusions. The Board, however,
seeks to share responsibility for maintaining
adequate flows among all water users and to
concentrate on controlling sources of
pollution rather than relying on freshwater
releases to dilute pollutants. Still, it will be
difficult to meet any reasonable water quality
goals for the Bay-Delta without some
required releases.
Several years ago, federal and state
officials proposed a joint project, the
Peripheral Canal, as a major phase of the
SWP to increase deliveries to water
contractors in Southern California and other
areas served by the project and thereby avoid
Bay-Delta transportation problems. The plan
was to divert both SWP and CVP water into
a new canal to the east, bypassing the Bay-
Delta. Canal proponents claimed it would
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FIGURE 3-1: Major California Storage
Reservoirs and Conveyance Facilities
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produce the added benefit of solving the
contamination problem (Meyers and Tarlock,
p. 352,1980). Environmentalists opposed the
canal on the ground that it would deprive the
Delta of vital freshwater flows. Proponents
insisted that failure to build the canal would
come at the expense of Project contractors,
especially Southern California water users,
since freshwater releases would then be
required from the State Water Project to halt
the salinity and silt intrusions.
Despite winning the endorsement of
key state agencies, the Peripheral Canal
proposal was defeated soundly by referendum
in 1982. Northern California overwhelmingly
opposed the canal but the project's defeat
was ensured when it received only a weak
approval from voters in Southern California,
the area that was the major intended
beneficiary, and heavy negative votes
throughout most of the rest of the state. A
more recent proposal by California Governor
George Deukmejian for a different project to
get water past the Bay-Delta also was stopped
by wide political opposition.
The feelings of Californians about the
distribution of water between the northern
and southern regions of the state remain
strong today. Unresolved conflicts over water
quality, conservation, water marketing and
groundwater rights are certain to be
exacerbated in the event of severe drought.
There are several proposals to expand
and complete the SWP. Indeed, construction
is underway on the East Branch Enlargement
and additional pumps are being installed at
the Delta pumping plant. They could add
considerably to the delivery capacity of the
SWP. The efficacy of these projects, however,
may be limited by the State Water Resources
Control Board's resolution of the Bay-Delta
issue. Thus, improvement in the system's
physical capacity to meet Southern
California's water supply needs may not be
fully realized because of the necessity to
restrict the quantity of water pumped from
the Bay-Delta to protect public values.




California is often described as having
a "dual system11 of water law. The two
primary legal doctrines that form California's
law of water rights are: (1) the riparian
doctrine; and (2) the prior appropriation
doctrine. These doctrines quickly came into
conflict as the state began to develop its
water resources.
The riparian doctrine is the legacy of
the common law, which had developed in the
eastern United States by the time of
California's statehood in 1850. The first
California legislature adopted the common
law as the rule of decision for state courts.
The common law, it was assumed, embraced
riparianism (Attwater and Markle, 1988).
The riparian doctrine gives the owner
of land abutting a watercourse full use of the
water on the adjoining - or "riparian" - land.
The doctrine provides that all landowners
abutting a stream share equally in any loss in
streamflow during times of shortage; that the
water must be used only on stream-front
parcels within the watershed; and that no one
may unreasonably interfere with the use of
another riparian owner on the stream.
The miners who swarmed to
California in the Gold Rush of 1848 found
the riparian doctrine inadequate to meet their
needs. Since riparian rights could belong only
to landowners and all the land was owned by
the United States, there was no way for the
miners, who were essentially trespassers, to
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obtain water rights. They required water to
work their placer deposits in California's
mountain country, which were not always
conveniently located along flowing streams.
Traditionally (though not consistently)
riparian jurisdictions had held that only the
owners of land on streams were entitled to
water that could be used only on the
streamside land.
Since riparian law did not fit the
miners' situation they formulated their own
water rights rules by custom. They simply
went ahead and diverted the water they
required through ditches and flumes to their
diggings. The mining camps had developed
a rule of "first in time, first in right" to
resolve disputes among mineral claimants.
The same rule was applied to water. The
first miner to "appropriate" water - the prior
appropriate* - established a priority of right
to use it. The miners believed the United
States intended minerals on the public lands
to be developed free of charge, using any
water that was necessary to do the job.
The new doctrine vested the prior
appropriator with a right to divert water from
the stream so long as it was used beneficially.
Rights did not depend on land ownership. In
contrast to riparian law, prior appropriation
also enabled a user to diminish the flow of a
stream and even change its course to fit the
"beneficial" purpose (Bowden, Edmunds, and
Hundley, p. 167, 1982).
In 1855 the California Supreme Court
applied the prior appropriation doctrine to
resolve the rights of two miners "trespassing"
on the public domain (Irwin v. Phillips, 1855).
These rights, established by usage, remained
valid so long as the beneficial use continued,
even after title to the public land was
patented to private individuals. But in later
cases where water use commenced after land
was patented to private parties, rights were
considered to pass with the land and to be
held under the riparian doctrine. Thus, the
state recognized two very different water
rights systems. The court was forced to
resolve the inevitable clash between the
doctrines in 1886, which it did by announcing
what would be known as the California
Doctrine (Lux v. Haggin. 1886). It declared
that an appropriator who began using water
before a private landowner acquired the
property from the United States (by
homestead, mining claim patent, etc.) held a
superior right to use the contested water. If
the appropriator began using the water after
riparian land was patented by the United
States, the landowner's riparian right would
be superior.
The California Supreme Court
elevated the rights of riparians in a 1926
decision by holding that riparian rights were
not limited to "reasonable uses" in contests
with appropriators:2^ The decision departed
from the reasonable use principle that had
been widely accepted in eastern states. It
appeared to sanction wasteful uses by
riparians who were competing with
appropriators for water. As a result, the
California Constitution was amended in 1928
to impose upon riparians and appropriators a
uniform standard prohibiting the waste of
water and limiting water rights to reasonable
beneficial use (Calif. Const, 1928). The
principle of reasonable beneficial use is now
considered "the central theme of modern
California water rights law" (Governor's
Comm'n, p. 9, 1978; United States v. State
Water Resources Control Board. 1986).
The 1928 Amendment to the
California Constitution does not provide any
exact definition of what constitutes "wasteful"
or "reasonable" use of water. State judicial
decisions interpreting the terms indicate that
a use considered reasonable under one set of
facts and circumstances may be considered
wasteful under different conditions (Attwater
and Markle, p. 979, 1988). Consequently, a
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significant change in conditions affecting many
users, such as a severe drought, could
potentially trigger constitutionally sanctioned
prohibitions against widespread current uses
on the ground that they are not reasonable
under drought conditions.
Even before the 1928 Amendment,
the state had placed some controls on the
use of water and created a system to
recognize and administer water rights without
resort to the courts. In 1914 California
voters passed a referendum approving the
Water Commission Act, which established a
permit system and recording requirements.
The Act provided that, while all water within
the state belongs to the people, the right to
use water can be conditioned "as provided by
law." The Water Code is the modern
statutory expression of California water law
and it declares a policy that domestic
purposes, followed by irrigation, are the
"highest use[s]" of water. (Cal. Water Code
§ 106, 1971).
Applications for permits based on new
appropriate rights are now approved, denied
or conditioned according to several standards
including public interest considerations at the
discretion of the State Water Resources
Control Board. The Board then requires that
permittees exercise "due diligence" in making
their appropriations. Riparian rights are not
subject to state permitting requirements
unless they have never been exercised.22 The
state supreme court has ruled that the
priority of a "dormant11 riparian right may be
subordinated to other rights in a statutory
adjudication of a stream system, fin re
waters of Lonp Valley Creek Stream System.
1979).
Appropriators who, through a lack of
due diligence, fail for five continuous years to
apply water to a reasonable beneficial use are
subject to forfeiture of their appropriative
rights. Critics have charged that this law
discourages conservation because any waters
conserved could be considered unused and
the right to use them forfeited. The Water
Code was amended in 1979 to protect
appropriators' future rights to use water that
is salvaged by conservation efforts. In
addition, water rights holders who meet the
conditions of the statute are allowed to
transfer their rights without the amount
transferred being subject to forfeiture (Cal.
Water Code § 1011). An apparent effect of
this latter change is to facilitate the lease or
sale of "surplus" water from agricultural users,
who account for about 80% of California's
water consumption, to municipal users (Bliss
and Imperati, 1978).
Groundwater Law
Groundwater rights exist as a distinct
subset of California water law. Groundwater
basins are vitally important, especially in
Southern California and the San Joaquin
Valley, as sources of supply and as natural
alternatives to above-ground storage facilities.
They are especially valuable during a drought
when surface supplies are limited. Eventually,
however, aquifers are subject to depletion as
a drought deprives them of recharge from
surface runoff and as water users increase
pumping to offset shortages in surface water
supplies.
Groundwater extractions which take
water for public service or for non-overlying
uses are considered appropriations.
Appropriators are limited to the extraction of
"surplus" water, that which is not needed for
overlying uses. Owners of land overlying a
groundwater basin generally have rights to
extract a share of the water in the aquifer for
reasonable overlying uses. There is no
priority among overlying users, but each has
a "correlative right" to pump a portion of the
water. But overlying users have priority over
appropriators regardless of when the various
uses began.
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California law also has allowed
groundwater rights by "prescription" in
overdrafted basins. That is, overlying users
taking more than their shares under the
correlative rights doctrine, and appropriators
taking non-surplus water, were allowed to
acquire the rights to those additional amounts
and thereby defeat the correlative rights of
other overlying owners. This encouraged
excessive pumping. Basins were being
"overdrafted" - pumped beyond
replenishment levels.
The courts consequently began
adjudicating contested groundwater claims
(Bowden, Edmunds, and Hundley, p. 168,
1982). The California Supreme Court
attempted a solution by developing a doctrine
of "mutual prescription," whereby all users in
an overdrafted basin were given prescriptive
rights against one another (City of Pasadena
v. City of Alhambra. 1949). Though designed
to restore equality in the sharing of basin
supplies, the doctrine generally increased
overdrafting, as users raced to establish their
extra pumping rights.
The court modified mutual
prescription in 1975 by holding that private
users could not obtain a prescriptive right
against a public agency or utility (City of Los
Angeles v. City of San Fernando. 1975). The
court also suggested that case-by-case
adjudications and the use of negotiated water
supply arrangements among groundwater
users should be employed in the future to
conserve basin supplies.
Critics have pointed out that
California lacks comprehensive state
groundwater management (Governor's
Comm'n, pp. 142-143, 1978). Only limited
state agency oversight extends to
groundwater; most control is exerted by
special districts. The legislature has approved
establishment of several districts in Southern
and Central California to manage the
groundwater resources of entire basins. Once
rights are adjudicated among claimants within
a basin, their pumping is limited to a "safe
yield" that recognizes established rights but
prevents overdrafts. "Safe yield" is a relative
figure that may temporarily exceed the
average rate of natural replenishment if it
does not result in damage such as land
subsidence or pollution (e.g., from salt water
intrusion).
Pueblo Rights
During the period of Spanish and
Mexican rule in the American Southwest, the
Catholic Church established missions
throughout the area. Under Spanish and
Mexican law the communities, or pueblos,
that grew up around these missions received
the right to use waters running through them
from their source to the sea. This right
applied to both surface water and
groundwater basins supplying these
watercourses (Attwater and Markle, p. 969,
1988). When the region became part of the
United States the cities which succeeded the
pueblos retained these water rights.
A city which is a successor to a
pueblo right has the right to take from the
normal river flow as much water as may from
time to time be reasonably necessary for
municipal purposes and for the use of its
inhabitants, both those within and those
without the boundaries of the original pueblo.
This right is prior to and paramount over the
right of any other person whether claiming as
a riparian owner or appropriates (City of Los
Angeles v. City of Glendale. 1942).
Los Angeles' pueblo rights attach to
the Los Angeles River (Vernon Irrigation Co.
v. City of Los Angeles. 1895) and to the San
Fernando Groundwater Basin, which is a
source of the Los Angeles River (City of Los
Angeles v. City of San Fernando. 1975). San
Diego has a pueblo right to the San Diego
38
River (City of San Diego v. Cuvamaca Water
Co.. 1930). The cities have the right to the
entire water sources because both require
much more water than the rivers supply.
In practical terms, however, pueblo
rights have very little significance today.
Local water supplies fill only a small portion
of the area's total water demand. By giving
a preference in use of these local sources to
the cities, pueblo rights can reduce costs to
the cities holding them. Thus, Los Angeles
and San Diego can rely on a larger share of
local water, purchasing less imported water.
Others, lacking pueblo rights, rely more
heavily on imported water, typically from
Metropolitan Water District deliveries. Of
course if there were a shortage of imported
water the two cities with pueblo rights would
enjoy priority in use of waters from the Los
Angeles and San Diego Rivers.
Area of Origin Protection
California enacted two of the earliest
area of origin protection laws in the country.
In the 1930s, the state began major initiatives
to develop projects in water-rich areas of the
north to serve agricultural needs in the
Central Valley and municipal growth in
Southern California and the San Francisco
Bay. People in areas where the water
originated were understandably concerned
about exporters monopolizing rights to water
resources that would be needed locally in the
future.
In 1931 California passed its county of
origin law (Cal. Water Code § 10505). The
statute is narrowly applicable to
appropriations of water held by the state of
California and assigned or released by the
state to others. And it protects only counties
where exported water originates. The statute
in its entirety states that: "No priority under
this part shall be released nor assignment
made of any application that will, in the
judgment of the board, deprive the county in
which the water covered by the application
originates of any such water necessary for the
development of the county." Several
limitations are apparent in the statute: (1) It
protects only the ability of the county to
"develop," not necessarily against the effects
the county would suffer as a result of exports
during a drought; (2) It applies only to
appropriations of water made by the
Department of Water Resources
("assignment" refers to the Department
assigning these rights for use by others), to
enable fulfillment of a water plan or future
water needs; (3) It depends on judgments of
the State Water Resources Control Board
made at the time an assignment of rights
from the Department is approved. As a
practical matter, this last qualification makes
the statute extremely difficult to apply unless
there is an identifiable future development on
the horizon in the county of origin. The
Board otherwise must speculate about long-
range county development and the water that
would be necessary for it. In practice the
Board avoids this speculation in approving
assignment contracts by requiring that a
proviso be included in each contract reciting
that they are subject to "any and all rights of
any county" of origin.
California enacted a broader area of
origin statute in 1933. The Watershed
Protection Act was designed to deal with the
equities of the much larger areas that would
be deprived of water by development of the
massive Central Valley Project (CVP). Thus,
the law extends rights to entire watersheds
and to areas adjacent to them that can
conveniently be supplied with water from the
watershed. The Act creates a "prior right to
all of the water reasonably required to
adequately supply the beneficial needs of the
watershed, area, or any of the inhabitants or
property owners therein" (Cal. Water Code
§ 11460). Importantly, it protects a right to
water required for watershed needs on an
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ongoing basis. Presumably this statute can be
applied as shortages occur, giving it
importance in drought.
The Watershed Protection Act is by
its terms enforceable only against the
Department of Water Resources. It does not
apply generally to the State Water Resources
Control Board's exercise of its water
allocation responsibilities (except when water
is allocated by the Board to the Department
for the CVP).
Although the Act was designed
specifically to deal with the CVP, its
applicability to the project as it finally
developed has never been tested. After the
law was passed, the state decided thai it did
not have the financial means to build the
CVP as it had planned. Instead, the federal
government took over the Project in 1935.
As such, the project is subject to Section 8 of
the Reclamation Law which declares that the
federal government will proceed in conformity
with state water laws when acquiring rights
for Reclamation projects (43 U.S.C. § 383).
The Supreme Court has interpreted Section
8 as requiring the government to follow
mandates of state law "which are not
inconsistent with congressional provisions
authorizing the project in question"
(California v. United States. 1978). If a
preference for the watershed of origin
resulted in inadequate water for the CVP or
otherwise offended the fundamental purposes
of the project, operation of the Watershed
Protection Act would be precluded (Tresno v.
California. 1963).
The watershed of origin for the CVP,
while covering a vast area of Northern
California, is sparsely populated, has relatively
low agricultural demands and is already well-
supplied with water. However, if watershed
needs were read as including all
environmental resources of the area the
statute could be a further tool in limiting the
extent and manner of diverting CVP water.
This could bear on decisions concerning the
Bay-Delta discussed elsewhere in this report.
Limits on CVP supplies would not directly
affect use or availability of water in the study
area, even in a drought This is because
CVP water is not allocated to Southern
California. There could be indirect effects on
the region, though. Exchanges and other
arrangements that have been pursued recently
between MWD and CVP contractors assume
continued CVP supplies being available to
the contractors.
State Agencies
The two key state agencies charged
with administration of water rights under
California law are the State Water Resources
Control Board (SWRCB) and the
Department of Water Resources (DWR).
The SWRCB is made up of five
members appointed by the Governor. It has
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions.
The Board is authorized by statute to permit
appropriations "under such terms and
conditions as in its judgment will best
develop, conserve, and utilize in the public
interest the water sought to be appropriated."
In evaluating applications, the SWRCB
considers the likely effect of the proposed use
on existing beneficial uses. It also evaluates
the reasonableness of the purpose and
amount of the proposed use and the relative
benefits to be derived considering all
beneficial uses of water (Attwater and
Markle, pp. 984-85, 1988; Cal. Water Code §
1257). Beneficial uses include fish and
wildlife protection as well as domestic and
agricultural uses (Cal. Water Code § 1243).
The DWR is a unit of the California
Resources Agency, a cabinet-level entity.
The Department's directive is to protect,
conserve, develop and manage California's
water. Its primary duties are to plan the
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statewide water supply, provide for public
safety and build and operate the State Water
Project (SWP). In its planning capacity the
DWR cooperates with SWRCB in developing
the California Water Plan, a periodically
updated framework for water management
DWR's safety functions are flood control and
supervision of dam operation, maintenance
and construction. Its management of the
SWP is discussed elsewhere in this report.
The SWRCB and the DWR agencies
are both directed by state law to prevent the
waste or other misuse of water by enforcing
the constitutional rule of reasonable beneficial
use. They have fashioned joint rules to
investigate and act upon waste or other
misuse of water, whether in the context of a
permit application or otherwise. The
SWRCB is empowered to conduct
adjudicatory hearings to determine
reasonableness of use and to enforce its
findings in three ways. The Board may go to
state court for an order enjoining the misuse
of water; it may assess civil penalties against
unauthorized appropriators; and it may issue
its own "cease and desist" order to stop
violation of a water rights permit (Cal. Water
Code § 1831).
Concerns over shortages from drought
prompted the legislature in 1982 to expand
the roles of the SWRCB and the DWR in
facilitating conservation. The agencies are
directed by section 109 of the Water Code to
encourage voluntary transfers of water and
water rights and to help users implement
technical conservation measures to increase
the availability of water. The DWR is
charged with collecting and making available
information on the physical facilities which
can be used for transfers and listing possible
water lease and exchange partners (O'Brien,
p. 1195, 1988).
An appropriator who wishes to
transfer water or make any other change in
the point of diversion, place of use or
purpose of the use allowed under the water
right must secure the permission of the
SWRCB. The Board's approval depends on
a showing that "no injury" (i.e., reduction in
reasonable use) will result to any legal user
of the water involved (O'Brien, p. 1170,
1988). It has been suggested that
conservation would be further enhanced by
giving the SWRCB statutory authority to
compel users "injured" by water transfers to
accept substituted sources of supply or to
modify their uses at the transferring party's
expense (Dunning, p. 448, 1986).
The SWRCB is also entrusted by law
with oversight of water quality within the
state. The problem of salt water coming into
the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta from San
Francisco Bay, discussed in this chapter in
connection with the State Water Project,
exemplifies a situation in which the board
must consider modifying existing water rights




As discussed in more detail in
Chapter 2, California's total apportionment
from the Colorado River is 4.4 million acre-
feet per year. Of this amount, generally
speaking, 550,000 acre-feet are for municipal
users. The rest of the state's share, 3.85
million acre-feet, belongs to three large
irrigation districts. The consumptive use of
Indian tribes with reservation land in
California, now 55,000 acre-feet a year,
should be deducted from the total water
available to other users.
MWD has secured the right to use
100,000 acre-feet a year of Imperial Irrigation
District's entitlement and 26,000 acre-feet a
year of Coachella Valley Water District's
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entitlement, resulting in a rather certain
MWD supply of 676,000 acre-feet, even in
very dry years. Negotiations are proceeding
for MWD and perhaps other municipal users
to obtain rights to salvage and use 70,000
acre-feet from the All American Canal and
additional high priority Colorado River water
allocated to agricultural irrigators.
As noted earlier, MWD has used
several hundred thousand acre-feet a year of
"surplus" lower basin entitlements while the
Central Arizona Project has been under
construction. Continued use of some of that
water will probably be possible until the
growing urban areas of Arizona, especially
Phoenix and Tucson, have exhausted less
expensive groundwater supplies or local or
state decisions are made to import the full
share of the state's CAP water and use it to
recharge aquifers.
Although the salinity of water
imported from the Colorado River is high, it
can be blended with locally pumped
groundwater and treated so that it is of
acceptable drinking water quality.
Local Surface Water
In a normal year, only five percent of
Southern California's water comes from local
streams (State of Cal, DWR, Drought.... p.
23, 1989). Figures for surface water supplies
in Southern California are difficult to
distinguish from groundwater, however. Little
surface water is used directly; most is
collected as floodwater runoff and used to
recharge groundwater basins. In Los Angeles
County and Orange County, reservoirs
capture runoff from the surrounding
mountains and allow it to percolate into
groundwater. Only one of these, the San
Gabriel Dam and Reservoir, has facilities for
direct use of runoff flow; the rest are used
solely to supply spreading grounds which
recharge groundwater, averaging about
300,000 acre-feet a year. Only about 28,570
acre-feet a year of water are directly
delivered downstream to the "Committee of
Nine," a consortium of water users in the San
Gabriel Valley (David, 1989).
San Diego County uses about 100,000
acre-feet of local runoff in an average year.
All of this water is captured by dams and
then allowed to flow down to users' diversion
points (Maitski, 1989). In addition, Camp
Pendleton, located north of San Diego in the
county, takes all the water from the Santa
Margarita River to supply the Marine base's
needs (Duncan, 1989).
Inland areas of Southern California
receive almost no rain, and what does fall
soaks into the ground almost immediately.
Because of these factors, use of water by
surface diversions is minimal. The entire
Colorado River Desert area produces only
4,000 acre-feet annually while total water use
is about four million acre-feet (State of Cal.,
DWR, Drought, p. 35, 1989). Complete loss
of local surface supplies would have almost
no effect on this area.
Groundwater
Groundwater basins underlying
Southern California contain a vast amount of
water — an estimated four million acre-feet.
Their average annual safe yield — the
estimated amount that will be replaced - is
over one million acre-feet, more in a wet
year. Annual pumping can exceed safe yield
without "overdrafting" a basin because large
amounts of imported water are put into
groundwater basins for storage, providing
artificial recharge. Temporary overdrafts also
may be motivated by exigencies. In the
drought year of 1977, the City of Los Angeles
overdrafted the San Fernando Basin, one of
its primary local water sources, by 40,000
acre-feet (Boronkay and Hutchinson, p. 146,
1977).
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Local groundwater pumping provides
about one-third of all water used in Southern
California (Metropolitan Water District, p. 7,
1987). The area relies heavily on
supplemental water supplies imported and
delivered by the Metropolitan Water District
There is a growing problem of aquifer
contamination from organic compounds and
toxics that seep in from dumpsites, old
industrial plants and leaking underground
storage tanks. Groundwater is usually mixed
with imported water to dilute such pollutants
before it is delivered to customers. Water
for Southern California comes from about
thirty different groundwater basins, which
provide a stable supply of about 1.3 million
acre-feet each year to users in the area (see
Table 3-1).
The groundwater basins serving
Southern California vary greatly in quality.
For instance, the basins underlying the City
of Beverly Hills contain significant water
deposits that are unusable because of inferior
quality. San Diego County has sizable
groundwater basins but most of the water is
affected by saline intrusions from the Pacific
Ocean and so the basins provide almost no
usable water.
State Water Project
Entitlements to delivery of Northern
California water are based on of each long-
term contractor's future water needs as
estimated when the contracts were signed
between 1960 and 1965; some entitlements
have been revised from original estimates.
The Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California, by far the largest of the SWP's
public agency contractors, is entitled to
2,011,500 acre-feet annually. This comprises
nearly half of all SWP entitlements which are
4,217,786 acre-feet for all areas served.
MWD's contract was the first one for SWP
water. It is the prototype for the contracts
used by the state to allocate project water to
some 30 other agencies (State of Cal., DWR,
Bulletin 132-88, 1988).
Although entitlements exceed 4.2
million acre-feet annually, the current annual
"firm yield," or dependable annual water
supply, of the SWP is limited to
approximately 2.4 million acre-feet Thus, the
amount of water actually delivered to MWD
is about 1.15 million acre-feet per year
(Kendall, 1990). This is because transfer and
conservation facilities planned for the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and other
unbuilt facilities would be necessaryfor the
SWP to operate at full capacity (Littleworth,
p. 1203, 1988).
SWP contractors may be allowed
deliveries in excess of their annual
entitlements under conditions that protect the
entitlements of other contractors. In 1987,
for example, the DWR allowed two
contractors, the Oak Flat Water District and
the Antelope Valley-East Kern Water
Agency, to take increased deliveries as
advance deliveries of their 1988 entitlement
water. "Future entitlement delivery credits"
for "make-up water" are available to all
contractors when the SWP is unable to
deliver the requested entitlement in any year.
These credits entitle them to deliveries of
"wet-weather" water at times when above-
normal local supplies reduce the demand for
SWP water.
Contracts for State Water Project
water provide for reducing deliveries to
agricultural users during shortages by up to
50% before any reductions are made for
municipal and industrial purposes.
Agricultural reductions may amount
cumulatively to 100% of the annual
entitlement over any given period of seven
consecutive years. After either a 50%
reduction in a single year or reductions over
seven years amounting to 100% of a
contractor's annual entitlement, municipal and
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Sources: Metropolitan Water District, 1987;
State of California, DWR, Bulletin
No. 160-83, p. 133, 1983.
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agricultural users must share reductions in
their contractual entitlements equally.
Under Article 15 of the State Water
Contract, contractors can sell entitlement
water outside their own districts. If the water
is to be used within another SWP contractor
district the transfer requires the permission of
the DWR and the district Transfers that
would impair the ability of contracting
agencies to make payments on their
entitlements are not allowed.
The greatest constraint on the State
Water Project's capacity to deliver water is
the Bay-Delta problem. Pumping operations
can seriously reduce flows into the Bay-Delta,
increasing salinity and siltation. In times of
low flows, which generally coincide with the
greatest demand for pumping, serious water
quality problems occur as salt water from the
San Francisco Bay intrudes, threatening the
ecology of a large expanse of low-lying lands
and associated wetlands. Degradation of fish
and wildlife habitat and of other beneficial
uses of water have led to a full consideration
of how to meet water demands consistent
with protection of public values. There is
also general correlation of low outflow and
the incidence of trihalomethane precursors.
Carcinogenic organic chemicals known as
trihalomethanes are formed when water
containing precursors are subjected to
chlorination (Vaux, 1990). Measures to
control these contaminants are also being
considered.
The State Water Resources Control
Board is developing a revised water quality
control plan for the Bay-Delta. Although the
Board intends for all users of Bay-Delta water
to share to some extent the burdens of
maintaining its quality, the plan almost
certainly will result in some required releases
of water. Such releases will reduce the
overall amounts of water available for SWP
and CVP water users and restrict new uses of
water from these projects. The consequences
of reducing Southern California's SWP supply
to satisfy the Bay-Delta water quality plan
would obviously be magnified if a severe
drought reduced supplies from other sources.
The SWP and CVP have some joint-use
facilities for pumping, generating and storage
under a 1961 agreement between the DWR
and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR).
In 1986, these two agencies signed the
Coordinated Operation Agreement (COA),
which provides for the sharing of
responsibility to meet Delta water quality
standards. Also under the COA, the DWR
and the USBR have recently concluded a
contract that allows CVP water to be
conveyed through SWP facilities in exchange
for interim SWP use of excess CVP water.
This arrangement is expected to enhance the
DWR's ability to meet SWP contractor
entitlements. The agreement allows the
DWR to convey CVP water as long as such
deliveries do not reduce SWP supplies,
increase costs to SWP contractors or
adversely affect the quality of water delivered
to the contractors (State of Cal., DWR,
Bulletin 132-88, pp. 5-6, 1988).
Los Angeles Projects
Owens Valley
By purchasing lands in distant Inyo
County riparian to the Owens River, as well
as lands overlying groundwater supplies, Los
Angeles effectively gained a monopoly on
water rights in the Owens Valley less than a
decade into the twentieth century. The City
currently receives about 370,000 acre-feet per
year from the Owens Valley, by far the
largest portion of the City's water supply.
Plans to expand this source have been
thwarted so far by legal opposition.
In the 1970s, the City planned to
augment water delivered by the Los Angeles
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aqueduct from increased surface diversions
out of the Mono Basin, reduced irrigation of
Los Angeles' Owens Valley lands and
increased pumping of the underlying
groundwater reservoirs. Inyo County sued to
enjoin Los Angeles' expanded groundwater
pumping until the City filed an Environmental
Impact Report (EIR) in compliance with the
California Environmental Quality Act
(CEQA). In 1973 the state court of appeal
ordered the City to prepare the EIR and
later imposed a limit on the amount of
groundwater to be pumped until the
document was approved (County of Invo v.
City of Los Angeles. 1973). The court
retained jurisdiction and made several
additional decisions (County of Invo v. City of
Los Angeles. 1976, 1977, 1981, 1984).
In 1980 Inyo County voters approved
the Owens Valley Groundwater Ordinance,
giving the County regulatory authority over
groundwater pumping in the valley. After the
Inyo Superior Court declared the ordinance
unconstitutional, Los Angeles and the County
entered into a five-year interim agreement in
1984. The agreement suspended all litigation
and called for a long-term groundwater
management plan for the Owens Valley. It
also established an enhancement and
mitigation program to develop wildlife habitat,
recreational areas and greenbelts as a
condition to the County's acquiescence in the
City's continued groundwater pumping (Los
Angeles Dep't of Water and Power, 1988).
In July, 1989, Los Angeles and Inyo County
entered a long-term agreement. The
agreement is subject to court approval, which
would allow Los Angeles to pump
groundwater from the Owens Valley so long
as it does not cause mining of groundwater
or create surface vegetation problems. Los
Angeles will be required to mitigate any
problems that arise (Los Angeles Dep't of
Water and Power, Agreement. 1989).
Approval of the agreement awaits the
preparation of an adequate EIR. The City
will submit an EIR, its third attempt, in mid
1991.
In 1940 the Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power (DWP) was granted
appropriation permits by the State of
California to divert water from streams
tributary to Mono Lake for municipal uses
and power generation. Shortly thereafter,
DWP completed an extension of the Los
Angeles Aqueduct from the Owens Valley to
the Mono Basin to a total length of 338
.miles. It then began diverting about half the
flow of these streams into the aqueduct.
Between 1941 and 1970 the City imported a
yearly average of approximately 57,000 acre-
feet from the Mono Basin. In 1970 DWP
completed the second Los Angeles Aqueduct
and has since imported an annual average of
100,000 acre-feet from the Mono Basin, about
17% of the City's total water supply
(Attwater and Markle, p. 1028, 1988).
The future" of the City's Mono Basin
water supply became uncertain as a result of
a 1983 California Supreme Court ruling
(National Audubon Society v. Superior Court
of Alpine County. 1983). The court held that
appropriate water rights in the state are
subject to review and potential reallocation
under the public trust doctrine. Under this
judicial doctrine the state holds all navigable
waters and underlying lands in California in
trust for the benefit of the people.
Environmentalists charged that Los Angeles'
diversions from Mono Lake lowered its level
by more than 40 feet and made it more
saline. This reduced the brine shrimp
population and seriously diminished the value
of the lake as migratory bird habitat. The
state supreme court found that the state had
granted Los Angeles its rights without
considering all the competing interests,
particularly environmental consequences.
Because water is held in trust for the public,
the City's rights must be reconsidered. The
court held that the SWRCB and the courts
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have authority to reexamine previously
authorized diversions of the state's waters,
such as DWP's Mono Basin rights, to
determine whether they were permitted
consistent with the public trust.
Subsequent lawsuits by public interest
environmental groups have challenged specific
diversion licenses held by Los Angeles in the
Mono Basin. In January, 1989, the state
court of appeal ordered the SWRCB to
revoke two of Los Angeles* Mono Basin
licenses and reissue them with conditions
requiring releases to create water flows for
fishery maintenance (California Trout. Inc. v.
SWRCB. 1989). The City appealed, but the
California Supreme Court refused to hear the
case. The Sacramento County Superior
Court is currently implementing the appeal
court's order.
According to the Los Angeles DWP,
Mono Basin releases would require
replacement supplies at a cost of $230 per
acre-foot, a maximum of $23 million per year,
if the full 100,000 acre-feet claimed by the
city must be left in the streams flowing into
the Mono Lake to protect the environment.
Los Angeles would purchase any necessary
replacement water from the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California (MWD)
(Los Angeles City Attorney's Office, 1989).
All the above sources are summarized in
Table 3-2.
Institutional Water Management in Southern
California
Metropolitan Water District
There are over 1,000 separate water
districts in California which deliver water to
various urban and rural users. The largest of
these districts is the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California (MWD).
MWD was organized as a public agency in
1928 by the City of Los Angeles and ten
other cities to develop a municipal water
supply from the Colorado River to augment
local supplies. It now delivers full or partial
supplies as a wholesaler to 27 member public
agencies in six Southern California counties,
providing for about 50% of the water demand
for the 14.5 million people in its service area.
Although MWD's primary mission is to supply
municipal water, it serves a small number of
irrigators in its service area; deliveries to
irrigators may be curtailed in shortages.
The water delivered by MWD comes
from two sources: dams and reservoirs that
are mostly federal on the Colorado River,
with delivery through the Colorado River
Aqueduct which MWD owns and operates;
and State Water Project reservoirs whose
waters are conveyed through the California
Aqueduct under a contract between the state
and MWD.
MWD, the first contractor for SWP
water in 1960, is entitled to over 2 million
acre-feet of water per year of which it
receives a firm annual yield of 1.15 million
acre-feet. As explained in the preceding
section, MWD has the right to demand
curtailment of agricultural uses to allow it to
use its share of firm yield in a time of short
supply. Only after severe reductions in
agricultural uses is MWD exposed to
reductions of SWP deliveries. In the drought
year of 1977, for example, after an initial
50% reduction in all agricultural supplies
MWD's contractual entitlement of SWP water
was reduced by some 75,000 acre-feet
concurrent with a 10% additional agricultural
reduction (MWD Contract with DWR, 1988;
State of Cal., DWR, 1976-1977 California
Drought. 1978). In the same year, MWD
initiated a conservation program aimed at
reducing the demand of its 27 member
agencies. The program included a surcharge
on water sales to member agencies, offset by
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conservation practices (State of Cal., DWR,
Drought. 1989).
MWD's current objective is to
maximize deliveries of Colorado River water
to meet its requirements. Its goal is to
reduce the higher energy costs involved in
pumping SWP water and generally to lessen
its demands on the State Water Project. It is
endeavoring to do this in a number of ways,
including several agreements with agricultural
users of Colorado River water that give
MWD firmer rights to large quantities of that
water. MWD's claim on Colorado River
water is being greatly enhanced by virtue of
its agreement with the Imperial Irrigation
District (IID). Over 125,000 acre-feet a year
of additional water will be available as a
result of the MWD investment in
conservation measures to improve agricultural
water delivery system in the Imperial and
Coachella Valleys. MWD has entered into
exchange agreements that allow it to take
direct delivery of SWP water belonging to the
Desert Water Agency and the Coachella
Water District. MWD continues to lake
delivery of its full share of Colorado River
water which is then stored in the Coachella
groundwater basin where it is available for
users there.
MWD is also using conservation to
stretch present supplies. In 1987, MWD
began offering financial incentives to member
agencies that implemented conservation
measures. Reclamation and reuse of water
within the MWD service area has also begun.
These measures now produce less than
200,000 acre-feet a year, but opportunities for
greater salvage of usable water are
tremendous. Notwithstanding all these
programs, increased demand from rapid
growth in the service area is quickly
outstripping the savings.
Pressures on MWD will increase as
locally developed groundwater supplies of
MWD's member agencies are limited by
groundwater contamination and the DWP's
Los Angeles Aqueduct supply (Mono Lake
and Owens Valley), are restricted by legal
requirements and agreements. As noted
previously, MWD's supply of SWP water is
itself subject to potential limitation since the
SWRCB's Bay-Delta water quality plan may
require releases of SWP water. These
pressures coincide with Arizona's incipient
capacity to use its share of Colorado River
water. Consequently, MWD's dependence on
SWP water may increase despite MWD's goal
of maximizing Colorado River water
deliveries.
Los Angeles Department of Water
and Power
The Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power ("DWP") provides
municipal and industrial water for the City of
Los Angeles. The Department serves about
3.4 million people through more than 650,000
connections and makes minimal agricultural
deliveries (State of Cal., DWR, Drought.... p.
61, 1989).
DWP's primary source is surface water
delivered through the Los Angeles Aqueduct
from the Owens Valley and the Mono Lake
Basin. As noted above, these sources supply
an average of 470,000 acre-feet per year to
the City. They are subject to considerable
uncertainty due to legal problems that may
limit their future yield. Local supplies also
provide DWP with some water. Groundwater
pumping provides DWP with about 100,000
acre-feet per year. Surface water is also
used, primarily for groundwater recharge.
During 1988, DWP's Los Angeles
Aqueduct supply was reduced to about 75%
of normal, due to the summer's extended dry
conditions. This shortage was partly offset by
increased groundwater pumping from the
Owens Valley and water from reservoirs in
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the Los Angeles Aqueduct system. DWP has
greatly increased its reliance on purchases
from MWD to meet growing demands as it
has been faced with the uncertainties and
limitations on its own supplies. Purchases
have escalated from the range of 50-100,000
acre-feet a year historically to 150,000 acre-
feet in 1988 and 200,000 in 1989. DWP
expects to buy over 260,000 acre-feet in 1990
(MWD, 1989). The role of MWD water is
evolving from a secondary, supplemental
source into a basic, very substantial source for
DWP.
The City of Los Angeles has adopted
water conservation ordinances in recent years
and spent $5 million in 1988 to enforce them.
The City implemented Phase I of its
Emergency Water Conservation Ordinance in
April 1988, restricting some residential water
uses such as hosing of sidewalks and
driveways. Under the ordinance, residents
were required to repair all water leaks on
their property and were asked to reduce their
water consumption voluntarily by 10%. The
City also passed an ordinance requiring the
retrofitting of water conservation devices on
all commercial, industrial and residential
properties. DWP will assess surcharges of
10% to 100% against certain users who fail
to install retrofit devices, but the charges do
not apply to the largest numbers of customers
(single-family dwellings and duplexes). In
addition, a 10% to 100% surcharge will apply
to all owners of large turf areas who do not
reduce their water use by 10% (State of Cal.,
DWR, Drought.... 1989).
DWP has the option, in the event of
reduced Los Angeles Aqueduct supplies in
the future, to implement Phases II through V
of the Emergency Ordinance, which require
mandatory reductions of 10%, 15%, 20% and
25%, respectively. DWP also considers
increased conservation efforts as a way of
obviating the potential environmental effects
of continued extensive groundwater pumping
in the Owens Valley.
Special Water Districts
The DWR and the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation are the largest water suppliers in
California, wholesaling water through the
SWP and the CVP, respectively. These
agencies deliver water to nearly 1,000 local
districts, cities and water companies which
then sell it to water users (Phelps, Moore,
and Graubard, 1978). These entities were
created under state law with duties and
powers over water distribution. Special
districts include irrigation districts and
municipal districts.
Special water districts are autonomous
governmental organizations formed for the
purpose of managing water supplies to the
citizens of an area. California has over a
hundred general and special acts authorizing
different kinds of water districts (Leshy, p.
357, 1982). Most districts primarily provide
water to farmers for irrigation but as
California and the West as a whole become
more urbanized this is changing; many of
these districts now provide considerable
municipal and industrial service. Economies
of scale help special water districts give water
users access to water sources and facilities
they could not otherwise afford. They also
provide a framework for operation of these
facilities.
All seventeen western states have
some act authorizing water districts, also
known as irrigation districts. They are all
based to some extent on California's 1887
Wright Act. The Act defines five typical
aspects of irrigation districts: (1) They are
under local control. Under the California act
(though not in all western states) local voters
elect the directors of the district, who must
own land within the district boundaries. In
some instances, voters and directors need not
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be residents if they own land in the district.
(2) Irrigation district boards have generalized
powers to perform any acts necessary to carry
out the purposes of the Act. (3) Directors of
water districts have the power to issue bonds
enabling development of more expensive
projects than would otherwise be possible.
(4) Districts are authorized to levy
assessments on real property. In California,
assessment rates are based on property
values; in other states they can be based on
a rate per acre or on the benefit received
from water. (5) As governmental entities,
water districts have tax-exempt status. All
property owned by the district, as well as its
income, is exempt from taxation by the state,
county or municipality.
In California, the district holds legal
title to water rights within its boundaries.
Landowners have a right to use the water
under a beneficial title. The system is much
like a trustee-beneficiary relationship.
Special agricultural water districts have
rights to significant quantities of water.
Municipal interests like MWD have begun to
explore the possibility of water transfers to
areas of high use during droughts. Such sales
are legally and physically feasible. The
California Supreme Court has ruled that sale
is a beneficial use for water. The district
must have incentives to sell, however. It
must either have extra water or be able to
induce reductions in use within the district to
obtain extra water. Although the parties to
a transaction must arrange transportation for
the water, Southern California's water supply
system is so extensive that most areas of the
state are on or near some part of the
network. Local prohibitions against transfers
out of the district can be a problem. The
directors of a district not only must be
persuaded to sell their water, but also to
change the rules prohibiting sale.
Southern California must pay enough
to persuade districts and their constituent
agricultural users to market their water and
give up their entitlements. As water becomes
scarcer during a drought, the value of water
to Southern California municipal users is sure
to be greater than its value to farmers in
other parts of the state. Theoretically, the
amount of water subject to transfer is limited
only by the total amount of water use in the
state. However, there are political and
economic arguments against a serious
intrusion on the state's rich agricultural
industry. Ultimately, though, most of the
water needed for municipal uses could be
acquired through agricultural transfers.
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Arizona was originally part of the
New Mexico Territory that was won by the
United States in its 1846 Mexican War
victory. The separate Arizona Territory was
created in 1863. Settlers began to
concentrate in the south central region of
Arizona by the end of the nineteenth century.
Until after World War II when Arizona's
population growth exploded, water was
supplied mainly by surface diversions from the
Colorado, Verde, Salt and Gila Rivers and
their tributaries. Agriculture was then the
primary user, accounting for approximately 95
percent of consumption.
Demand for diversion and storage
facilities in the Salt River Valley (which
includes Phoenix) led to the creation of
Arizona's first major water project, the Salt
River Project (SRP). See Figure 4-1.
During the late nineteenth century, the future
development of the area was limited by a lack
of water storage, inadequate diversion dams
and inequitable water distribution.
Landowners in the valley resolved to
overcome these problems by building a
reservoir at the confluence of Tonto Creek
and the Salt River some 80 miles northeast of
Phoenix. The cost of such a reservoir was
projected at $2-$5 million. As a territory of
the United States, Arizona was prohibited
from incurring debt, and private financing was
unattainable. Consequently, private
landowners in the valley turned to the newly
created federal Bureau of Reclamation to
help fund the proposed Salt River Project
(SRP). The project was included in the first
project authorization bill under the
.Reclamation Act of 1902.
Valley landowners created the Salt
River Valley Water Users* Association on
February 9, 1903 to ensure repayment of
project costs. They pledged members* lands
as collateral. A 1904 agreement between the
Bureau and the Association provided that the
obligation for construction costs and
assessments would be distributed among
Association members on a per-acre basis
regardless of the use or non-use of water.
The agreement was sanctioned by a federal
court decree apportioning stored Salt River
Valley waters in proportion to the
landowners' acreage. The rights to the
natural flow of the valley's streams remained
subject to determination under the prior
appropriation doctrine. The Association was
also formed to assume responsibility for
operation of the project.
The initial feature of the SRP was the
Roosevelt Dam at the Salt River-Tonto
Creek confluence. It was begun in 1905 and
completed in 1911 at a cost of more than $10
million. The reservoir, known as Roosevelt
Lake, had an original capacity of 1.2 million
acre-feet. Spillway modifications completed in
1936 increased the reservoir's capacity to 1.38
million acre-feet.
The SRP was expanded to include five
smaller reservoirs on the Salt and Verde
Rivers, with nearly continuous construction
spanning the four decades from 1908 to 1949.
The Horse Mesa, Mormon Flat and Stewart
Mountain Dams create a chain of reservoirs
called the Salt River Lakes. The Horseshoe
and Bartlett Dams are on the Verde River.
With Roosevelt Dam these facilities have a
combined storage capacity of over two million
acre-feet. Irrigation flow is regulated by





















































































































the Salt River. Four miles downstream from
the confluence of the Salt and Verde Rivers
(about 22 miles east of Phoenix) water is
diverted into two main canals at the Granite
Reef Diversion Dam for delivery to water
users within the SRP area (U.S. Dep't of
Interior, 1981).
The SRP now serves an area of about
250,000 acres and includes 248 well-pumping
units to supplement surface water supplies, as
well as 1,259 miles of canals and ditches of
which 842 miles are lined or piped. In 1937,
the Association persuaded the Arizona
legislature to form the Salt River Project
Agricultural Improvement and Power District
to help meet the SRP's financing obligations.
The Power District's boundaries and
constituencies are practically identical to those
of the Association. The Power District, a
political subdivision of the state, was
empowered to refinance the Association's
outstanding bonds at a lower rate with tax-
exempt bonds. The Association transferred
all of its properties to the Power District
under contract, but the Association continued
to operate the entire SRP until 1949 as an
agent of the Power District. The Salt River
Valley Water Users* Association completed
the repayment of the federal loans in 1955.
The administration of the SRP is now
effectively divided into two systems: water
supply and power supply. The Association
still operates the water system for agricultural,
municipal and industrial uses. The Power
District maintains the power generation and
delivery system. The two legally distinct
entities are commonly considered to comprise
the Salt River Project.
Agriculture was the dominant land use
when the SRP was formed. It still accounted
for 80% of the use of SRP member lands in
1956. By 1982, however, agricultural use had
fallen to 41%, due to the steady expansion of
the greater Phoenix metropolitan area and
the consequent increase in demand for
municipal and industrial water. Agricultural
uses of water within the SRP area are
projected to cease entirely by 2034. As
completed, the SRP now includes a total of
seven dams on the Salt and Verde Rivers. It
provides a total storage capacity of over
2,000,000 acre-feet for surface water supplies.
The other major source of surface
water in Arizona, the Gila River, flows
through southern Arizona, and is joined by
the Salt below Phoenix. It is hydrologically
part of the Colorado River basin, but its
water rarely reaches the Colorado River. It
has historically been administered separately.
Most of the Gila's waters are used for
agricultural purposes.25 The largest
consumers are the Gila River Indian
Reservation and the Wellton-Mohawk
Irrigation District. Several dams have been
built on the river, most notably Coolidge
Dam, which creates San Carlos Reservoir.
The San Carlos Irrigation Project was
authorized by Congress in 1924. Coolidge
Dam, located on the Gila River about 100
miles east of Phoenix, is the project's main
facility. The project diverts water from the
Gila River at the Ashurst-Hayden Diversion
Dam just above Florence, Arizona. The San
Carlos Reservoir created by the dam has a
capacity of about one million acre-feet.
Although the reservoir floods part of the San
Carlos Indian Reservation, uses water subject
to Indian water rights, and is administered by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the project Act
recognizes no prior rights in the tribe to use
water or storage relative to other project
beneficiaries. The project was designed to
provide water to 50,546 acres of the Gila
River Indian Reservation owned by Pima
Indians, and 50,000 acres off the reservation
owned by non-Indians (U.S. v. Gila Valley
Irrig. Dist., 1935). Because of chronic water
shortages, however - the reservoir has only
reached its capacity once, in 1983 (Walsh,
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1989) - it usually irrigates a total of only
55,000 to 65,000 acres (Dodge, 1989). The
most common use of project water is
irrigation of cotton and alfalfa fields (U.S.
Department of the Interior, 1988). Each
year, the project manager sets an allotment
of water for that year based on the estimated
available amount. This allotment has
historically ranged from one half to four acre-
feet per acre (Neumann, 1989). Once the
allotment has been determined, each farmer
decides how much land to irrigate. Any
water captured by a water user which has not
been stored in the San Carlos Reservoir is
not counted against the allotment (Neumann,
1989).
The San Carlos Irrigation Project has
several water rights in the Gila River. The
earliest is an immemorial (earliest priority)
right to 437.5 cubic feet per second (cfs)
based on Indian reserved rights. The project
also has water rights totalling 819 cfs with
priority dates ranging from 1868 to 1924, the
latter being among the most junior in the
system. In all, the project has rights to
1256.5 cfs out of total rights on the river of
1805.22 cfs (Gila Commissioner's Report,
plate 29, 1977). Rights on the Gila River
were adjudicated in 1935 in a decision known
as the "Gila Decree" OJ.S. v. Gila Valley
Irrie. Dist., 1935).
From 1930 to 1975 inclusive, the
project's water rights yielded an average of
177,132 acre-feet annually. This figure is the
amount that actually reaches the land to be
irrigated, and takes into account a 43.7
percent transit loss from Coolidge Dam to
the land (W.S. Gookin, 1977). About one
third of this loss occurs in the river between
Coolidge Dam and Ashurst-Hayden Dam.
Most of the ditches in the system are unlined
so that some of this transit loss is recaptured
as groundwater, but much of it is lost to
evaporation (Dodge, 1989).
The land served by the San Carlos
Project also gets water from groundwater
basins. The project has about 100 wells on
its lands. The wells. provide 60,000 to
100,000 acre-feet annually (Dodge, 1989).
The groundwater basins' primary source of
recharge is seepage from the river and
irrigated lands.
Dam safety concerns limit the amount
of water that the San Carlos Project can store
and deliver (Walsh, 1989). In late 1988, the
Bureau of Reclamation, which had been
requested by the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) in 1980 to inspect Coolidge Dam,
found safety deficiencies. Instability of the
foundation could lead to dam failure during
normal operating conditions. As a result,
restrictions on use of the dam have been
imposed. The reservoir cannot be filled
above eighty percent of capacity for extended
periods of time. Also, whenever the reservoir
reaches sixty percent of its capacity, BIA must
institute an around-the-clock watch on the
left abutment where the greatest problem was
found.
While surface water diversions in
Arizona have generally been governed by the
prior appropriation doctrine, groundwater
withdrawals have not been subject to a system
of priorities. The development of
groundwater supplies began in Arizona about
the turn of the century and increased steadily
over the next several decades. Following
World War II groundwater use grew rapidly
with the innovations in pump technology
which then were available. Groundwater
became the chief source of water and in
many areas of the state it is now the only
source. It soon became clear that Arizona
was depleting its groundwater more rapidly
than aquifers were being recharged in large
part because the Arizona courts and
legislature steadfastly.declined to impose legal
limitations on the extraction of groundwater
(Mann, p. 17, 1963).
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Virtually all dependable supplies of
surface water in Arizona were appropriated
by the 1960s. Total reliance on groundwater
supplies for all new growth exacerbated the
overdraft crisis. The state anticipated delivery
of surface supplies from the Colorado River
to abate the problem. Huge farms in the
three western counties along the Colorado
River, Mohave, LaPaz and Yuma, began
irrigating with river water early in the century.
As explained in Chapter 2, however, Arizona
always assumed that it was entitled to a
significant additional quantity of water from
the Colorado but the exact amount was not
determined until 1963. Then it took many
more years to finance and construct the
massive facilities needed to bring the water
from the river to the areas of the water
demand in the state.
As early as the 1940s the importation
of Colorado River water to central Arizona
was advanced as a solution to the state's
groundwater overdraft problem. The U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation completed a feasibility
study of the Central Arizona Project (CAP)
in 1947 and for the next several years
Arizona sought congressional authorization
and funding for the project.
Arizona maintained a prolonged feud
with California over the proper
apportionment of the river and while the
stalemate continued the CAP could not
achieve congressional approval. California
used its congressional clout to block the
project because of an ongoing dispute over
the two states' respective entitlements to
Colorado River water under the 1922
Colorado River Compact. The issue was not
resolved until 1963 when the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that Arizona had a right to 2.8
million acre-feet per year of Colorado River
water (Arizona v. California. 1963). In 1968,
the CAP was approved by Congress with
California's support, after Arizona agreed to
guarantee California's 4.4 million acre-feet
annual entitlement as a priority over use of
Arizona's apportionment in the CAP.
The CAP consists of three main
transportation facilities. The Granite Reef
Aqueduct running from Parker Dam on the
Colorado River to the greater Phoenix area
began deliveries in 1985. Deliveries via the
Salt-Gila Aqueduct, which extends the system
to Pinal County, began in 1986. The Tucson
Aqueduct, the project's final stage, is
expected to be completed in 1992 at which
time Arizona will be capable of diverting its
full share of Colorado River water.
The federal government erected a
hurdle to construction of the CAP when it
required that Arizona have a program to
conserve groundwater as a prerequisite to
federal funding of the project. The state
passed the 1980 Groundwater Management
Act (GWMA) in response. This complex
groundwater management scheme is described
below.
As the twentieth century draws to a
close, Arizona is experiencing continued
dynamic population growth, primarily in the
Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas. The
state's population rose by 51 percent to 2.8
million people between 1971 and 1981.
Phoenix is now the 9th largest metropolitan
area in the United States. This growth has
led, in turn, to a steady increase in the use of
water for municipal and industrial purposes,
with a commensurate reduction in agricultural
use. Nevertheless, most of the state's water
is still used for irrigation. Irrigated
agriculture consumed 6.3 million acre-feet of
water in 1980, while municipal and industrial
users consumed about 971,000 acre-feet. The
Arizona Department of Water Resources
(ADWR) projects that municipal and
industrial water use will continue to increase
and agricultural consumption will decrease.
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The Spanish tradition of civil law was
firmly rooted in Arizona when the territory
passed from Mexican to American control in
1846; the riparian common law, which
governed water rights in the eastern United
States, had made no inroads in the region.
By the time Arizona became the 48th state in
1912, the prior appropriation doctrine was
established as the guiding principle of water
law there as in the other western states. The
doctrine was seen as preferable to the
common law doctrine of riparian rights which
some believed would create monopolies for
the few landowners strategically located along
streams with dependable flows.
The 1864 Howell Code which served
as the territorial constitution declared that all
surface water capable of being used for
purposes of navigation or irrigation was public
property. It also guaranteed the rights of
settlers to build acequias, or irrigation canals,
and to "obtain the necessary water for the
same from any convenient river, creek, or
stream of running water" (Mann, p. 32,
1963), In 1887 the legislature amended the
code to declare that, "[t]he common law
doctrine of riparian rights shall not obtain or
be of any force or effect in this territory."
This language was later adopted in the
Arizona Constitution.
The Howell Code did not define
requirements for valid appropriations of
surface water. Thus the territorial (and later
state) courts supplied guidance, asserting that
diversions under the prior appropriation
system required an intention to .divert
followed by an actual appropriation pursued
with diligence toward some beneficial
purpose. In 1893 the Howell Code was
amended to require the publication of notice
of any intended diversion, as a means of
gauging the appropriator's diligence in putting
the appropriation to a beneficial use. Failure
to pursue the appropriation diligently would
result in forfeiture of the right. The statute
was amended again in 1921 and 1928. Only
a few reported cases dealing mostly with the
extent to which certain types of underground
water were covered by the code, applied the
law.
A 1945 law removed all underground
water from the Howell Code's coverage;
nearly all subsequent developments in water
law have dealt with groundwater. (Leshy and
Belanger, 1988). Historically, Arizona water
law focused on distinguishing between surface
water which was covered by appropriation law
and groundwater in which rights were linked
to land ownership. There was essentially a
dual system. Pumpers attempted to avoid the
obligations to prior users under the
appropriation doctrine by seeking to classify
as much water as possible as groundwater.
The courts often cooperated even where
pumped water was hydrologically connected
with a stream.
The 1980 Act centralized the
administration of water law in the state.
Surface water matters were formerly handled
in the office of the State Water
Commissioner. Extensive administrative
authority over surface waters has been
maintained in the 1980 Groundwater
Management Act, but the Director of the
Arizona Department of Water Resources
(ADWR) is now vested with the authority to
approve or reject applications for permits to
appropriate all water. The Director must
reject applications which conflict with vested
rights, menace public safety or threaten public
interests (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 45-152, 45-
153). An application may not be approved
for a greater quantity than can actually be
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put to a beneficial use and thus may be
approved for less water than is requested in
the application. Applications for municipal
uses may be approved to the exclusion of all
subsequent appropriations from the same
source if the Director determines that the
estimated needs of the municipality so require
(Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-153).
The state has assigned relative values
to uses of water to help in resolving conflicts
between applications for use from a given
supply. The order of preference for uses is:
(1) domestic and municipal; (2) irrigation and
stock watering; (3) power and mining; (4)
recreation and wildlife, including fish; (5)
artificial groundwater recharge (Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 45-157). Historically, Arizona
water law focused on distinguishing between
surface water which was covered by
appropriation law and groundwater in which
rights were linked to land ownership. There
was essentially a dual system. Pumpers
attempted to avoid the obligations to prior
users of a source of water under the
appropriation doctrine by seeking to classify
water as groundwater even though it might be
hydrologically connected with a stream.
While the 1980 Act discussed below
is nominally a groundwater law, it also makes
important changes in the law affecting surface
water. It generally moves Arizona toward
cooperative use of surface and groundwater
(See Leshy and Belanger, 1988). Many of its
provisions apply to both kinds of water. How
successful the concept of conjunctive
management will be in practice depends on
the discretion of the Director of Water
Resources.
Groundwater
Arizona's territorial legislature did not
specifically address groundwater in its 1893
amendment to the Howell Code. Very little
groundwater was being used at that time, in
marked contrast to the prevailing pattern of
use in the state now. The water that was
being used collected in shallow wells and was
subject to surface water law. Other pumped
water, if considered groundwater, could be
exploited by overlying landowners without
state control. The 1919 amendment to the
State Water Code made the first legislative
reference to underground water in declaring
that water flowing in definite underground
channels was subject to appropriation.
Meanwhile, the Territorial Supreme Court in
1904 applied common law principles in
drawing a distinction between waters flowing
in underground channels and those which
"percolated" through the soil. Percolating
waters were held to belong to the owner of
the land overlying them (Howard v. Perrin.
1904).
After World War II, Arizona became
more dependent upon groundwater supplies
than any other western state. In 1945 the
legislature passed the state's first Ground
Water Act requiring minimal filing
requirements of well owners and drillers.
Because of concern that an increasing
dependence on groundwater was rapidly
depleting the state's supplies, additional
controls were enacted in 1948. The law
provided for the designation of critical
groundwater areas in which pumping for
agricultural purposes could be restricted
unless the land to be irrigated had been in
cultivation for five years prior to passage of
the act. The 1948 Ground Water Code was
largely ineffective because of a lack of
enforcement and the fact that it did nothing
to reduce existing overdrafts (Mann, pp. 53-
54, 1963). Groundwater pumping actually
increased dramatically in the first five years
following passage of the act. Attempts to
strengthen the 1948 Code failed, and the
legislature did not come to terms with
Arizona's groundwater supply problem for
another three decades.
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Judicial activity created considerable
uncertainty. At one point, the Arizona
Supreme Court declared all groundwater
subject to the prior appropriation doctrine
(Bristor v. Cheatham. 1952). Then it
reversed the decision on rehearing and
adopted a common law rule allowing
landowners to pump groundwater subject only
to a reasonable use limitation (Bristor v.
Cheatham. 1953). The reasonable use rule
allowed virtually all agricultural withdrawals.
The court declined to embrace the correlative
rights rule which California employs to
apportion limited groundwater basin supplies.
Several years later, the court held that
municipalities purchasing and retiring
farmland could pump and transport only as
much groundwater as the prior agricultural
owner had consumed (Jarvis v. State Land
DepH. 1976). This case retreated from an
earlier ruling involving the same parties that
was more favorable to municipalities. The
court next ruled that use on municipal and
industrial (mining) lands was unreasonable
where such lands were not actually overlying
a statutorily designated critical area from
which the water was pumped (Farmers
Investment Co. v. Bettwv (FICO\ 1976).
Until the 1976 FICO decision, the
cases imposed little restraint in groundwaler
pumping. By then Arizona was pumping an
average of 4.8 million acre-feet of
groundwater per year, while diverting 2.5
million acre-feet of surface water per year.
The annual rate of groundwater recharge,
made up of natural recharge was 2.6 million
acre-feet, of 300,000 acre-feet plus return
flows from previous uses which found their
way back into the groundwater basins,
leaving a yearly statewide overdraft of 2.2
million acre-feet, about 45% of the total
amount pumped. Overdrafting has caused
substantial subsidence and ground fissures in
areas where heavy pumping has been
employed to meet agricultural demand.
For many years, the state's ultimate
strategy for dealing with the overdraft
problem was to rely on future Colorado River
supplies from the planned Central Arizona
Project (CAP). However, when the CAP
received congressional authorization in 1968,
it carried the stipulation that no water from
the project would be delivered in absence of
measures to control expansion of groundwater
use. The Carter Administration, in
furtherance of its water conservation goals
and to assist Arizona Governor Bruce
Babbitt's efforts to develop a new
groundwater law, later threatened to withhold
funding for the CAP until Arizona complied
with the groundwater management stipulation.
The state responded by enacting the 1980
Groundwater Management Act, creating a
system to restrict new groundwater uses in
overdrafted areas of the state with
concentrated municipal growth (Meyers,
Tarlock, Corbridge and Getches, 1987).
The Groundwater Management Act
(GWMA) was designed to manage the supply
and use of Arizona's water in such a way as
to achieve a condition of "safe annual yield"
within certain geographic areas where there is
groundwater overdraft. This translates to a
management goal of maintaining a long-term
balance between groundwater withdrawn and
groundwater replenished each year. The
other goal apparent throughout the Act is to
facilitate and regulate the conversion of
agricultural rights to municipal uses.
The GWMA created two classes of
areas in which new uses are severely
restricted. First, the Act established four
Active Management Areas. (AMAs) for the
groundwater basins containing Phoenix,
Prescott, Tucson and Pinal County. These
areas cover 80% of the state's population and
69% of the overdraft occurs there. New
AMAs may be designated by the Arizona
Department of Water Resources or by voter
initiative in the proposed area. Second, the
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GWMA designated three Irrigation Non-
Expansion Areas (INAs) in which only the
land cultivated in the five years prior to the
year of designation may continue to be
irrigated with groundwater. The goal for the
Phoenix, Tucson and Prescott AMAs is to
achieve safe annual yield by January 1, 2025.
For the Pinal AMA, the goal is the
preservation of the area's agricultural
economy "for as long as feasible, consistent
with the necessity to preserve future water
supplies for non-irrigation uses" (Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 45-562).
The GWMA's program for
groundwater conservation is implemented
through a series of five management plans
over a 45-year period. Each successive
planning cycle will tighten restrictions on
withdrawals, gradually imposing conservation
requirements on all types of users. Almost
all groundwater use in an AMA depends on
a statutory category. Groundwater rights may
be grandfathered for agricultural or non-
agricultural purposes or for conversion from
agricultural to municipal uses. They may also
be obtained through a groundwater
withdrawal permit for non-agricultural
purposes. Both grandfathered and newly
permitted rights must comply with the
management plan's conservation requirements.
Plans for the AMAs call for
achievement of safe annual yield by focusing
on improved efficiency of use by all three
major classes of water users, agricultural,
pumped and industrial. But because
agriculture is the largest user, the greatest
reductions will result from major reductions
in irrigation use. In the AMAs there is a flat
prohibitio against irrigating new agricultural
land. Three of the four AMAs account for
over 30 percent of the state's total
agricultural water consumption. Agricultural
use in the Phoenix AMA is projected to
decline from 1980 levels of 1,300,000 acre-
feet to 530,000 acre-feet by 2025, a 59
percent reduction. Agricultural reductions in
the Tucson and Prescott AMAs are projected
at 36 and 35 percent, respectively, over the
same period (Arizona Academy, p. 66, 1985).
Tucson will remain entirely dependent upon
groundwater for its water supply and
overdrafts will continue until completion of
the Tucson Aqueduct phase of CAP in 1992
(Ariz. Water Comm'n, pp. 24-25, 1975).
State Agencies
Water use in Arizona is controlled by
the Department of Water Resources. The
Department is headed by a Director, who is
appointed by, and serves at the pleasure of,
the Governor. The Department promulgates
and enforces all rules for water use in the
state. A seven-member board, the Arizona
Water Commission, reviews and makes
recommendations as to water policy, but the
Director is not legally obligated to follow
these recommendations.
The Director must approve all
applications to appropriate or change the use
of appropriated water. Any applicant whose
rights are affected by the Director's decision
may appeal to the state superior court. In
addition, anyone appropriating from a given
source may directly petition the court for a
general adjudication of the nature, extent and
relative priority of the water rights of all
users of that source as an alternative to an
administrative determination (Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 45-252). The Director also provides
technical assistance to the superior courts in
general stream adjudications.
Water Sources
The sources of water used in Arizona
will change in importance after the Central
Arizona Project (CAP) is fully operational.
Table 4-1 depicts the state's major sources of
water before and after the CAP.
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Local Surface Water
Surface water available to Arizona,
other than from the Colorado River
mainstem, flows primarily in the Gila, Salt
and Verde Rivers. These rivers in the south-
central part of the state, are connected: The
Verde is a tributary of the Salt, which is in
turn a tributary of the Gila. Water supplied
by the rivers is used heavily by agricultural
interests and the City of Phoenix. The
quantities available are discussed below under
the major projects that make possible their
delivery.
Major Water Projects
The Salt River Project currently
contracts to deliver surface and groundwater
supplies to ten municipalities within the SRP
area, including the cities of Phoenix, Tempe,
Glendale, Mesa and Scottsdale. These
municipalities pay the SRP an annual
assessment for formerly irrigated urban
acreage and receive the water to which this
acreage is entitled (Salt River Project, 1984).
Other cities partially within SRP district
boundaries cannot contract for SRP water,
though there is water available, because of
prohibitions in present law against serving
such customers. Actual diversions by the
project from 1930-1985 averaged 892,000
acre-feet per year (Linkswiler, 1990).
Because many of its water rights are
relatively junior, deliveries from the San
Carlos Project on the Gila River are not
entirely reliable in a drought. The Indians'
immemorial right will always provide some
water but other water rights could be
ineffective in a shortage. Those shortages
are shared by Indians and non-Indians alike.
From 1930 to 1975, the Indian portion of the
project never received more than 78% of its
decreed water right; in most years, the
.percentage was below forty (W.S. Gookin,
1977). With the recently imposed restrictions
on dam usage, it seems unlikely that even in
wet years the project will be able to deliver
more than it has in the past. The project is
currently capable of delivering less than
177,000 acre-feet per year. That amount, on
the average, most likely will be deliverable
once repairs on the unsafe dam structure
have been completed. About 77,000 acre-feet
of groundwater are pumped from the project
area which represents seepage from system
facilities and return flow from irrigation with
project water.
Colorado River
The largest single source of water to
Arizona is the Colorado River from which
the State is entitled to take 2.8 million acre-
feet per year. About 1.3 million acre-feet are
used on the lands closest to the river. The
remainder depends on major transportation
facilities to pump and convey it to central
Arizona. Those facilities are partially
completed allowing delivery as far as the
Phoenix area and soon, on full completion,
will allow the rest of Arizona's apportionment
to be diverted and delivered throughout
Central Arizona as far south as Tucson.
When fully operational, the CAP will
deliver an initial average of 1.5 million acre-
feet of water annually. (Another 50,000 acre-
feet of annual CAP supply could conceivably
come from development on the Gila and San
Pedro Rivers.) Of total available CAP
supplies, 640,000 acre-feet per year have been
allocated to municipal, industrial and
recreational uses; 310,000 acre-feet have been
allocated for use by Indian tribes; and the
remaining 600,000 acre-feet have been
allocated to non-Indian agricultural uses
(Arizona Academy, 1985).26
All non-Indian users of CAP water
will pay a charge of $53 per acre-foot for
project operation and maintenance, plus a
water service charge per acre-foot. The
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* The Pre-CAP figure for "dependable" water supplies excludes historical overdrafts of
groundwater that amounted to about 2.2 million acre-feet per year. See Table 4-2. Presumably
some overdrafts will be required to meet demand even after the CAP is fully operational.
**
Return flows from previously applied water from all sources historically have provided 2.3
million acre-feet of water available for reuse. As uses change from agriculture to municipal, it
is difficult to predict the amount of water that will return to aquifers and be available for reuse,
although the amount is certain to be considerably lower.
*** Exclusive of return flows and overdrafts.
Source: Arizona Water Commission, 1975.
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Bureau of Reclamation has set the service
charge at $2 per acre-foot for non-Indian
agricultural users. The Central Arizona
Water Conservation District, the contracting
agency for the CAP, has set an initial charge
of $5 per acre-foot for municipal and
industrial users. The "M & F charge will
eventually rise to $40 per acre-foot. The
acre-foot charges will be an important factor
in determining the amount of CAP water that
is used. Given the cheaper option of
pumping groundwater, users will generally
choose that source.
Groundwater
Much of Arizona's water supply,
nearly all the water historically used in the
state, comes from its aquifers. The most
active source is the basin underlying the Salt
River Valley, which has provided well over
one million acre-feet a year. In addition,
almost one million acre-feet has been pumped
annually from the Lower Santa Cruz Basin
near Tucson. In total, the groundwater
basins of Arizona have historically provided
over four million acre-feet per year to water
users throughout the state (Arizona Water
Commission, p. 10, 1975).
Table 4-2 shows that the historical use
of water in Arizona exceeded the dependable
water supply (from Table 4-1) by about 2.2
million acre-feet per year and, if total water
usage remains constant (7.3 million acre-feet),
will exceed the dependable water supply by
between 700,000 and 3 million acre-feet per
year. Deficits historically have been met by
overdrafting groundwater - pumping in excess
of the natural recharge plus return flows
(waste water which soaks back into the
groundwater basins). Since the Groundwaler
Management Act of 1980, overdrafting of
aquifers has decreased and is expected to
decrease more in the future, though it will be
difficult to meet the act's objective of no
overdrafts by 2025. Arizona is still using far
more water than it can dependably supply,
and overdrafting aquifers will continue unless
agricultural rights are retired, not simply
converted to municipal uses. In the first
place, present demand requires overdrafts
even with CAP fully on line. Furthermore,
reusable return flows tend to decline with
conversion to municipal use. Substantial
agricultural return flows are now pumped
from aquifers and reused, but municipalities
typically consume more of the water delivered
to them and are capable of reusing nearly all
of it. Thus, it is theoretically possible to
reduce return flows to much smaller amounts.
In fact, an Arizona court has ruled that cities
have the right to the sewage effluent they
generate and may reuse it or sell it for reuse
even in other areas (Arizona Public Service
Co. v. Long, 1989). The ruling that effluent
is not subject to regulation under state water
law may mean that little of the water used by
cities ~ much of it converted to municipal use
from former agricultural uses - will be
returned to groundwater. Of course this
results in highly efficient use of valuaable
water, but will result also in fuller
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CHAPTER5
PERFORMANCE OF LEGAL AND INSnTUTTONAL SYSTEMS IN DROUGHT
The impacts of a drought within the
study area are distributed partly according to
phenomena of weather and geography and
partly according to legal and institutional
arrangements allocating scarce water. The
sources of water available to Southern
California and Arizona and the legal
arrangements for utilizing them are described
in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Water rights
priorities, interstate apportionments and
contractual rights are critically important in
allocating water as storage is depleted and as
annual runoff is diminished. The purpose of
this chapter is to determine generally how
those arrangements operate in a drought
situation and to identify the aspects of the
water supply system that are the most
vulnerable to drought.
Decisionmakers can use information
about drought effects to determine with
greater accuracy the trade-offs involved in
political decisions to allow further growth in
demand, to preserve or phase out agriculture,
to tolerate a greater risk of drought effects
and to deflect greater consequences on the
areas where imported water originates.
Limitations on water supply inevitably will
force decisions about major redistribution of
water from agricultural to municipal uses and
from other regions to the study area.
Consciously or unconsciously, these decisions
will involve choices about the limits and kinds
of growth and the quality of life in the study
area. It is essential to have such a modeling
tool to inform these decisions.
The water sources and the legal and
institutional arrangements allocating them
should be tested with greater precision than
is possible here to determine their adequacy
to serve the study area assuming various
drought scenarios. In the absence of a model
to test legal and institutional variables in the
context of particular drought scenarios, it is
possible to describe in a general way how the
system would perform in a drought. The
discussion that follows is necessarily
theoretical and only broadly indicative of what
would happen during a severe, sustained
drought.
The following assessment is based on
certain status quo assumptions about facts
and conditions that are virtually certain to be
different in fact. Pending negotiations and
legal proceedings, could have dramatic effects
on actual performance. The Metropolitan
Water District is negotiating several market
transactions that could improve its position.
It is pursuing deals with irrigators who have
high priority rights to Colorado River water
that would result in firming up MWD's rights
and with other State Water Project
contractors that would secure MWD more
project water. Other developments could
diminish the water available to the study area.
For instance, the full extent of limitations
imposed on water passed through the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta will not be
known until 1992, and Los Angeles' rights to
Mono Lake water are still subject to judicial
review. Further adjudication or negotiated
settlement of Indian water rights and greater
use of adjudicated rights will reduce the
quantities available for non-Indian users.
For purposes of this report in
discussions of likely drought consequences, a
severe, sustained drought is defined as several
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years of significantly below-average runoff,
beginning in a year with quantities of water
stored in reservoirs at average levels. It is
also assumed that drought conditions coincide
throughout the areas where water for the
study area originates - the watershed of the
Colorado River and in Northern California.
This is an unusual coincidence, though it has
happened historically. The goal here is not
to define exactly where or in what degree of
severity the effects of drought will be felt, but
rather to describe what interests will be
affected, and in what order, if water sources
should seriously decline.
The following descriptions of how
existing water supply systems could be
expected to perform in a drought are built
on the discussions in earlier chapters. The
consequences of applying the Law of the
Colorado River, which is the backbone of
water supply in both Southern California and
Arizona, are described first. The following
two sections discuss the availability of other
water sources to Southern California and
Arizona in a drought. In the final chapter
several possible options for improving drought
performance are suggested for consideration
by water supply officials.
Colorado River
There is tremendous reliability built
into the system for distributing Colorado
River water. Huge storage facilities make the
river a dependable source of water even in
years when flows are below normal. Releases
necessary to fulfill basic lower basin and
Mexican deliveries can continue undiminished
for many below-normal years. The only
immediate effect felt by the lower basin states
would be a cessation of deliveries of water to
Southern California in excess of the basic
compact apportionment. This should not be
understated in its importance, however, in
light of the many years that Southern
California has been able to rely on those
deliveries. But only when storage is depleted
will the lower basin states be threatened with
limitations on their compact apportionments.
Thus, much of the discussion of the impacts
of drought focuses on the upper basin states.
The storage system on the Colorado
mainstem can forestall many of the impacts
of drought on the upper. So long as there
is adequate water stored in the mainstem
reservoirs the system can satisfy compact
delivery requirements to the lower basin with
reservoir releases. This then allows the upper
basin to use all of the direct flow as well as
all of the water in upper basin storage (not
including water in Lake Powell which is too
low on the river for delivery to upper basin
states) to meet its current demand which now
amounts to about 3.5 million acre-feet a year.
Some immediate effects of a drought may
nevertheless be felt locally in the upper basin.
Particular streams may not produce enough
water for some users to capture the water to
which they are entitled at the points where
they are entitled to take it under state water
law. This may result in some upper basin
demands going unsatisfied even when there
is enough upper basin water available in the
aggregate throughout the basin.
Besides the rather abrupt impacts of
a severe drought on upper basin consumptive
users who lack storage or whose storage
becomes depleted, there will also be
immediate impacts on instream flows. Some
instream flows are protected under upper
basin state laws benefitting fish, wildlife and
recreation uses. Rights held by the states for
these purposes will mean little in drought,
though, because virtually all are junior to
consumptive use rights and therefore seniors
can generally consume all the water in
stretches of most streams. To the extent that
the federal government may hold reserved
rights for instream flows with sufficient
seniority, however, those rights may be
enforced to maintain some basic flows. Such
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rights are likely to be concentrated in small,
high mountain streams where the earliest
National Parks and Forests were established.
Generally the only water that will flow
in the river and in lower reaches of its
tributaries in the upper basin is that which is
not consumed by upstream water rights
holders and which is required to meet a
downstream state's call under the Law of the
River. This could result in immediate and
irreversible consequences for riparian areas
and for fish and wildlife. Sectors of the
upper basin economy that depend on these
resources, including the increasingly important
recreation industry, will be harmed. Only
limited "protection" is furnished for such
values by having a compact call that demands
leaving water flowing in the stream so that it
reaches the lower basin. Calls will be
satisfied under present institutional
arrangements within the upper basin states
simply according to where and when water is
available, not necessarily with any sensitivity
to other values.
Other immediate effects of drought
in both lower and upper basin stales are not
necessarily linked to reductions in river
diversions. Crops that rely on rainfall or sub-
irrigation supported by runoff for parts of the
year may fail. Rangeland and forests may
suffer immediate and economically measurable
consequences. Recreational uses of water
such as fishing, hunting, boating and skiing
may decline, and with them economic returns
will drop and the quality of life will suffer.
The operation of each state's water
rights system in low flow years will generally
track actual operations in recent drought
events. These operations should be studied.
Generally, in droughts water is more strictly
administered by state water officials. The
most junior users.may face cutbacks; seniors
will receive water according to the priorities
and quantities of their rights. Thus, the
effects on particular users in each state can
be modeled to some extent based on
knowledge of existing uses and water rights
and assumptions about streamflows, an
exercise that is beyond the scope of this
study. Of course the reliability of projections
depends on there being no interstate demands
resulting in compact calls that alter the
overall amounts of water that can be used by
a particular state.
Compact Calls
There has never been a compact call
on the Colorado River. A call could occur
in one of two circumstances:
1) Interbasin call: Lower basin
versus upper basin. When
mainstem storage has been
depleted to the point that it is
inadequate to make required
deliveries to the lower basin at
Lee Ferry the lower basin can
call for the upper basin to leave
enough water in the river at Lee
Ferry to satisfy the Compact and
to fulfill the upper basin's portion
of the Mexican Treaty
requirement. The upper basin,
however, would be guaranteed
use of a quantity of water equal
to its "present perfected rights"
(at the time of the Compact) --
about 2 million acre-feet a year.
2) Interstate call: Upper basin state
versus upper basin state. If an
upper basin state is consuming
more than its percentage share of
the available flow in a particular
year and another upper basin
state downstream of the first is
not getting all of its percentage
share for which it has beneficial
uses, the downstream state can
call on the upstream state to let
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water flow to it. A call can
be made also if it is necessary
to reduce overall upper basin
use to meet a lower basin call.
Upper basin interstate calls
can be made, as a practical
matter, by Utah against
Colorado, Wyoming and New
Mexico and by New Mexico
against Colorado.
An interbasin call will occur when it
is necessary to curtail upper basin uses to
deliver current flows sufficient to meet the
75 million acre-feet guaranteed compact
delivery requirement for the current ten years
plus half the annual delivery requirement to
Mexico of 1.5 million acre-feet. Only what is
left over is then available to be used in the
upper basin. Present perfected rights are not
subject to the call.
The upper basin versus upper basin
interstate call can be made any time one
state's use exceeds its percentage share under
the Upper Colorado River Compact and
injures another. The injury may be caused
by cutting into the amount of water another
state needs to use or by failing to reduce
usage enough to respond to an interbasin
call. Since the percentages are not based on
established uses, the effects of a call would
be the harshest on the most developed states.
Of the upper basin states only New Mexico
is currently using its full apportionment. The
prospect of cutbacks and economic
dislocations raises concerns for upper basin
states as they consider building up a greater
dependence on consuming Colorado River
water.
Upper basin states theoretically must
be concerned with the possibility of an
interstate compact call in any very dry year.
But a lower basin call can occur only in
extreme situations when reservoirs are
virtually empty and flows available for current
use are meager, historically rare
circumstances. It would take many years for
the mainstem storage system to become so
depleted that it was unable to satisfy lower
basin delivery requirements, promoting a
lower basin call. In these instances, the
upper basin states* only protection against
shortages is existing tributary storage and the
ability to curtail demand. Once there was a
lower basin call, however, the probability of
successive calls would tremendously increase
because it would be difficult to build up
storage without some extraordinarily high
runoff years — producing enough water to
satisfy all current uses plus a surplus.
Whenever lower basin calls are in effect, it is
more likely that there would also be upper
basin interstate calls. Furthermore, the upper
basin versus upper basin interstate call can
occur in a single low flow year, even when
there is plenty of water in downstream
storage to meet downstream compact
obligations. Neither kind of call is likely at
present levels of development and use in the
upper basin but the likelihood of a call
increases as upper basin states increase their
consumptive uses. All calls bear most
heavily on the most developed states.-27
During episodes when calls are made lower
basin states can avoid any significant cutbacks
so long as their full compact entitlements are
timely delivered at Lee Ferry. Still, they face
insecurity of future supplies when the
enormous mainstem reservoirs are drawn
down.
The Resewoir System
The drought protection capability of
the Colorado River plumbing system has
never been tested. Evidence indicates that
the period during which the study area has
become so dependent on Colorado River
water is a statistical anomaly; the long-term
averages are lower, and the extreme low flow
years are worse than the area has experienced
in the post-development period. Assuming an
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annual average flow of 13.5 million acre-
feet,^ only nine of the twenty-five years
since completion of the Glen Canyon Dam
have produced "below average" virgin flows
(Upper Colorado River Commission, 1988).
Only once since 1896 has there been a series
of more than three consecutive below-average
flow years, and that happened in 1953-1956,
before Glen Canyon was completed. The
reservoir system was filled to capacity in
recent years by several successive high
precipitation years. Nevertheless, storage at
high levels can be maintained for a long time
so long as historical averages are maintained
and not interrupted by an extremely severe
drought or tapped to meet increased
demands.
As Table 5-1 shows, the. average
annual demands on the Colorado River are
12.5 million acre-feet. Therefore, if deliveries
to the lower basin are equal to full compact
requirements, upper basin consumptive uses
do not increase, and flows do not depart too
long or too widely from the average (13.5
million acre-feet), the storage system should
be adequate indefinitely to ensure constant
lower basin deliveries by smoothing out
average fluctuations in annual flows and thus
forestalling shortages or lower basin calls on
the upper basin. The stability depends in
part on there being no surplus deliveries to
the lower basin, even in high flow years, and
on flows occurring in times and sizes that
enable optimal storage.
If the assumptions based on the
averages are not realized, however, several
years of extremely low flows unmatched by
compensating high flows could deplete the
reservoirs at present rates of consumption.
Depending on how the reservoirs were
actually operated, that could occur if the
Colorado River experienced another period
equal to the lowest ten consecutive years of
flows, even with substantial storage in upper
basin reservoirs. The following calculations
based on that episode are illustrative. Tree
ring data indicate that the ten years from
1584 to 1593 produced only 97.1 million acre-
feet of virgin flow in the Colorado River, an
average of 9.7 million acre-feet a year
(Stockton, et al., 1989). We assume that the
dry spell begins with 31.2 million acre-feet in
storage (about 50% of total capacity), 15.6
million acre-feet in each basin.
Aggregate demand for the ten-year
period would be 125 million acre-feet (ten
times the average demand from Table 5-1).
Aggregate available supply for the period is
assumed to be 128.2 million acre-feet (97
million acre-feet inflow and 31.2 million acre-
feet in storage). This should result in an
overall surplus or 3.2 million acre-feet,^ but
reservoir operations would have become
sensitive to the low flow conditions to avoid
cutbacks in upper basin diversions. Table 5-
2 illustrates two possible methods for
operating the reservoir system in a drought.
Method A shows that the upper basin would
suffer reductions in the water available to it
after the seventh year of the drought if equal
releases were made each year. Full uses in
both basins could be accommodated, however,
if the upper basin could rely on water in
storage to make deliveries, thus protecting its
ability to use limited inflows. Thus, under
Method B, the lower basin would draw more
heavily on its own storage to satisfy current
demands, allowing the upper basin to store a
portion of annual inflows rather than
delivering a full 7.5 million acre-feet each
year to satisfy the compact delivery obligation.
In this way upper basin uses could be
continued during each of the ten years. The
upper basin would then be obligated to
compensate for the annual deficits in lower
basin deliveries within ten years of when each
deficit was accumulated. In the example for
Method B in Table 5-2, the deficit is 5.85
million acre-feet which would be due in the,
next (eleventh) year, for a total lower basin
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TABLE 5-1
Colorado River Annual Average Demand
(million acre-feet)








obligation in that year of 14.1 million acre-
feet.
If the assumptions made in the above
calculation change, shortages could occur in
the system. The assumption that concern for
power generation would not affect the overall
quantities of water released is questionable
under present operating criteria. In addition,
upper basin usage is bound to increase,
though probably very gradually. As those
uses increase, less water will accumulate in
storage, removing the buffering effect of the
reservoir system. Storage could also be
drawn down more rapidly if the lower basin
received additional releases for any reason.
The lower basin states now have sufficient
consumptive demand to use far more than
their apportionment. If additional releases
were allowed by the Secretary under article
III(b) or III(e) to satisfy present lower basin
consumptive uses, storage would become
depleted much more rapidly, causing the
system to lose its present reliability.
Moreover, there would be far less water in
storage than was assumed at the onset of the
hypothetical drought. Similarly, if the
Secretary did not charge Indian consumptive
uses and evaporative losses entirely to the
states' consumptive uses, more water would
be released than necessary and storage drawn
down more rapidly. The Secretary's present
operating criteria can be read to prevent any
surplus releases and depletion of storage once
a drought is apparent/*-*
Reductions Within the Lower Basin
At the point that reservoir storage
plus available flows become inadequate to
meet compact delivery requirements and the
Mexican Treaty obligation,1*2 there must be
cutbacks in certain lower basin uses. These
cutbacks will first affect Arizona at virgin
flows of less than 11 million acre-feet, after
reservoir storage is depleted. This is because
when less than 7.5 million acre-feet are
available for the lower basin, then shortages
are to be absorbed by the Central Arizona
Project which has been allocated 1.5 million
acre-feet of Arizona's 2.8 million acre-feet.
Under the Colorado River Basin Project Act,
however, California is entitled to receive its
full 4.4 million acre-feet. The Secretary is
free to reduce other Arizona uses (which are
entitled to 1.3 million acre-feet) and Nevada
uses (which are entitled to .3 million acre-
feet) as soon as water available to the lower
basin is inadequate for all. But no cutbacks
may be made to California users of its 4.4
million acre-feet until the CAP has been
denied its full 1.5 million acre-feet. Arizona
conceded this point as part of the political
price of securing approval of the CAP.
Before the CAP would face reductions,
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however, the upper basin would be cut back
to the point that it could use only water
secured by its "presented perfected rights."^
These rights amount to about 2 million acre-
feet. Thus, the beginning point for
reductions to CAP is the 11 million acre-feet
necessary to meet prior obligations:
California, 4.4; Nevada, .3; Arizona, 2.8;
upper basin perfected rights, 2.0; Mexico,
1.5.~34
The only limitation on deliveries
available to California will occur after the
reservoir system has been depleted and the
annual flow is so low that the lower basin has
"called" all water available to it under the
Compact from the upper basin and service to
the Central Arizona Project has been cut
entirely off. Thus, if virgin flows in the river
dropped below about 9.5 million acre-feet (11
million acre-feet less the 1.5 million acre-feet
CAP allocation) and there were no storage
left, California would face cutbacks in its
share of river water. Virgin flows this low
have occurred eleven times since 1896, but
never after a period that would totally
deplete storage assuming present levels of
consumption.
It should be pointed out that the
manner in which cutbacks are to be shared
in a shortage by lower basin users is subject
to the discretion of the Secretary of the
Interior and available water need not be
prorated according to the apportionment in
the Boulder Canyon Project Act.1*5 Within
California, however, the waters available
under the Compact have now been allocated
by a recent amendment to the Law of the
River. Several years ago the Secretary
discretionarily exercised his contracting
authority by allocating California's 4.4 million
acre-feet according to the "Seven Party
Agreement." The Agreement was actually a
recommendation of the state Department of
Water Resources proposed by the mutual
agreement of several agricultural and
municipal water users. In 1988 Congress
statutorily recognized the agreement as
establishing priorities among California users
(102 Stat. 4005, 4006). Under the
Agreement, agricultural users (Imperial
Irrigation District, Palo Verde Irrigation
District, Coachella Valley County Water
District) have the first three priorities to 3.85
million acre-feet of California's 4.4 million
acre-feet share of river water. The
Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California has the next two priorities (either
expressly in the Agreement or by subsequent
agreement with Los Angeles and San Diego)
for 550,000 acre-feet. Further priorities in
the Agreement apply when there is more
than 4.4 million acre-feet a year to share.
The Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California has been firming up its
rights to Colorado River by separate contracts
that depart from the allocations under the
statutorily adopted Agreement. It has agreed
to pay the cost of salvaging water in the
Imperial Valley in exchange for the right to
use the water saved. A similar arrangement
has been made with Coachella Valley County
Water District. Other negotiations are being
pursued that would also put MWD in the
shoes of the Palo Verde Irrigation District
and other agricultural beneficiaries of the
Agreement.
To the extent that the tribes along
the mainstem put a portion of their 900,000
acre-feet of water to use in California or
Arizona, the water is not available for use by
other users within each state. Tribal uses
take priority over all junior uses.
Mainstem Indian tribes now use 340,000 acre-
feet a year on Arizona land and 55,000 acre-
feet a year within California. This water
comes out of the first water allotted to the
state in a shortage, diminishing water
available for non-Indians. Other tribes have
secured rights to CAP water and some
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Upper basin consumption cannot be reduced below "present perfected rights" which are about 2 million acre-feet.
























claims. Increased Indian uses would consume
parts of each state's share of Colorado River
water. The lowest priority users (under the
law of the river) in each state ~ CAP in
Arizona, MWD in California ~ will feel the
first effects of increased tribal water
consumption. These interests may seek to
negotiate with the tribes to secure the use of
Indian water in these events (and perhaps to
use the Indians' prior rights at other times)
through leasing the rights or agreements for
non-development of Indian uses.
Salinity
The effects of increased salinity on
lower basin uses could be profound. It is
impossible to determine the degree to which
salinity will increase in a severe, sustained
drought without further studies. In recent
years salinity levels have dropped when high
flows diluted salts and flushed out reservoirs.
It is reasonable to expect that concentrations
of dissolved solids in the river will increase as
flows diminish, reservoir levels drop, and
evaporation leaves greater concentrations of
salts, though they probably will not increase
directly as flows are reduced. High salt
concentrations occur during average flow
periods, approaching water quality levels that
are detrimental to agriculture and that would
violate the law. Prolonged low flows would
reduce the river's dilutive capacity and lead to
exceeding those levels.
Municipal users in both California and
Arizona can mix salty Colorado River water
with water from other sources to dilute it.
They also can treat and desalinate water in
properly equipped treatment plants before
serving their consumers. The complex
delivery network makes this physically
possible, though the additional treatment
processes would be costly. For agricultural
users in the two states, increased salinity may
mean failed crops and an outright inability to
irrigate with river water. If this were the
consequence of a severe, sustained drought,
the waters that were too saline for farmers
possibly would be reallocated to municipal
users who could afford to pay for treatment.
Summary
Arizona's ability to draw its full share
of Colorado River water has always depended
on construction of a major public works
project, the Central Arizona Project, which is
now nearly complete. Though it will enable
the state to take about 1.5 million acre-feet
of water a year that it could not divert in the
past, the CAP cannot legally take water when
it would result in California getting less than
4.4 million acre-feet. Cutbacks in CAP
diversions will occur only when storage is
depleted and virgin flows are less than the 11
million acre-feet needed to satisfy the basic
lower basin and Mexican delivery
requirements plus the upper basin's present
perfected rights. At that point, CAP
contractors must begin to absorb the
necessary reductions. Among the contractors,
agricultural users will be cut off before
municipal and industrial users.
Other Arizona users of Colorado
River water need not suffer cutbacks until
CAP diversions have been completely
eliminated. Municipalities served by CAP,
however, could contract with Arizona's
agricultural users on the mainstem and its
tributaries to get them to agree to
subordinate their uses in times of shortage.
California is virtually guaranteed its
4.4 million acre-feet of Colorado River water
each year until the reservoirs are depleted
and annual flows are so low that the upper
basin's uses are limited to present perfected
rights and the full 1.5 million acre-feet
allocated to CAP has been cut off. As
discussed above, this would occur at a virgin
flow of 9.5 million acre-feet. At that point,
cutbacks are to be made according to the
77
Secretary's discretion in contracting for use of
river water with Arizona agricultural users in
the western counties, California users and
Nevada users, within California agricultural
users would be preferred under the Seven
Party Agreement except to the extent
irrigation districts agree to transfer their
rights to municipal users.
Although California apportionment of
Colorado River water appears the most
secure in a drought, present uses in excess of
4.4 million acre-feet are tenuous and are the
most vulnerable to termination in drought.
Absent a shortage, though, these uses may
continue until the CAP demands its full
entitlement or the Secretary of Interior
changes the operating criteria for river
facilities.
Other California Sources
Los Angeles Aqueduct ~ Mono Lake
and Owens Valley
Southern California's Mono Lake and
Owens Valley sources are imported by the
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
through the Los Angeles Aqueduct. They
are the subject of ongoing legal actions and
negotiations. The State Water Resources
Control Board must decide, and the courts
must agree, that the amounts of water
removed from the tributaries to Mono Lake
are consistent with the public trust doctrine.
It is fair to assume: 1) that the amount
regularly available after this determination is
made will be less than the full amount of Los
Angeles' rights; and 2) that the amount
available in a drought will be less than in
normal years.
Owens Valley supplies are limited in
times of drought. For instance, in 1988-89
they were only 75% of normal, requiring Los
Angeles to call on MWD to make up the
difference. Furthermore, as explained in
more detail in Chapter 3, Los Angeles has
recently agreed with Inyo County that it will
limit groundwater pumping in the valley when
the pumping would endanger vegetation.
This limits an important aspect of drought
protection since groundwater is usually less
vulnerable to drought than surface sources.
State Water Project
The largest source of water used in
Southern California other than the Colorado
River is the State Water Project, about 1.15
million acre-feet per year. The Metropolitan
Water District must share the burden of
inadequate supplies with other contractors,
but not until agricultural contractors have
suffered reductions totalling 100% of their
annual allocation in any seven year period or
50% in any one year would MWD experience
reductions. After such reductions have been
made, MWD will sustain reductions equally
with other contractors. The preference in
reductions can be illustrated by assuming that
a total system reduction of 175,000 acre-feet
were necessary. If agricultural contractors
have contracts for 1.25 million acre-feet a
year, they would have to absorb shortages of
175,000 acre-feet a year for seven years (7 x
175,000 = 1.225 million acre-feet) before
MWD would face reductions. They most
likely would revert to groundwater pumping
for irrigation. More detailed analysis of the
effects of various levels of drought on SWP
supplies would be useful. However, at
present and for the foreseeable future, the
principal constraint on deliveries from the
SWP is not the quantity of water produced in
Central and Northern California. Instead,
deliverable supplies are limited by the
capacity of facilities to move the water south
and the water quality effects of operating
those facilities.
Though several features of the SWP
as planned have not been built, the main
bottleneck preventing fulfillment of contracts
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is the Bay-Delta water quality problem. The
architects of the SWP recognized decades ago
that the quantity of water that may be moved
through the Delta is physically limited. But
more recently it has become apparent that
pumping water out of the Delta during low
flow seasons can cause immense water quality
problems. Saltwater intrusion can be
controlled, but this may require diversions to
be accompanied by upstream releases of large
amounts of fresh water to flow to the Bay
from facilities that were constructed for
development, storage and transport of water
to SWP contractors. Trihalomethane
precursors also occur in Bay-Delta waters
limiting its utility as drinking water;
maintaining sufficient flows may be the
solution to this quality problem as well.
In 1991 or 1992, the State Water
Resources Control Board will decide on a
regime for controlling the SWP's facilities'
effects on the Bay-Delta by adoption of the
Delta Water Quality Plan. It, in turn, will
determine whether diversions to Southern
California can be increased at all in the
future and, most important to this report,
what releases must be made in times of low
flow.
Other Arizona Sources
As discussed above, Arizona's share
of Colorado River water is rather secure in
a drought, especially for users who do not
depend on the CAP. Other sources available
to those who rely on CAP water include large
groundwater reserves and surface water,
principally the Salt River Project for the
Phoenix area.
Surface Water
In a drought Arizona's surface water
sources could become less productive. Even
if they produce at average levels, it is clear
that seasonal local supplies will not be a
dependable cushion for a drought.
Historically, storage in the Salt River Project
has averaged only about 1 million acre-feet.
It could make up for reduced annual runoff
within the SRP for a few years but could not
compensate for the loss of CAP water.
Groundwater
Arizona's heavy reliance on
groundwater has caused major overdraft
problems. The state's 1980 Groundwater
Management Act mandated conservation and
will lead to a gradual phasing out of
agricultural uses in many places where
groundwater overdraft has been the greatest.
The act's strict limits on groundwater uses
were motivated by the promise of deliveries
of imported water through the CAP. As
explained in Chapter 4, imposition of
groundwater pumping controls was a
precondition on federal funding for the CAP.
Although Arizona has reduced its dependence
on groundwater, many areas are still in
overdraft.
If Arizona loses its CAP water or a
significant part of it, municipalities like
Phoenix and Tucson will be forced to rely
primarily on groundwater. Cities have already
embarked on an aggressive program of
purchasing farms and ranches to obtain
groundwater rights to accommodate future
growth. Groundwater reserves are so
enormous that they will allow pumpers to
survive almost any drought. However, their
utility will depend on drilling new, deeper
wells and paying high energy costs for
pumping. Other ill effects of overdrafting
aquifers, such as land subsidence could occur.
The concern for containing overdrafts was so
great that Arizona's 1980 Act made no
exceptions specifically allowing a reversion to
overdrafts in a drought emergency. If
groundwater pumping is to be the principal
supply during a prolonged drought, that
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purpose should be established in amendments
to legislation and reflected in drought plans.
True conjunctive use of groundwater
as a back-up for diminished surface flow
requires a heavy emphasis on aquifer
replenishment. If the drought occurs against
a backdrop of heavily overdrafted aquifers,
dislocations will be hastened and costs
increased. Conversely, the best drought
protection for Arizona is to recharge aquifers
so that they can be used conjunctively with
other sources to survive a drought. This
requires shifting reliance away from pumping
and toward use of CAP water for both
present uses and a recharge program in times
of normal or surplus surface supplies. Some
interests like Central Arizona Water
Conservation District and several
municipalities are pursuing recharge programs.
However, the attractiveness of these programs
is limited by the high cost of CAP water.
Furthermore, some areas like Tucson are still
awaiting the delivery of CAP water and have
no alternative to using groundwater.
Summary: A Composite of System-wide
Drought Performance
Identification of the most drought-
vulnerable parts of the systems serving
Arizona and Southern California is central to
any effort to anticipate problems or to make
the system more capable of resisting drought.
Yields and capacities of these systems in
average years are adequate to meet present
demands. That conclusion is less optimistic,
however, given the inevitability of drought
events - significant departures from the
average - in the study area and the
likelihood of growth. Thus, it is important to
evaluate the systems under stress.
We have assumed for the purposes of
this report that a severe, sustained drought
stretches simultaneously over the study area
and over the seven-state Colorado River
watershed and the huge Central and Northern
California watersheds on which the study area
depends for a water supply. Though drought
events frequently do not coincide in both
watersheds, the coincidence is a worst case
scenario that illustrates how stresses operate
on the system.
At present population levels and
patterns of use, both Southern California and
Arizona are equipped to cope with short-term
dry spells throughout this vast area. But, as
a drought wears on, storage will be depleted,
alternative supply sources will no longer be
available and certain cutbacks in existing uses
eventually will be necessary.
While we can predict the sequence in
which effects will be felt, it is impossible to
describe, with our present information and
tools, when and where those effects will occur
and with what level of severity. Accurate
predictions must be based on more precise
data and assumptions about the nature of the
hydrologic drought event and possible
institutional responses.
Because of the number of variables,
the complexity of the system and the
likelihood that facts will be in constant flux,
an analytical model is needed to test system
performance in a drought. A computer
model could vary the levels of demand, the
patterns of drought and the institutional
responses. In this way, the nature, timing and
extent of various drought effects can be
predicted with reasonable accuracy.
Decisionmakers can visualize the
consequences of increasing levels of risk of
exposure to drought by allowing future
growth. The model could also indicate the
consequences of applying alternative
management strategies, such as limiting future
demand growth and reallocating present
supplies, to variable fact patterns. This would
help decisionmakers find the best responses.
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The present project does not have the
advantage of such a model, but the following
descriptions summarize generally how an area-
wide drought might unfold and the sequence
in which its impacts might be felt.
Phase 1
Existing consumptive uses generally
will continue in the study area. Municipal
consumers will not necessarily notice the
effects at first; consumer demand might
initially increase as lawns and other plants
begin to show effects of dryness in a long,
hot spell. A few areas with especially
vulnerable systems (e.g., Santa Barbara,
California) because they are not served by
MWD will feel severe effects and their plight
will create a drought awareness among other
urban users. Such an awareness will aid in
promoting conservation efforts. Past
experience has shown that urban consumers
can conserve and reduce usage by up to 15%
without feeling significant negative effects.
Reduced local surface flows in most parts of
both Southern California and Arizona can be
replaced by imports and some increased
groundwater use. Imports from the Colorado
River system will continue if an average
supply of water is in storage, but California's
present advantage of additional deliveries will
be curtailed to the extent Arizona takes
advantage of its share. Southern California
will be forced to draw down groundwater in
storage within and without the service area;
recharge with imported water will decline as
more imported water is needed for immediate
use. At the same time, natural recharge will
be reduced.
In order to make up for shortages in
Salt River Project supplies, urban users in
Arizona will rely more heavily on direct use
of CAP water. Groundwater pumping will
be constant and use of CAP water for
groundwater recharge will be discontinued.
In California, releases from reservoir
storage to meet Bay-Delta water quality
requirements might have to be larger to make
up for low runoff flows. Although average
supplies of water in storage will be adequate
for this purpose, water entering the SWP may
be limited. Agricultural users of SWP water
in the Central Valley will begin to experience
reductions, forcing them to pump
groundwater.
No significant agricultural losses are
expected. Range, fish and wildlife, forests,
recreation and agriculture dependent on
sustained streamflows and natural irrigation
all will sustain adverse effects. Economies
dependent on these resources will show
losses. As urban supplies from all sources
are limited, localized water rationing will
occur and mandatory restrictions in outdoor
water use may be necessary after a few years.
Phase 2
California's groundwater in storage
will be seriously depleted and overdrafts will
begin. Mono Lake/Owens Valley sources will
be less productive because groundwater
pumping will have to be cut back.
California State Water Project
deliveries will be reduced as Bay-Delta quality
problems increase due to diminished natural
flow and MWD will eventually be required to
share shortages with Central Valley
agricultural contractors; continued releases
without replacement from runoff could begin
to deplete SWP storage. Arizona
groundwater overdrafts will increase as
surface storage becomes depleted and surface
flows dwindle; recharge programs will end.
Pumping costs will escalate and new wells
may be necessary. After several years of a
severe drought Arizona's CAP water will
eventually be threatened with curtailment as
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Colorado River water in storage begins to be
depleted.
Urban consumers in both Southern
California and Arizona will face reductions
and water rationing. The most vulnerable
California communities, generally outside
MWD's service area, will reduce water use
to the most basic demands, eliminating
virtually all outdoor use and causing losses of
exotic plants and lawns. The extent of
cutbacks in most urban areas can be limited
if water suppliers and the states are willing
to tolerate groundwater overdraft.
Agriculture will suffer minimal losses
in the Central Valley (based on the 1976-
1977 drought experience) and Imperial Valley
will be unaffected. Salinity will increase in
the Colorado River, however, potentially
causing damage to agricultural users.
Great losses will be felt in the
recreational industry. Wildlife and fish will
suffer serious, perhaps permanent damage.
Continued grazing on parched range could
destroy soils. Drought would cause large
economic losses in these sectors. As
operational flexibility of the hydroelectric
generating system is limited the overall value
of the power produced will decline.
Phase 3
In the extreme situation where a
multi-year drought of major proportions
blankets the area, serious dislocations will be
felt once the many fail-safes planned into the
system are exhausted. Southern California
will experience further reductions in SWP
deliveries as Bay-Delta requirements increase.
At some point the SWP Feather River
storage system will run out and current
Northern California runoff will be inadequate
to satisfy both Project demands and Bay-
Delta quality requirements. This will lead to
reductions in urban and agricultural deliveries.
Owens Valley pumping will be even
more restricted and coastal salt water
intrusion, concentration of pollutants and
aquifer damage could force curbs on
groundwater production in the coastal plain
of California. California's groundwater
overdrafts will cause permanent harm to
aquifers by contamination from existing
plumes of pollutants and from saltwater
intrusion.
Arizona will face subsidence and other
localized damage from increasing groundwater
overdrafts, although the supply of water will
sustain the area for a long time. This
probably will coincide with reductions or even
elimination of CAP deliveries if the Colorado
River storage system runs dry. Only after all
CAP deliveries end will California's deliveries
be reduced along with deliveries to western
Arizona (and Nevada).
Outdoor municipal water use in
California and Arizona will have to be nearly
eliminated in many areas, causing heavy losses
of lawns, golf courses and other water
intensive vegetation.
Agriculture will remain productive in
the Imperial Valley because of the high
priority of agricultural water rights from the
Colorado River. Farmers on the lower
Colorado River (in both Arizona and
California) might have had to reduce their
usage of river water not because of a lack of
water but because of high salinity. This could
incidentally free up some additional water for
municipal use in the states where those
reductions are made if the municipalities can
pay the high cost of treatment. Central
Valley farmers, heavily reliant on groundwater
by this time, will experience high costs of
pumping and well-deepening. Increasingly
saline water and lower, less accessible
groundwater levels will accompany heavy
pumping. Crop failures and especially
livestock losses will occur.
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Fish and wildlife, wetlands and
rangelands will sustain major damages. Forest
growth will be noticeably retarded. By this
time recreational economies built on fishing,
hunting, skiing and the aesthetic attraction of
natural systems may collapse. The decline in
quality of life will be reflected in real estate
prices and sales activity. The demise of
reservoir storage will eliminate most power
production and increase pumping costs to
some users of river water.
The above predictions are
summarized in Table 5-3.
Both Arizona and Southern California
have potentially great drought protection if
their resources and rights are managed to
optimize supplies for drought. The area can
withstand short-term droughts, even rather
severe ones affecting simultaneously all its
sources of water supply. Initially, only
localized damage will occur; there is no
serious threat to existing consumptive uses in
most of the study area. Even after a few
years of drought, mostly minor damage to
outdoor plants would result. There would,
however, be noticeable and progressive losses
of resources dependent on regular minimum
stream flows and runoff. Quality of life also
would begin to decline with such losses and
with the inevitable restrictions on outdoor
water use for irrigation of yards, parks and
golf courses.
A relatively optimistic prognosis for
the area's resistance to drought is based on
present rates of diversion and use. But the
population and economy of the area are
growing and sources of new supplies are not
on the horizon. In light of inevitable
pressures for growth as well as inevitable
major droughts, decisionmakers must consider
a variety of options, many of which go
beyond the traditional gambit of water supply
decisions that are made in response to
droughts. Some require fundamental choices
about the future economy, lifestyle and
environmental quality of both the study area
and the regions from which they draw water.
These are choices that must be made at a
higher political level and with wider public
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COPING WITH FUTURE DROUGHTS IN SOUTEIERN CALIFORNIA AND ARIZONA
Options for Improving Drought Protection
The natural phenomenon of drought
exposes the limits of any water supply system;
performance in drought tests its weak points.
Accordingly, every water decision affects the
system's performance in a drought. In
virtually all water supply decisions,
decisionmakers have four kinds of options:
1. Expand supplies. The study area
has historically emphasized this option.
Because nearly all the obvious sources
potentially available to the study area have
been tapped, however, we assume that this
option is limited in the foreseeable future.
Of course, several new sources of water are
theoretically available, though they strain
technological and economic feasibility. Large
scale desalination of sea water and schemes
to import water from distant watersheds
(Columbia River, Yukon River, Great Lakes)
and cloud seeding all have been discussed. In
any event, development of major new sources
is not now planned and could not be realized
in time to respond to a drought in the next
two decades.
2. Manage supplies. Better
management of existing supplies requires
planning and technology to decide how best
to distribute and use seasonal supplies and
present facilities. Considerable effort is being
made in the study area to improve water
management. In many cases, these options
are the least costly and most politically
feasible choices, though they may have legal
or institutional limits.
3. Reallocate supplies. Exchanges and
marketing of water rights could reallocate
existing supplies from agriculture, Indians and
other states to meet growing water demand in
the study area. The respective rights of
states, basins, and users under compacts, court
decisions and statutes do not depend on who
makes the most economically efficient uses or,
in some cases, even whether the rights holder
makes any present uses of water. There is an
enormous quantity of water being used in the
study area, mostly in agriculture;
municipalities now may have to curtail uses
in shortages to respect the legal rights of
agricultural users, whose uses may be less
"efficient" or "productive." Some states and
Indian tribes hold unused or underutilized
rights. Reallocation of these rights is
therefore justified economically but implicates
complex existing legal arrangements and
important equities that must be considered.
4. Limit demand. The amount of
water required to satisfy future needs can be
controlled by reducing demand. Reducing
per capita demand, requires conservation
measures. The potential is enormous and
water suppliers in the area have started
programs aimed at this goal. Water
management techniques can be improved at
the system level and at the user level. In
addition,- physical changes may be necessary,
such as construction of facilities to treat
wastewater for reuse.
Another approach is to find ways to
satisfy the ultimate objectives of water
demands in ways that require less water or
no water. Thus, aesthetics can be maintained
with much less water if native plantings, not
bluegrass lawns are used. Dry-land farms can
sustain some rural communities without
irrigation. Economic growth can be based on
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educational or technological investment
instead of water intensive industries.
A virtually unexplored form of
demand reduction in the area is limitation of
future population growth. Though now
politically sensitive, this option necessarily
must be weighed with all the others. There
are good reasons, in addition to the limits on
water supply, to consider growth control.
Drought protection measures, and
solutions to other water problems, can employ
some combination of the above options.
Their adequacy can be tested by projecting
their performance in drought. Every
response is effectively a choice of what level
of risk of damage and dislocation from
drought is acceptable.
Recommendations for the Study Area
It is beyond the scope of this report
to prescribe the mix of options that should
be chosen from those set out above. Choices
depend on economic and political judgments
that should be made by those most affected
by the decisions. Wise decisions can result in
prolonging the ability of the study area to
withstand drought. Or they may concede the
necessity of taking a greater risk of drought
effects. And the outcome of the process is
essential to deciding whether and to what
extent additional growth can occur within
acceptable limits of risk. Inevitably, these
decisions determine the quality of life that
the region's population will enjoy.
The greatest strength of the study
area's water system, its resilience in drought,
comes from two sources: immense
groundwater reserves, stored naturally and
enhanced by recharge efforts and imported
water from the California State Water
Project, and the Colorado River with its great
mainstem reservoirs. Given the nature of
these sources, the degree of future
vulnerability to drought depends on:
• the amount of water in storage
in reservoirs and groundwater at
the onset of a drought
water quality control - salinity in
the Colorado River, saltwater
intrusion and toxic pollutants in
Southern California coastal plain
wells, saltwater intrusion in the
Bay-Delta
level of demand and depletion of
storage during non-drought
periods
perceptions of inequity to other
areas (Northern California and
Colorado River upper basin
states)
uncertainties caused by legal
priorities of farmers and Indian
tribes
Continued drought protection for the growing
study area requires special attention to these
limitations on the system's resilience.
The following measures are
highlighted for special consideration by
decision-making institutions and individuals in
the region because they can be effected with
reasonably little expense and in a reasonably
short time. Some are generally applicable to
any area concerned with drought protection;
all are related to the situation of the study
area.
1. Improved Drought Planning.
Governments in the area must design
comprehensive new planning processes that
identify alternatives for meeting society's
many objectives that depend on water use.
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Traditionally, the purpose of water planning,
including drought planning, has been narrowly
focused on providing a certain level of water
supply. Successful water planning now
depends on a more comprehensive approach
that begins by identifying society's objectives
and then analyzes alternative uses of water
resources in accomplishing those objectives.
Social and economic objectives
implicated by the use of water resources
include economic production, equity between
regions and people, efficiency, promotion of
the family farm, preservation of natural
ecological systems, recreation, lifestyle,
aesthetics and so on. These objectives have
different values for different constituencies,
each, of which has a claim to be heard in the
decisionmaking process.
Water shortages are only a problem
because they cause disappointment of
expectations that various objectives will be
satisfied. There is economic dislocation in a
drought if crops die and farmers (and their
communities) suffer financial losses.
Aesthetic and lifestyle values are damaged if
people have an objective of rich, green
Kentucky bluegrass lawns. But the economic
and lifestyle objectives may also be satisfied
with far less water if, in advance of a
drought, alternative ways to reach the same
objectives are accepted. Farmers may plant
less water-intensive crops. Or they may sell
their land and water as other economic
activities replace farming. Natural
landscaping may be substituted for bluegrass.
Policies that lead consciously to these ends
are drought-related policies.
Legal and institutional arrangements
for allocating water are a major part of an
overall "plan" for responding to demands.
These arrangements are intended to
accomplish certain objectives. For instance,
interstate compacts allocating water are
designed to promote equity among the states.
Presumably, equity requires delivering a
quantity of water to particular states. But if
facts change — such as in a major drought -
equity may be achieved by other means.
Thus, the lower Colorado River basin states
may decide to negotiate an agreement to
compensate upper basin states or Indian
tribes for release of a portion of their
apportionment or a promise to retire some
uses or lease some undeveloped rights.
Planners should identify the basis for
water demand: what objectives people want
to accomplish with water. They then should
present decisionmakers with alternatives that
can satisfy the public's objectives. The
planning process should identify the
economic, social and environmental
consequences of each alternative with respect
to society's diverse objectives. Decisions then
can be made by the representatives of an
informed public. Some changes may require
legal measures including legislation and
negotiated agreements.
The first step in dealing with drought,
then, is to review, revise and expand the
scope of water planning processes. These
processes at the state, federal, basin and local
levels must deal with the broadest possible
range of alternatives available to
decisionmakers.
Comprehensive water planning
includes setting levels of acceptable risks of
shortage and recognizing commensurate limits
on both per capita use and on the numbers
of consumers who can be served by a system.
Although limited natural water supply is the
most vivid of physical realities of western life,
some decisionmakers treat drought as an
extraordinary event. Responses to drought
are typically temporary; conservation and
sharing are accepted as occasional hardships
that will cease as soon as it rains. Drought
plans are often no more than exercises in
disaster management. But planning for
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drought should consider all parts of the
system as tools for forestalling and minimizing
the effects of a major drought.
Inherent in every water plan or
decision are choices of acceptable risks of
exposure to drought. Every choice to allow
demand to increase and consume more of a
fixed supply is a decision to reduce drought
protection. Drought planning should project
the levels of risk that exist at various levels of
demand assuming hypothetical droughts of
various historical frequency in the region.
Water suppliers and management
experts should use comprehensive modeling
exercises to determine the system's
vulnerability to drought A computer model
could quantify and predict the consequences
of climatological events of different
magnitudes and durations. A model capable
of integrating these factors would allow water
managers and policy makers to assess the
effects of variables on system operations and
to determine and manage the risks of
drought. It would be an important tool for
evaluating options for forestalling drought
such as reallocating existing supplies among
existing users, controlling demand or
expanding supplies. In addition, it could be
used to identify and quantify, where possible,
the economic and non-economic effects of
droughts and not only on water supply but on
power generation, Gsh and wildlife, recreation,
range, forests, and other environmental
resources. Drought-modeling is an important
way to demonstrate the stresses on the system
that are created by continual growth in the
study area.
A model could also express a "drought
risk factor" at various demand levels for the
system or for certain parts of it. The factor
would indicate the probability that annual
supplies would be inadequate to meet
demand. Planners can use this information to
determine the number of people who can be
served at specified levels of per capita
demand with what degree of risk. Policy
decisions must then be made about the level
of acceptable risk, whether and how to
reallocate present supplies, allowable per
capita demand and how to control it,
alternative ways to accomplish the objectives
of society, and the maximum number of
people to be served.
Drought planning should consider the
types and intensity of damage to natural
systems that will occur at various levels of
reduced supply. There has been no
evaluation of the consequences of a severe,
sustained drought to natural systems in the
study area. Harm will be measured in
economic and non-economic terms; some
harm will be essentially irreparable. Policy
makers need to consider this information in
deciding whether to seek less water-
dependent alternatives for achieving social
and economic goals and in determining how
much new growth in consumptive demand is
tolerable to society. Furthermore, they need
to design measures to protect natural systems
against unacceptable levels of harm. The
nature and extent of harm from various
magnitudes of projected drought have not
been identified and therefore the tradeoffs
are unknown. Impacts on natural systems
have been considered in the context of a few
individual proposed actions or projects or in
reports on episodic droughts that come within
the impact assessment requirements of federal
or state laws, and such impact analyses would
be desireable on a watershed or regional
basis.
Decisionmakers (particularly state and
federal governments since this is beyond the
mission of water suppliers) should: 1)
identify a baseline below which depletion of
streams, lakes and groundwater is
unacceptable; this would be included in any
modeling exercise that is used to determine
when the system will be at risk from drought;
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and 2) develop programs to achieve the
desired levels of protection for natural
systems, such as purchases of senior rights,
schedules of reservoir releases and restrictions
on transfers.
There are now no effective
protections for fish, wildlife, recreational uses
or environmental resources and values during
a drought Though some impacts are
inevitable many can be greatly aggravated by
water management decisions in times of
shortages. There are virtually no legal
requirements that any basic flow or quantity
be supplied to streams, lakes and wetlands in
the study area. Only some federal reserved
rights and relatively insignificant state-
protected instream flow rights are senior
enough to furnish any protection against total
depletion of waterways by diversions for
consumptive uses.
There is some incidental protection
of flows and the natural resources dependent
on them provided by legal requirements that
allow a downstream senior user or a
downstream state with compact rights to "call"
water past other potential diverters. The
effectiveness of this incidental protection for
natural systems has not been evaluated to see
how adequate it would be in case of various
degrees of drought. The protection furnished
by such calls may depend on state
government decisions about whether to allow
consumptive water rights to be transferred to
another place on a stream and by plans
identifying the specific sources of water (i.e.,
which tributaries and which junior rights will
be used) to meet interstate compact calls for
water.
2. Groundwater Management.
The ability of the study area to
cushion the impacts of drought depends on
the amounts of water that are in aquifer
storage. Groundwater should be seen first as
insurance against shortages - an emergency
supply of water to be conjunctively planned
and managed with all other supplies. The
effects of drought will certainly be felt sooner
and with greater severity if groundwater
supplies have been depleted by ordinary
demands or by an earlier drought event.
Regular overdrafts can leave the area with
little drought protection, prolong the recovery
period from a drought and cause
contamination and permanent aquifer damage.
Storage of groundwater should be a
high priority use for any water in excess of
essential water demands. Overdrafts should
be strictly avoided. Arizona's Groundwater
Management Act expresses such a policy,
though a long time is allowed for conforming
practice to policy and full compliance appears
impossible. Innovative programs for
groundwater recharge and storage should be
pursued; recent efforts of the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California and
Arizona municipalities are models. Storage of
imported water, such as from the CAP, is an
expensive but prudent decision. It could be
made more attractive by imposing a pump tax
on groundwater users, thereby making
pumping costs more comparable to the price
of CAP water. Credits against the tax could
be allowed to rechargers.
3. Optimizing Colorado River
Reservoir Management.
Depletion of Colorado River reservoir
storage in a drought triggers a chain reaction
of negative impacts and should be minimized.
Mainstem reservoirs are adequate for all but
the severest droughts. The point at which
they become inadequate is a function not
only of weather but of prior years'
management and levels of demand. Because
of the serious dislocations that will be felt
within and without the basin as reservoirs are
emptied, policies for reservoir operation
should lead to optimizing storage to meet
90
future drought needs so far as satisfaction of
present needs permits.
consuming water from the river even in times
of normal flows.
Reservoir depletion shifts a burden of
risk to CAP users - farmers, then municipal
users ~ who will be relegated to overdrawing
groundwater if the lower basin deliveries are
curtailed. At the point that inadequate water
is left in storage to satisfy lower basin and
Mexican Treaty delivery requirements, many
users in the upper basin states are at the
mercy of annual runoff, limiting consumption
to the "present perfected rights" that existed
as of the 1920*5. The apparent inequity of
this situation could spark political
repercussions. In the most extreme cases
cutbacks are felt by Southern California users
and by other agricultural interests in Arizona.
As these effects occur, greater reliance will
be placed on Northern California sources,
themselves in short supply in a drought.
Plans should be devised for shifting
uses to other sources of water as Colorado
River reservoirs are drawn down.
Contingency plans should elevate the
importance of preserving water in storage as
reservoir levels drop. This means revising
operational regimes that are now driven
strongly by hydropower production to patterns
that will preserve storage while accomplishing
other important natural resource management
goals such as conservation of fish, wildlife and
recreation. Of course, the economic
consequences of restricting hydropower
generation should be evaluated and weighed
in decisions.
Although huge quantities of water can
be stored in the Colorado River reservoirs,
managers in all states that depend on them
(and the Department of the Interior as
operator of most of the facilities) should
jointly decide on appropriate goals for
conserving those supplies for drought
protection. Those goals can be met only if
the basin states exercise restraint in
4. Coordination Among Colorado
River Basin States.
The water supplied by and stored in
the Colorado River system is vital to drought
protection in the study area. The law of the
river is therefore the source of much of the
area's water security. A sound working
relationship among all the basin states can
prevent misunderstandings and minimize the
need for outside political intervention.
Salinity control efforts are a model for basin
cooperation that should be expanded to deal
with broader issues.
A Colorado River basin-wide
organization should be formed to make plans
and decisions concerning drought and other
common interests of the basin states. A
regularly convened body could deal directly
with drought management and planning. It
could take responsibility for broad issues of
common concern to basin states, all of which
are related to the ability to deal with drought.
The issues to be addressed might include
operation of reservoirs, hydroelectric power
production, salinity control, other water
quality issues, flood control, recreational
concerns, protection of environmental
resources, endangered species problems,
Indian water rights, interstate water marketing
proposals, water project development and
conservation, compact interpretation and
dispute resolution, Mexican Treaty compliance
and identification of alternatives for meeting
the full array of objectives sought by the
basin states. Such an organization is best
created by federal legislation designed with
participation of the basin states. An excellent
model is the Northwest Power Planning
Council in which the states of the Northwest
(Washington, Oregon, Idaho), affected Indian
tribes and the federal government make
decisions jointly concerning the Columbia
91
River, its dams, hydropower facilities,
fisheries, Indian issues, power conservation
and environmental standards.
5. Transfers and Marketing.
Finn water supplies that may be vital
to surviving a drought can be assured through
economically beneficial contractual
arrangements. Drought protection - and
larger, dependable long-range supplies — for
the growing population of the study area can
be secured by agreements using existing water
supplies more fully and efficiently.
Agreements, with appropriate payments and
other concessions, can reallocate unused or
underutilized rights permanently or
temporarily.
Water salvage and reuse schemes can
be pursued. Other marketing arrangements,
like MWD's agreement to install conservation
measures in the Imperial Irrigation District in
return for the water saved, could be pursued.
Urban areas can tremendously increase the
supply of available water by reusing treated
sewage effluent, a source of water which has
only begun to be tapped.
Exchange agreements can allow more
flexible use of existing water resources. For
instance, by contracting for seasonal use of its
State Water Project water with Central Valley
Project participants, Southern California can
gain rights to use more SWP water at times
when CVP users have excess water available
from that source.
Agreements for use of agricultural
water can increase drought protection for
urban areas without permanently impairing
agricultural production. Throughout the study
area agriculture is the largest water user with
the best rights, especially to Colorado River
water. Arizona and California municipal
users can pursue dry year leases and other
marketing arrangements that would give them
the use of some of this agricultural water
when contingencies of shortage arise. For
instance, Arizona CAP users - particularly
cities - could negotiate for rights to use
Colorado River water during a drought that.
are now used by mainstem agricultural rights
holders. The water could easily be delivered
to them through the CAP facilities.
Permanent transfers also can be made
without destroying agricultural uses. Because
of the small quantities of water needed by
cities relative to the quantities consumed by
agriculture, major impacts on agricultural
production are not necessary. Furthermore,
many California counties actually showed
increases in agricultural income during the
1976-1977 drought as a result of crop
changes, more careful use of water and
elimination of over-irrigation.
Policy makers should carefully
consider the effects on agricultural economies
and communities if they decide to expand
municipal populations on water obtained from
agriculture.
Agreements with upper basin states
could make present Colorado River supplies
more reliable in the lower basin. The upper
basin has a legal right to develop and use
considerably greater quantities of water,
though demand is now low. As demand
grows less surplus water will be available to
the lower basin and mainstem reservoirs will
be deprived of some of the water that now
goes into storage. Agreements could assure
that some of this water is not developed for
a term of years. Indeed, much of the upper
basin consumption is in very low value
agriculture and it would be possible to
discontinue such uses upon payments and
other concessions by lower basin states.
The salinity problem could also be
ameliorated by entering into arrangements
economically beneficial to upper basin
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interests so as to delay future development
or retire certain existing uses (such as low-
valued farms that contribute high salt loads).
These agreements need not result in
abrogation of present compacts, though the
states may ultimately decide that temporary
departures from their terms or even re
negotiation of certain aspects of the compacts
is desirable. Again, a means should be
devised to evaluate the equitable and
economic effects of such arrangements.
Urban water users can negotiate
agreements with Indian tribes that have
presently unused rights to ensure that the
water subject to those rights continues to be
available to the cities. A variety of
arrangements for sale, lease or exchange are
possible. For instance, a tribe could agree
not to develop a portion of its reserved water
rights, thereby securing the reliability of water
presently used in Arizona and California.
The agreement might be in exchange for
money payments or other incentives (e.g.,
economic development, reservation
improvements, public facilities, etc.). Tribal
rights, being both very senior in the state
priority systems and "present perfected rights"
with an absolute priority under the Compact,
are especially valuable.
6. Demand Limitations.
Reduced demand, like a source of
supply, can furnish drought protection. If less
water is consumed more can be stored in
reservoirs and aquifers. Policy makers can
choose whether to use demand reduction as
a way of maintaining a margin of safety for
drought or of freeing up water for new
growth. Arizona's groundwater law has
recently targeted the need to reduce per
capita demand and municipalities in California
have turned to water conservation programs.
Limits on population growth still have not
been confronted.
Governments in the study area
traditionally have assumed that neither
population growth nor per capita demand are
subject to limitation. But Southern California
and Arizona are simply growing too fast for
the existing drought protection to last long;
other systems - air, water quality,
transportation, education -- are showing even
greater stress than water supply.
Unless adequate new sources are
found or there are major reallocations to
meet the demands of new growth, restraints
on growth appear necessary. A decision not
to restrain growth in demand is effectively a
decision to increase the exposure of the area
to the effects of a drought, to impinge on or
alter the quality of life, or both. It narrows
the present margin of drought protection and
commits the area to more frequent and more
serious drought disasters as well as a panoply
of other growth-induced problems.
Land use controls can be employed
to curb growth in Southern California and
Arizona. At a minimum, subdivision approval
could be made contingent on acquisition and
dedication to a regional water supplier of
water sources sufficient to serve the
subdivision (such as purchasing rights of an
existing agricultural user). Arizona requires
new developments in designated "active
management areas" for groundwater to
demonstrate that they have an adequate
source of water. Such requirements must be
refined to ensure that only the same quantity
of water that was actually consumed in prior
uses (i.e., net of return flow) is counted as
available for new consumptive demands.
Furthermore, since the retirement of
agriculture usually means major social and
economic changes for rural communities,
there should be a way of considering these
impacts. Such transfers are essentially policy
decisions deserving high level consideration
and broad public participation; more than a
buyer and a seller are involved.
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Land use planning can also be used
to prevent, limit, and guide growth away from
certain areas and into others. For instance,
a major city might decide to revamp existing
neighborhoods, opting for high-rise residences
instead of single family homes. Besides
addressing problems of inadequate affordable
housing and transportation difficulties
inherent in urban sprawl, high-rise buildings
could enable twice as many people to survive
on the same water supply because each family
would not require water for outdoor use.
Land use regulation also can limit yard size
and types of plantings to curtail demand.
Water conservation is a high priority
for water suppliers and government at all
levels. Arizona's Ground water Act is an
example of a legislated demand reduction
program. Conservation is also becoming a
more significant element in the programs of
the Metropolitan Water District and other
suppliers. Ambitious targets for reducing
demand require not only the technical
expertise of water managers but considerable
political will. They must be ambitiously
conceived and vigorously enforced. The
public's support must be enlisted through
aggressive public education programs. An
open, comprehensive drought-planning effort
would itself be an exercise in public
education.
State and federal governments can
adopt agricultural water efficiency programs.
Agencies can educate farmers about low cost
techniques for reducing their water demand
and provide incentives for them to adopt such
methods. Incentives could include tying
present federal and state subsidies and tax
breaks to major reductions in demand. Other
measures could include taxes on water
consumed, per acre-foot depletion charges
and escalating charges for water use based on
level of demand.
California has taken steps to remove
barriers to transferring agricultural water to
high value uses. For instance, water
efficiency techniques can be financed for
farmers by municipalities who need the saved
water.
Major use restrictions, especially on
outdoor urban water use, prolong supplies
and delay the negative effects of drought
Some new growth can be accommodated
without increasing drought risk if urban
irrigation or ornamental plants and lawns is
reduced. Because watering lawns and plants
constitutes the largest segment of non-
agricultural water consumption, outdoor water
use is an obvious target for reduction.
Furthermore, almost all the early damage
from a severe, sustained drought in the study
area will be to landscaping. Thus drought
damage can be contained by curbing the
water demand created by outdoor plantings.
Requiring xeriscape plantings around public
buildings, at parks and schools, and in new
residential and commercial developments can
lower demand substantially. Incentives may
be necessary to induce homeowners to re-
landscape with drought resistant plantings.
Water pricing is the most effective
means of reducing urban demand Graduated
block rate structures are a disincentive to
high water demand. They can lead water
users to reduce their per capita water demand
permanently.
Conclusion
This report concludes that Arizona
and Southern California could now weather
a severe, sustained drought without serious
dislocations or economic damage. The area
is served by legal institutions and water supply
facilities conceived earlier in the century
which give them ample drought protection.
But the optimistic conclusion should be
viewed with caution. First, it is based on
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present levels of demand. Second, it is
limited to the study area, not extending to
the areas where imported water sources
originate. Thus, there is no analysis of the
effects on areas such as the Upper Colorado
River Basin. Finally, the study does not
attempt to identify harm to the many uses
(e.g., timber, grazing, skiing, boating, other
recreational uses, fish and wildlife) that would
be affected besides irrigation, municipal and
industrial purposes. All three of these issues
merit attention.
There is reason to believe that
Arizona and Southern California will continue
to experience high rates of population and
economic growth. Therefore, major drought
preparation and planning in relation to
growth is necessary. In the short run, growth
in demand can be absorbed by elimination of
inefficiencies in the water supply system
through improved management and by minor
reallocations of the right to use water.
Conservation and re-use programs have
already begun. These measures can bridge
the time needed to plan for the future
beyond the next few years.
Planning is no longer synonymous with
a search for more water. The most readily
available water for the study area is now
legally allocated to others, primarily
agricultural users. It can be reallocated, but
not without important economic and social
effects. Reallocations of developed water by
agreements allowing municipal use of
agricultural water are occurring now.
Decisions about the future of agriculture and
of rural communities in the region will be
made in the context of these water
transactions. Opportunities exist for transfers
from other states and regions and from
Indian tribes. The value of water in
municipal uses is so high, relative' to present
uses (or nonuses) by those with rights, that
transfers are likely. These transfers, however,
implicitly make "decisions" about the areas
from which water originates. Because the
study area's water planning implicates the
quality of life in much of the West, the
interests of others should be consciously
considered and accounted for in these
transactions. If they are not treated equitably
there could be a call for fundamental changes
in prevailing laws and institutions.
Studying institutional responses to
drought in Southern California and Arizona
leads inexorably to the question: how much
more demand will they tolerate? If
decisionmakers are to maintain protection
against drought and obtain major quantities
of water in transactions that reallocate
existing entitlements, they must have a clearer
idea of future demand levels. Those figures
depend on vital, difficult decisions being
made.
The ultimate water demand of the
area can be fixed in a number of ways: the
maximum sustainable level of population and
economic activity; a level that will allow a
decent quality of life for a moderately
increased population; no growth; or growth
restrained only at the point of catastrophe.
Choosing a maximum demand (or not doing
so) is terribly important to people within and
without the study area. At a most basic level,
water managers need to determine whether
and when to seek reallocations of agricultural
water to municipal and industrial purposes.
But the maximum tolerable drought demand
must itself be set after contemplating factors
that go beyond water supply and demand.
The area has reasons for reaching a
decision on a "carrying capacity". Water is
but one factor among many in defining the
future of the area and it should not be
considered in isolation. Of course, choices
about the kind of society a region will and
should support are driven by much more than
concerns for a reliable water supply. For the
study area, the scope of these "equality of
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life" choices, is virtually unlimited. In the long
run, the area must confront the question of
what it aspires to be: the mix of economic
uses, the degree of urbanization, the level of
environmental quality, and more. These
questions should be addressed in the process
of determining future water demands and
supplies.
Concern for drought preparedness
may help provoke discussion of these issues.
Hypothesizing a drought can help identify
consequences and trade-offs of a variety of
options. It follows that, because decisions in
this realm touch all aspects of life, they
should be made with the benefit of public
views and expert evaluation. The decisions
themselves should be made by accountable
public officials based on all the available
information.
In sum, there is no imminent drought
crisis in Southern California or Arizona. The
plumbing systems and water institutions are
capable of coping with the consequences of a
severe, sustained drought. Agriculture can
survive, but must transfer water to the cities
if they are to continue growing. There would
surely be adverse consequences for the Upper
Colorado River Basin and Northern
California, where water for Southern
California and Arizona originate. These areas
of origin face economic impacts and
environmental harm. Eventually, there would
be environmental and lifestyle consequences
within the study area and resulting social and
economic reverberations. Present laws and
institutions for allocating, reallocating and
administering water rights do not integrate all
these concerns and consequences. Although
there is no water supply crisis on the horizon,
the area could face a crisis in the use of its
political and legal institutions. If water
decisionmaking is, as in the past, seen as
simply a narrow device for securing enough
water for whatever demands may exist, the
interregional, secondary and environmental
issues will fester until they become
enormous. Ultimately there may be a
backlash against institutions that single
mindedly provide water but ignore the
effects within and without the region.
Major legal and political reordering could
result. To avoid such a breakdown, the
debate must be broadened to consider these
other interests and to seek alternatives to
allowing undisciplined growth in demand.
96
ENDNOTES
1. These figures are for most of the region. Locally, some isolated mountain areas receive up
to 40 inches a year, but this is atypical. (Arizona Water Comm'n, p. 3, 1975; State of Cal.
DWR Bulletin 160-83, p. 8, 1983.)
2. Between 1985 and 1989, the population of the Metropolitan Water District service area in
Southern California increased by 1,427,000, or 11 percent (MWD Analysis, 1989). Arizona's
growth rate is even greater: the Phoenix metropolitan area grew 3.6 percent every year, or
almost half a million people over the period from 1980 to 1987 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce,
1989).
3. Data from the tree ring studies furnish scenarios to illustrate the physical and legal
arrangements for allocating and distributing water within the study area. See Kendall and
Dracup (1990). This type of exercise could be expanded to determine what types of alterations,
physical and institutional, would optimize the use of resources in light of existing or projected
demand and value choices of people in the area.
4. The lowest average 10 year average flows for the Colorado River occurred from 1584-1593,
9.71 million acre-feet per year. The lowest 10 year average flows for northern California were
1624-1634, 13.45 million acre-feet per year. (Stockton, Meko and Boggess, 1989.)
5. This figure is based on tree ring studies covering a 400-year period (Stockton and Jacoby,
1976). Virgin flows based on records since 1922 show an average of 14.4 million acre-feet
(Upper Colorado River Commission, 1988).
6. The Compact promises that the upper basin states will not deplete flows at Lee Ferry below
75 million acre-feet in any ten consecutive years. See Colorado River Compact, Article III(d).
7. Article III(b). The usual interpretation of this provision is that the lower basin can use
waters of the Gila River, a tributary, in addition to Lee Ferry releases. A less credible
interpretation is that further releases will be allowed at Lee Ferry. But even if this argument is
accepted, releases presumably would be contingent on the availability of surplus water, a
condition that exists when reservoir storage is high after full satisfaction of upper basin demands
up to 7.5 million acre-feet. To forego storage for the sake of "surplus" releases any time
reservoir levels are low or declining would be inconsistent with compact provisions assuring
protection for future basic deliveries to the lower basin states that may depend on storage.
8. The provision assured existing users that they would not be limited by the allocation scheme.
Lower basin users of present perfected rights, however, were relegated to the water available in
the reservoirs. This gives holders of upper basin "present perfected rights" an important priority
in times of shortages (See Article VIII).
9. There is disagreement on a number of points under the Compact, including how much of
the evaporation and transportation losses (about 2 million acre-feet a year) should be borne by
each basin. As a result, these figures would not be readily conceded by all parties to the
Compact (Getches, 1985).
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10. The percentage shares are: Colorado, 51.75%; Utah, 23%; Wyoming, 14%; New Mexico,
11.25%; Arizona (which has a small area draining into the river above Lee Ferry), 50,000 acre-
feet (Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 1949).
11. Arizona was using about 4.8 million acre-feet of groundwater a year. Annual aquifer
recharge of 2.6 million acre-feet, including artificial recharge from return flows and 300,000
acre-feet of natural recharge from precipitation, resulted in a yearly overdraft of 2.2 million
acre-feet.
12. The city and county of San Diego have assigned their rights to MWD.
13. In the 1983 decision, the Court rejected the tribes' arguments that they had been
inadequately represented by the United States and that the government had erroneously failed
to claim irrigable acreage on the tribes* behalf. This ruling denied the tribes' claim to about
317,000 additional acre-feet which a Special Master had recommended be awarded to them.
The Court cited a "strong interest in finality" in determinations of western water rights and
rejected the expanded Indian claims. Presumably this judicial policy will guide the courts if the
five Colorado River tribes seek additional water in the future and if other tribes seek to reopen
determinations on their reserved water rights in other situations. See, ej*., Nevada v. United
States, 1983. Thus, to the extent that Indian water rights have been quantified, the maximum
demands these tribes will be able to make on the Colorado River are fixed.
14. For instance, one extreme estimate of the claims of the largest reservation in the
watershed, the Navajo Reservation, which is located mostly in Arizona, is 15 million acre-feet,
considerably more than Arizona's total share of 2.8 million acre-feet. WSWC/WGA, p. 26,
1984. Other estimates for Navajo are more realistic, but all are large. See Back and Taylor, p.
74, 1980 (court might award 2 million acre-feet based on practicably irrigable acreage formula);
Getches, p. 439, 1985 (formula would probably yield more limited quantities than Back and
Taylor estimate, though still large amounts).
15. Since 1896 there have been 23 years when the virgin flow was inadequate to meet the
aggregate demand of: 1) the average annual lower basin entitlement (7.5 MAF); 2) the Mexican
Treaty obligation from the upper basin (.75 MAF); and 3) present upper basin demand (3.5
MAF), which total 11.75 MAF. Without storage, lower basin uses also would have been
reduced in some of those years. Indeed, fluctuations in annual flow are so wide that there
have been five years in which estimated virgin flows at Lee Ferry were less than the amount
needed to supply the 8.25 million acre-feet average delivery to the lower basin (for its
entitlement plus the annual Mexican treaty obligation), which theoretically would have left no
water for consumptive uses by the upper basin in those years. (Upper Colorado River
Commission, pp. 22-23, 1988).
16. Lower basin reservoirs account for losses of 599,000 acre-feet and upper basin reservoirs
account for 1,120,000 acre-feet a year (U.S. Department of the Interior, 1976-1980 at 34).
These estimates are based on reservoir levels for a particular period and presently applicable
operating criteria. Reservoirs at lower levels expose less surface area and consequently
evaporate somewhat less water; at higher levels, more water evaporates.
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17. For example, the Colorado River Storage Project Act gives the Secretary power to
determine the acreage for which individual landowners can receive water from certain projects.
Likewise, under the Boulder Canyon Project Act, the Secretary can contract for storage and
delivery of water from Lake Mead under regulations that he prescribes. He can also use his
discretion in regulating use of the Hoover Dam power generating facilities. See also Boulder
Canyon Project Adjustment Act and Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act.
18. The criteria interpret and apply the requirements of the Colorado River Basin Project Act.
The criteria also refer to "all applicable laws and other relevant factors/ Although this
presumably incorporates the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Secretary has
never prepared an Environmental Impact Statement pursuant to that Act This is largely
because the criteria (though not all the annual operating plans) were adopted before Congress
passed NEPA in 1969. The requirement would surely apply to new criteria. In 1989, the
Secretary decided that he would prepare an impact statement analyzing the environmental
impacts of current operating criteria of the Glen Canyon Dam of the Colorado River Storage
Project and possible changes in these criteria (U.S. Dep't of Interior, 1989).
19. Many Owens Valley farmers claimed that the City of Los Angeles paid less than fair
market value for their lands. While the City has always denied such assertions, there is no
question that Los Angeles often bought parcels in a checkerboard pattern, leaving some hold
out farmers with less valuable acreage surrounded by de-watered plots.
20. Inyo County, where Owens Valley lies, sued the City claiming that its pumping violated the
California Environmental Quality Act by threatening plants and wildlife and that it constituted a
wasteful use of water. The litigation has raged for years. (County of Inyo v. City of Los
Angeles, 1973, 1976, 1977, 1981, 1984).
21. The court held that a downstream riparian could command the entire flow of a stream to
flood-irrigate riparian pastureland, thus preventing the development of an upstream
appropriator's power project (Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Co., 1926).
22. Like riparian rights, rights gained by appropriation prior to passage of the Act and
continuously exercised are not subject to permitting requirements and are limited by the
reasonable and beneficial use standard. All rights are presumably subject to the public trust
doctrine.
23. The City of Los Angeles largely avoided the superior groundwater claims of landowners in
the Owens Valley by purchasing their overlying lands, thus acquiring their extractive rights.
24. The United States Supreme Court upheld the Act's constitutionality in 1896 (Fallbrook irr.
Dist. v. Bradley, 1896), and a year later it was modified by the Wright-Bridgeford Act (Wright
Act; Wright-Bridgeford Act; Benson, pp. 383-90, 1982).
25. Throughout this report the Salt River-Gila River system is treated as separate from the
Colorado River. The Gila River is actually within the watershed of the Colorado River.
Arizona has steadfastly maintained that rights to use the waters of this tributary system were
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not apportioned by the Colorado River Compact. The question has not been definitely decided
by Arizona has always enjoyed the exclusive use of the Gila system. Further, the Colorado
River Basin Project Act, and accordingly the Supreme Court in its interpretation of the Act in
Arizona v. California (1963), did not include the Gila as part of the Colorado River for
purposes of apportioning the river among lower basin states. The Court left open the question
of whether the Gila was included in the compact apportionment but suggested that it logically
could be included in the Compact and excluded from the Basin Project Act.
26. The Indian uses provided for by the CAP do not include the substantial amounts of water
to which the Colorado River mainstem tribes are entitled. Usage of these rights now amounts
to about 340,000 acre-feet which is to come from Arizona's apportionment. The state will
presumably have to confront the question of how to allocate equivalent reductions as between
CAP deliveries and deliveries to farmers in the western counties along the mainstem.
27. In addition, when one upper basin state has used in excess of its proportionate share in
prior years, and a lower basin call is made, the overdrafting state must deliver to Lee Ferry an
amount of water equal to its excess use before any other upper basin states are required to
supply water to a lower basin call (Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, Article IV, 1949).
28. All evaporative losses are chargeable to the consumptive uses of the respective basin states
in proportion to the quantities stored in each basin and therefore are included int he figures for
the respective basins. Of course this reduces the amounts of water available for actual
beneficial uses. It is also assumed that all Indian reserved rights can be satisfied from the
deliveries attributable to the states in which their reservations are located. Finally, we assume
that reservoir releases will not be influenced by power generating operations.
29. Present reservoir operating criteria call for releases from Glen Canyon Dam to equalize
storage in Lake Powell and Lake Mead. It is assumed that the 15.6 million acre-feet in each
basin is in "active storage," i.e., is capable of being released.
30. A similar calculation in Kneese and Bonem's interesting study resulted in a basin surplus of
1.5 million acre-feet at the end of the hypothetical ten-year low-flow period (Kneese and
Bonem, pp. 103-106, 1986). The authors assumed 30 million acre-feet of water in storage.
They also assumed an aggregate runoff for the period of 100 million acre-feet and the recorded
low-flow period of 118 million acre-feet (1954-1963). They estimated higher upper basin uses
(3.7 million acre-feet), however, than does this report. They caution that their study is based
on very favorable assumptions and does "not reveal the tremendous conflicts that would occur
among various interests and the stresses and strains that would be put on the region's water
allocation institutions."
31. The operating criteria allow additional releases from Lake Mead for consumptive uses but
the Secretary is to take into account several factors, including the upper basin's ability to meet
compact obligation, actual forecasted storage and inflows to Mead and the upper basin
reservoirs. These considerations would militate against additional releases in most years,
especially in a progressive drought. See discussion of the operating criteria in Chapter 2.
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32. Under the Mexican Treaty deliveries to Mexico can actually be reduced in proportion to
reductions in consumptive uses in the U.S. if "an extraordinary drought or serious accident*1
makes it "difficult" for the full amount to be delivered.
33. "Present perfected rights" are not to be disturbed by the Compact allocation. See Article
Vm. The Boulder Canyon Project Act also requires that the Secretary accommodate them in
contracting for water from the river.
It is not clear exactly how much water is needed to satisfy "present perfected rights."
The Supreme Court created an ambiguity when it is said in Arizona v. California (1963) that
the term referred to rights perfected as of the effective date of the Act (1928) but the Act and
Compact seem to refer to rights predating the Compact itself (1922). It appears that under
either interpretation present perfected rights (exclusive of Indian reserved rights which probably
should be included) amount to about 2 million acre-feet for the upper basin, 3 million acre-feet
for California and something over 300,000 acre-feet for Arizona.
34. Assuming the treaty obligation has not been reduced which it can be in a serious drought.
See note 32.
35. The Special Master in Arizona v. California, 1963, recommended that shortages be
prorated according to the Act's apportionments (California, 4.4/7.5; Arizona, 2.8/7.5; Nevada,
.3/7.5) but the Supreme Court held that the Secretary had discretion to effect any method of
sharing the burden of shortages that serves project purposes (irrigation, flood control,
navigation, regulation of flow, and generation and distribution of power) and which respects
present perfected rights, Arizona v. California. 1963.
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